


MY USA



**Views on American
National Security
and Foreign Policy**

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STUDIES

Editor Mireille Radoi

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FOREWORD

RICHARD FEINBERG
RAYMOND CLARK

The breadth of issues and concerns that a sovereign nation addresses as part of its national security strategy speak volumes about both the domestic and foreign policy forces at play. The United States is not unique in adopting an expansive view of what constitutes national security, explicitly including not only military concerns, but also political, economic, scientific and technological developments that pose actual or potential threats to U.S. national interests. To undertake a course of study of a nations' national security policies and procedures can serve as a valuable mechanism for gaining insight into the politics and culture of that society. Such a course of study can also provide practical insights into the do's and don'ts of designing comprehensive national security policies and effective decision-making procedures and systems for developing countries.

In late 2005, the seven authors of this book, along with eleven others, were selected by the U.S. Department of State to participate in a program to study U.S. national security. The Study of the U.S. Institute on U.S. National Security is a long-standing exchange program sponsored by the State Department's Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, and the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) was honored by being selected to host both the program and a remarkable group of foreign policy scholars and practitioners. The Fellows spent six weeks on the campus of the University of California, San Diego, interacting with senior U.S. experts on a wide variety of topics, including global matters such as nuclear non-prolife-

ration and international terrorism, regional security issues in East Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, and domestic political, economic and social issues of immediate concern in the United States. In addition, the Fellows were privileged to spend a week in Washington, DC, where they visited with officials in the various agencies of the executive branch, the U.S. Congress and experts in public policy institutes. The program provided the Fellows with an opportunity to study and understand the U.S. national security policy apparatus in detail, and to gain a deeper appreciation for the depth and breadth of U.S. national security concerns. But the program aimed to do more than this: the overarching goal was to provide a mechanism for foreign scholars to understand the domestic forces and national ideas and values that shape and drive U.S. national security policy. As Radoi and Rofe point out in their introduction, this is not an easy proposition: it is inherently challenging for a foreign national to step outside of their national boundaries and fully comprehend what underlies the national security concerns of another nation.

The individual and collective experiences of the program Fellows resulted in a desire to express more than just appreciation for the knowledge gained and experiences enjoyed. In undertaking to prepare this volume, the Fellows set out, in effect, to turn the programs' overarching goal on its head: to share with readers how informed foreigners, who have had the special experience of studying in the United States and observing the decision making process first-hand in Washington, D.C., perceive U.S. national security policies and practices. The outcome of this creative exercise is this remarkable volume of essays.

In each chapter of this handsome volume, the seven stimulating contributions express the personal opinions of each author, while inevitably also reflecting currents of informed opinion from their country and region, as no scholar is fully free from their own social context and

national debates. Their fascination, therefore, derives from this combination of personal insights and of perspectives that reflect wider currents from around the world with regard to current US diplomacy — opinions which at this moment are deeply divided on critical issues of international relations. This volume proudly offers a widely diverse range of views — from Western and Eastern Europe, North and South America, and South Asia — on contemporary US foreign policy and its impact on individual nations and regions and on world affairs.

The chapters by Mireille Radoi and Vera Rihackova, on the foreign policies of Central and Eastern Europe, more specifically Romania and the Czech Republic, are expressive of the very positive history between their countries and the United States during the 1990s, when the US was broadly seen as playing an important, constructive role in their nations' successful transformations toward independent, democratic republics and market-oriented, dynamic economies. Rihackova emphasizes the close emotional ties of many of the region's political leaders and intellectuals with the United States during that decade, while Radoi describes the rich and deep bilateral relationship with the United States which not only assisted in the transition but also helped to prepare the nation for NATO membership and for accession to the European Union. More recently, the international relations of Central and Eastern Europe may be taking on less emotive and more balanced, pragmatic tones, but relations with the United States remain healthy. Radoi urges Europe to eschew efforts to develop the EU into a counterweight to the US, for such a policy could divide and weaken Europe. Rihackova foresees possibilities for improved cooperation between the "old" and "new" Europe, and perhaps even stronger trans-Atlantic partnerships in the future.

The contribution by Dragan Zivojinovic, from Serbia, is eloquent in its evaluation of the evolutions and contributions of the U.S. National Security Council. The NSC

is that organ of government, at the service of the President, whose function is to formulate consensus policies among the various agencies in the executive branch, taking into account the views of the Congress as well as the broader body politic. At times, the NSC also provides leadership and proposes creative initiatives for the President. Zivojinovic is effusive in his praise for the positive role that the NSC has played in the formations of US foreign policy: "Being one of the most successful personifications of the idea that knowledge and wisdom can rule the world."

In contrast, the essays by Erica Almeida Resende of Brazil and John Simon Rofe of the United Kingdom take on a much more critical tone. Resende argues with vigor that policies of the Bush administration that seek US hegemony and the right of pre-emptive strike violate previous US policies of international law, multilateralism and consensual rule-making, and, rare for an established great power, depart from the conservative status quo to attempt to transform the world system and the internal politics of its member states. "The United States expects world powers to accept their own irrelevance and to know tow to them," she decries. Resende doubts that such US policies will succeed, rather the US "is shooting itself in the foot." Rofe notes that the US declares that "it is at war," but finds this expression only in select portions of the executive bureaucracy, such that the expression is misplaced against in an historical context. He warns that any efforts, or even the appearance of such efforts, will backfire and will make the US less secure. Resende quotes the Brazilian foreign minister in support of her views. While Rofe's views do not reflect the views of the current British government, he does express views that are widely held in the UK and throughout Western Europe.

In this volume, policies of two leading middle powers are described by Mario Arroyo Juarez of Mexico and Swati Parashar of India. The authors are neither pro-

nor anti-current American foreign policy. They share many of the same concerns as US policymakers, and welcome an active US policy toward their country and region. But they are concerned that the level of attention, certain particular US attitudes, and perhaps strategic misperceptions are hindering the proper development of bilateral and regional ties. For Arroyo, the US correctly perceives the seriousness of the terrorist threat — more so than does Mexico — but the US still needs to adopt a more comprehensive approach to build on the NAFTA relationship and to better integrate its southern neighbor into its national security strategy. Arroyo warns against using Mexico as a scapegoat for various national ills, as the US has done too often in the past, rather the US should help Mexico modernize its security institutions. Similarly, Parashar welcomes a US presence in South Asia, and particularly its soft power potential which can be beneficial to sustaining a benevolent primacy. In this regard, the US should expand governmental and private-sector ties with South Asia. However, the US should avoid playing geo-political games that try to play one South Asian state off against another, seeking instead a “broad, balanced, and integrated strategy toward South Asia that is sustainable over a long term.” At the same time, states in the region should stop viewing their ties with the US as leverage against their regional rivals.

Throughout the volume, authors’ views reflect their years of scholarship and experience, as well as their participation in the National Security Fellows Program and their studies at UCSD and their interviews and meetings in Washington, DC. A common finding and concern is that Washington’s focus on the Middle East is distracting attention from other regions, not only from Latin America where regional specialists have long expressed frustration at the sporadic and short attention span of US policy makers, but also from Europe, a region that expects steady attention from senior US policy-

makers. Some authors came away from the program with a much deeper appreciation for the complexity of the US decision-making process, for the large number of institutions and players involved and the many issues under consideration at any one moment in history. Thus, when the President proclaims that the country "is at war," even if that is his sincere view, many segments of the bureaucracy may be carrying on in ways not fully congruent with that worldview.

Taken together, these seven essays present the reader with a fascinating series of "takes," from talented and serious observers, on current US foreign policy, in its global expression and regional implementation. What emerges is not one, single interpretation, but rather a healthy diversity of assessments of US diplomacy, ranging from generally positive, on balance constructive if in need of some adjustment, to negative and even potentially dangerously destructive to international relations. For some contributors, the United States is a constructive, essential force for world peace and prosperity, for others the United States is destabilizing and US policy is badly in need of revision. This is a very wholesome debate at a critical time — precisely the type of open, democratic discourse, informed by knowledge of history and an awareness of present policies, which the National Security Fellows' program aspires to foster.

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INTRODUCTION

IS THERE ANOTHER USA, MY USA?

MIREILLE RADOI
JOHN SIMON ROFE

"There is perhaps no more compelling task for Americans to accomplish in the twenty-first century than to learn to see the world through someone else's eyes".

Richard T. Hughes, 2003

Putting yourself in the position of another in order to learn about yourself is a challenge. Such introspection on a national level is inherently difficult. On an international level very rare. Yet it was with the aim of learning about the United States and its position in the world that eighteen individuals from around the world came together in the early part of 2006 in the sunshine of San Diego, CA. The contributors to this volume all participated in the program entitled *US National Security Decision Making in a Post-9/11 World* under the aegis of the US State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and run by the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation in San Diego. It was during that brief moment of time that our opinions coalesced and it became self-evident that it was not solely our purpose to absorb our intellectual surroundings but to contribute to them as well. It was in such a reflexive fashion that we sought to consider the nature of the United States' position in contemporary international relations and, crucially, the perception of it in our individual countries.

Before proceeding any further, and in that reflexive mode, it is appropriate to acknowledge that it takes a special sensibility — *exceptional* if you like — for a nation

to invite individuals from around the world to examine its National Security. That the United States government has such programs says a great deal about it as capable of the introspection that Richard Hughes hints at. Yet this is not a new character to the United States, though the need for it may be pressing. Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* posits that there is something about the United States that allows for this type of reflection. His observation of the "equality of condition among the people" is a facilitator: "[it] creates opinions, [and] gives birth to new sentiments".¹ In this light the assessments of US National Security in this volume illustrate differing "opinion" and "sentiment".

In near history, at the turn of the 21st century the role of the United States in the world was not clear. In the intervening period their role has become no clearer. It had, according to some², emerged triumphant from an ideological conflict a decade earlier. This led the esteemed realist, Henry Kissinger, to pose the question in a 2001 book, "does the United States need a foreign policy", so secure was the United States in the world around it. That the position of the United States is not clear in 2007 reflects the challenges posted to the role of the United States in the world. Be they from the forces of globalisation, the threat of "rogue states"; the resurgence of Cold War enemies in the form of Russia and China; Weapons of Mass Destruction in the hands of international terrorists; or a catastrophic natural disaster or pandemic, United States National Security is threatened — and crucially perceived to be threatened by those within and without its borders. President George W. Bush's opening to the 2006 National Security Strategy, begins with four words: "America is at War".³ These stark words: a statement that the United States as a "Nation at War" has, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, conflated a raft of threats. The "Global War on Terror" is another proclamation which has sought to bring clarity

to the multifaceted dangers facing the United States. But these assessments and the clarity they seek fail to acknowledge the perpetual motion of the situation, instead we contend that these phrases cannot provide a sufficiently sophisticated framework for the analysis of American foreign policy. Indeed, in articulating National Security Strategy in such terminology, the United States has raised anxiety across the world and increased the perils it faces. Paradoxically, in the early part of the 21st century the United States' global reach, in terms beyond simply its military capability, means it has a ubiquitous influence when it comes to discussing security. That is why, we, the contributors to this volume, as academics and experts assess the significance of the United States in terms of our own and our countries' experiences.

In establishing the parameters to a book dealing with such a broad concept as US National Security we focus upon the central role of the United States in global security. This book canvasses the distance between the intentions of US foreign and security policy and the outcomes they determine elsewhere in the world. Therefore, the challenge to the writers of this volume drawn from Brazil, the Czech Republic, India, Mexico, Romania, Serbia and United Kingdom, was to provide a lens through which we could present our views on the United States, its influence around the world and our experiences of it. In other words, what does US foreign and security policy look like to those outside its borders?

The views contained in this volume reflect the different views and experiences of the Fellows. It does not seek to be prescriptive as to a course of action for the United States but to contribute to the discourse on the United States' place in the world. Through the course of the chapters a variety of questions are asked. Underlying each author's approach is the position of the United States in relation to the key ontological questions:

“Who is being secured? Who is doing the securing? What is to be secure?”⁴

At the end of the day, this volume reflects the variety of opinions and views that the contributors came to out of a common goal. That such a breadth of opinion should emerge should be of little surprise and therefore these essays cannot be considered to have any prescriptive value, merely critical analysis provided herein; non-American eyes observations of the United States in the global system.

Notes

¹ Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 1935.

² Francis Fukuyama, *The Last Man and the End of History*, Free Press, 1992.

³ George W. Bush's Preface to *National Security Strategy*, March 2006.

⁴ Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security*, Routledge, UK, 2004, p. 6.

US'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS MEXICO AFTER 9-11: AN IMMEDIATE SCAPEGOAT OR A LASTING ALLY?

MARIO ARROYO JUAREZ

ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this chapter is to show how historically, while the US has been fighting to reach its national security goals, Mexico has played a key role, but not so much as a partner than as a target, particularly in relation to national and regional security as well as law and order issues. Hence, the US needs to decide whether to use Mexico as a scapegoat; a "regional hostage" to their global war on terror, or by adopting a more comprehensive, inclusive approach, bring Mexico into its own national strategy as a lasting ally, offering more incentives as a NAFTA partner. On the other hand, the essay argue that if Mexico desires better treatment from the US and wants to be considered as a real and lasting ally, and not as a scapegoat, it needs to elaborate a deep and realistic analysis of vulnerabilities and to create a national security system that could face the terrorism menace. Finally, the essay suggests that Mexico is vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and to counter them, it needs to quickly and efficiently reform its public security system, but also to reduce social inequity and poverty. The development of an effective national security policy would assist in both.

1. Introduction

In Mexico there is a popular saying attributed to former Mexican President, Porfirio Díaz¹: "Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United States". This fatalistic view of how Mexico perceives itself in relation



to the United States began when the two nations ended their long running conflict by signing, on February 2, 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.² While the 19th century was a time for American territorial expansion, the 20th century could be seen as a time of survival for the US as well as the rest of the world. However, with the beginning of the 21st century came a new task for the United States, to keep their homeland³ safe and secure against a new evil that President George W. Bush described as: "The enemy is not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly it is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents...The struggle against international terrorism is different from any other war in our history. We will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might. We must fight terrorist networks, and all those who support their efforts to spread fear around the world, using every instrument of national power— diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military... There will be no quick or easy end to this conflict. At the same time, the United States, will not allow itself to be held hostage by terrorists. Combating terrorism and securing the U.S. homeland from future attacks are our top priorities."⁴

Throughout history while the US has been fighting to reach its national security goals while pursuing their own economic interests, Mexico has played a key role, but not so much as a partner than as a target, particularly in relation to national and regional security as well as law and order issues.⁵ After the 9-11 attacks, it seems that this pattern of behavior is to repeat itself; as Bush declares the United States' new aims and challenges in the war against terrorism, Mexico, as its southern neighbor, is seen to serve, once again, as a scapegoat to anchor this new crusade. Therefore, it

becomes very important that Mexico recognizes this contemporary understanding of history that drives the United States in their endless and permanent war on terrorism. From a US perspective, the American people are at war, indeed, they will unfold this "war on terrorism" like many before, by viewing this conflict as not only a military contest but as a "political and moral crusade". This understanding helps link their domestic and foreign policies with their wide range of global interests. In other words, the United States "war on terror" also helps to confirm and reinforce their regional and international superpower status.

The question for Mexico is whether the U.S.'s "exclusive" approach to global terrorism is appropriate when handling regional issues such as illegal drug trafficking. Surely, the two nations need to find ways of cooperation since these complex issues differ from nation-state to nation-state. Hence, the US needs to decide whether to use Mexico as a scapegoat; a "regional hostage" to their global war on terror, or by adopting a more comprehensive, inclusive approach, bring Mexico into its own national strategy as a lasting ally, offering more incentives as a NAFTA⁶ partner. For Mexico this relationship is a challenging one since it has been mainly focusing recently on immigration and trade issues, neglecting the security reform that the country urgently needed decades ago. This issue is further complicated two legitimate security demands: its own citizen's domestic public safety; northern neighbor border security that involves on going and seemingly intractable migration issue. Both of these demands are related to deep national social causes.

Consequently, since the 9-11 terrorist attacks and the primacy of terrorism, have radically altered the bilateral relationship between these two nations, Mexico and the US urgently need to explore new solutions. For as we have already implied, the historical mistrust, which has

characterized our bilateral relationship, has become a barrier that could complicate or even escalate conflicts in realms beyond terrorism.⁷ Furthermore, this lack of understanding and cooperation could undermine the effectiveness of counter-terrorism, not only around the common border area, but within Mexico itself endangering Mexican and U.S. citizens and their assets. To move into a new era of cooperative action both nations need to overcome the shortcoming that current regional strategies produce on both sides of the Rio Bravo.

2. The shortcomings in US and Mexican strategies

The weaknesses inherent in the US terrorism strategy from a Mexican perspective, is seen to divide into four areas: the US approach to this global “war on terrorism” is underpinned by a unilateral vision⁸; Washington associates terrorism and immigration in a similar political and moral way⁹; this understanding promotes a mixture of fear and xenophobia primarily against Mexican immigrants whether legal or illegal¹⁰; the provisions of The Secure Fence Act,¹¹ has the effect of isolating Mexico from its closest “natural ally”. All these issues not only affect US-Mexico diplomatic relationships, but also it restricts the free movement of thousands of American citizens who visit or live in Mexico. This raises the question as to where protection of US citizens’ starts and finishes, bearing in mind the range and “lethality” of international terrorism.

The shortcomings within Mexico’s own strategies against terrorism are numerous as some could legitimately suggest what strategy? For Mexico to fully participate with the U.S.’s “war on terrorism” they need to recognize: that the 9-11 attacks were also threat to its national security, if for no other reason than because many Mexicans were among the victims at the World Trade Center¹²; the primacy of terrorism has had a major

effect on the crucial issue facing Mexico and the Bush administration — immigration; the neglect over many years of a National Security Strategy, which has hampered Mexico's ability to survive and to enhance its national power in a globalized world; to radically alter the inadequate national criminal justice system, which has been unable to deal effectively with common crimes, organized crime, let alone any potential attack that might come from any international terrorist organization; to secure its own borders; the lack of success with public policies that were introduced to try and retain its nation's labor force and therefore, reduce social inequity and poverty.

Hence, the challenge for both countries, Mexico and the US, is to understand that geographical, economic and cultural ties need to be recognized and enhanced by finding common solutions to these related problems. Consequently, commerce needs not only to continue, but to be strengthened in a very radical way. However, if Washington continues to follow its status quo unilateral approach of US-Mexican security politics and policy,¹³ we can foresee that little will change. Reality suggests that the US has the power to do whatever they believe it needs to be done against terrorism, but what Mexico's right to national sovereignty? Therefore, the questions should surely not be centred on "*What the US is doing to secure its southern border?*" or "*Which immigration policies are fair and just?*" but on, "*Why Mexico let these events escalate to this grave situation?*" Even more importantly, *What Mexico must do to reverse this situation?*

3. Understanding "the scapegoat" argument

Even though Washington's position over terrorism can be seen is understandable, their willingness to conflate this issue with immigration seems less so. Although the September 11 terrorists were free to plot and to attack

because US airports border controls were not secure, this does not mean that international immigration has a direct and undeniable link with terrorism.¹⁴ One possible explanation when trying to understand why the US would equate terrorism with immigration may be found within the “tradition” of the American political system to find scapegoats. When the US finds itself in the middle of a crisis their tendency is to focus on a particular target, they then follow their own well-understood “recipe” — *How to cook a well done national security threat*.

Firstly, a scapegoat needs to be visible (media could help); secondly, the target should lack the power to react, thirdly, the target must embody adverse sentiments; and finally, the target needs to be “culturally different”, preferably someone who speaks another language.¹⁵ Once these ingredients have been found, the “cooker” can produce the “correct amount of evil”. With in this context — “A Clash of Civilizations”, Islamic terrorist organizations met these criteria. The problem with approach is that in this case the target is diffuse “non state actors”, so how do you locate them? Moreover, selecting this kind of enemy not only implies huge financial costs for the American taxpayer, but also human lives as US troops are killed in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹⁶ With Washington taking on such an extended external enemy not only is it not profitable in terms of political gains, but it drives the increasing need to chose a convenient scapegoat, which is more visible,¹⁷ weak, and culturally different.¹⁸ As its southern neighbor, Mexico conveniently fits this “political recipe” — ready to be cooked as a well done scapegoat.

Support for this approach is far-ranging from respected scholars¹⁹ to politicians, such as Democrat Senator Robert Byrd, who observed during a Senate session: “Mr. President, I support cloture on H.R. 6061, the Secure Fence Act. The sooner the Congress passes

this bill, the sooner the Congress can put aside the misguided amnesty legislation passed by the Senate earlier this year. The American people have listened and rejected the call to offer U.S. citizenship to illegal aliens. They have said NO to amnesty! Hallelujah!...In the years immediately after the September 11 attacks, those funds (to secure the southern border) had not only been left out of the President's annual budgets but had been continuously blocked by the White House in the appropriations process.... So much more is required and needs to be done...the protective barrier called for in this bill will amount to nothing more than a line drawn in the sands of our porous Southern border."²⁰

Although there are some voices who warn the US government against this approach²¹, it is difficult in the short term, to stop this tendency. Therefore, in order to understand the logic behind the US "war on terrorism" and the role that Mexico could play, we will now consider some of the history that surrounds this subject so that we may draw some lessons in preparation for when Mexico and the US face subsequent security challenges.

4. "Stirring up enemies" against the US on their very doorstep

This heading paraphrases the words of President Woodrow Wilson when he made the Declaration of War against Germany: "That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence". He was referring to the now called "Zimmermann Telegram". In January 1917, British intelligence decoded a telegram, written by German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann, directed to the German Embassy in Mexico City, the original was written in an encrypted language, the decoded message stated:

“We intend to begin on the first of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and understanding on our part that Mexico is to re-conquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona...”²²

When Great Britain shared the information with the US government, President Wilson delivered on April 2, 1917, an address to a joint session of Congress and called for a declaration of war against Germany. The resulting congressional vote brought the United States into World War One. If we look even further back, we can see even more evidence as to how the US used its power and influence to shape Mexican domestic governance. After the War between Mexico and the US, the following decades of 19th century, were focused on internal civil strife for both countries — the Civil War in the US, and the Reforma War in Mexico. During these conflicts Mexico never envisaged direct US intervention. The Monroe Doctrine²³ had already been invoked when the U.S. government exerted diplomatic and military pressure in support of the Mexican President Benito Juarez. This support enabled, in part, Juarez to lead a successful revolt against the Emperor Maximilian of Hapsburg, who had been placed on the throne by France during the 1860's. The early 20th century, found Mexico being ruled by dictatorship, headed by General Porfirio Díaz with the constant support of the US government. This period known as “The Porfirian Pax”, was characterized by a mixture of development in some urban and rural settlements, but also by social deprivation in Mexico. US foreign policy towards Mexico, having been framed by the Monroe Doctrine, was cautious enough to help keep business relations remain stable. This enhanced and extended understanding of the Monroe

Doctrine was ratified by President Roosevelt's speech to Congress:

"All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."²⁴

The occasion when this police power was exercised was regarding Mexico's wrongdoing in 1914 when U.S. troops invaded Mexico, again occupying Veracruz Port for a six month period. In 1911, Mexicans overthrew Porfirio Diaz dictatorship and brought Francisco I. Madero to power. Two years later, a General, Victoriano Huerta, deposed and murdered Madero. The Constitutionalists, led in part by liberal reformer Venustiano Carranza, undertook an armed revolt against Huerta's rule. When President Woodrow Wilson took office in 1913, he refused to recognize Huerta's counter-revolutionary government. Wilson's action of sending an occupational military force aroused deep hatred and resentment within Mexico. Carranza's concern over this US invasion led him to seek support of Latin America governments.²⁵ Coincidentally, after and during the Zimmermann affair, Mexicans signed a new Constitution on February the 5th, 1917, making Carranza the legitimate President of Mexico.

5. Lessons from History

Throughout history, though not explicitly, Mexico recognizes that its political affairs are very often a political concern of the US, especially when Mexican domestic affairs seem to threaten US national security. So, a lesson that Mexico needs to learn from history is that in its relationship with the US, there are no neighbors, nor partners, neither friends, there are just national self interests. We could provide more examples from history, but this is not the primary aim of this chapter, but how Mexicans could learn some lessons from the US that would help them to draw a strategy to face future U.S. pressure. We are considering the making of a *tour de force* in this bilateral relationship, in military terms, which seems unrealistic, because as far as we know, Mexican regular forces, either military or police forces rarely have crossed into the US territory. The exception being the border anarchy generated by the Mexican Revolution: the raid on Columbus, New Mexico by Pancho Villa and his forces, who "probably smoked marijuana to steel themselves"²⁶. Even though the above assertion was contested by Ted Poe, U.S. Representative for Texas who noted: "Ninety years after his example, Pancho Villa would be proud knowing that armed banditos from Mexico continue to invade the United States border to harass U.S. citizens, and the U.S. Government won't do what is necessary to stop this invasion".²⁷

However, one positive example of this new kind of cooperation took place in July, 2005 when the Mexican Army entered United States territory when providing humanitarian assistance to help deal with the Katrina hurricane. So, taking into account the differences between Mexico and the US in military power and capabilities, a situation where Mexico could impose conditions on their relationship is practically impossible. If we take the above statement for granted, the question is, *What kind of*

relationship we should expect regarding cooperation on fighting terrorism?

6. The current situation: Mexico's role in the US strategy against terrorism

U.S. policies against terrorism involve Mexico in different ways. One first major change was the creation of the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), established in October, 2002 to provide Department of Defense (DoD) command and control to homeland in defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. Within the assigned area of responsibility air, land and sea approaches encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. The commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for this theater of security cooperation with Canada and Mexico. A second major change has been the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP). This initiative was launched in March, 2005 as a trilateral effort to increase security and enhance prosperity among the United States, Canada, and Mexico through greater cooperation and information sharing. The third change was The Secure Fence Act (2006), signed by President George Bush in October 2006.

The first key element in those fundamental changes, USNORTHCOM, mirrors the US traditional unilateral Defense Policy. In this case, Mexico is just simply an observer, not a partner. This approach is because Mexico's laws restricts their Army from engaging in joint military operations, but also because there exists a historical reluctance by the Mexican military to become involved with the US. This view is often supported by politicians in Mexico who embody a nationalistic

discourse. The second element, the SPP, also mirror the traditional foreign policy of the US; to cure any collateral damage provoked by defense policies in a softer, diplomatic way. SPP seeks to join civilian authorities of the NAFTA to demonstrate to their citizens that some sort of concerted action is being taken over their security and prosperity. Unfortunately, agreements within the SPP are not enforceable by law, but rely on the goodwill among the three parties involved to accomplish the established goals.²⁸ The third major change, The Secure Fence Act of 2006, shows the "real politics" within the political domestic arena. Here the constituencies and the logic of domestic demands drive both politics and policy. Hence, as in many other historical circumstances, immigration became the cornerstone of the domestic, foreign and defense politics and policies.²⁹

Although the SPP, seems to be an important attempt to foster cooperation, the other two initiatives, makes this observation appear a naïve attempt to gain time. The challenge is to elevate this level of cooperation not only with federal bureaucracies, but also at a local level. Mexico covers a 761,600 sq area, its estimate a 105 million population in Mexico growing at a 1.2 annual rate, and approximately 12 million living in the US. Both countries will continue share a 2,000 mile fenced border, while Mexico remains the second most popular place for US citizens to live outside of their homeland. How to deal with this conditions regarding security issues after 9-11? It seems that one of the first reactions from the US was to dig into its own national soul, as fear grew. Protect the homeland was their response, but the real question to Americans was: Do you want to live behind fences? Was not the idea of your "Manifest Destiny" to live in a free world? Is it not better to learn different languages and to travel freely around the world? It is not beneficial to have Mexico as an ally instead of seeing this nation as a national security threat? Does the answer

to all these questions just belong to them? Let us analyze our duties, let us make a brief survey of what are Mexico's own vulnerabilities and tasks to fulfill in order to face the terrorist menace.

The terrorism threat is a real danger to Mexico. The 9-11 terrorist attacks brought radical changes in the way of thinking about global and national security, changing radically the structure of the US government and affecting the daily lives of millions of people. Many nations reacted by changing their governmental structures, enacting new laws, new agencies and making great financial resources to fight terror. Mexico however, has not read adequately these signs of global change. Except for the rhetoric of its discourse, the Mexican state maintains the status quo when facing the terrorist threat to Mexican soil. Hence, we identify some of the characteristics that make Mexico vulnerable to terrorist attacks and analyze the shortcomings that impede Mexico in facing international terrorism.

Mexico's vulnerability against terrorism is based on two structural flaws. Firstly, it is due to the geopolitical proximity to the US and the economical dependency to this nation. Secondly, because Mexico possesses an extraordinary weak national security system unprepared to respond to international terrorists attacks. Regarding the first flaw, the international trends of terrorism show that of the attacks against US targets in 2003, 59% occurred in Latin America, 85% were with explosives and directed at American business, followed by diplomatic buildings, governmental offices and finally, military targets. As the groups identified by the Department of State — Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) — are preferring business as their targets, it is likely that, due to the enormous quantity of US business interests in Mexico, that the country will be attacked. This probability is even greater when considering that many of these FTO's are "present" in Mexico, either in the form of

refugees or as a part of political negotiations, namely: Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Colombian National Liberation Army (NLA-Colombia)), The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Shining Path (SP-Peru), the United Autodefense of Colombia (AUC). Even though, there is not yet any public evidence that FTOs are operating in Mexico, in Latin America some sources suggests the existence of various Al-Qaeda activities.³⁰ As everybody is well aware of how these clandestine terrorists' organizations work, with cells, which are trained in gathering intelligence, possessing tactical and operational skills, unlimited financial resources to execute stealth and lethal operations. In February, 2007, a Saudi wing of Al-Qaeda called for attacks on suppliers of oil to the United States around the world, saying targets should not be limited to the Middle East by listing Canada, Venezuela and Mexico.³¹

The real threat regarding terrorism is that Mexico does not have a coherent project of national security, which brings together the relevant areas: defense, law enforcement and the criminal justice system. Mexico has faced up to these global problems, such as terrorism, in a diplomatic way, through participation in international and multilateral forums (United Nations, Organization of American States). Always prompt in signing whatever treaty is in front,³² the problem comes with the implementation of these agreements. Policy and planning generally are two separated realms, rarely are policy options accompanied by monetary resources, the same case applies with the enactment of laws and its enforcement. At present, Mexico has a very poor performance in solving common crimes (robberies, burglaries, etc.): just 4 in 100 of reported crimes are cleared. With this bad record in tracing unskilled and non professional criminals, we could not expect a better performance chasing professional criminals, including terrorists. So, if Mexico desires better treatment from the US and be

seen as real and lasting ally, and not as a scapegoat, it needs to quickly and efficiently reform its national security system. This involves the gathering of intelligence, analysis, planning, programming, training, operating and evaluating policies. Obvious steps for many observers, but not for many Mexican policymakers.

7. Conclusions

One could expect that the U.S. will impose on Mexico its own agenda, principles, methods and conditions to "cooperate" in the war against terrorism. Mexico will be obliged to "cooperate", not only for its own benefit but also as a result of the U.S. pressure. This reaction to U.S. pressure could endanger Mexico's own status and the future of the country by only sharing the risks and vulnerabilities with the U.S. Mexico seem to lack the necessary resources to make a bold strategy that eventually could deter and reduce risks of being attacked by an international terrorist organization instead. Hence, before engaging in any kind of a major effort to fight terrorism, Mexico needs to realize a deep and realistic analysis of vulnerabilities and to create a national security system that could face this terrorism menace.

The purpose of this chapter has been to clarify and support the idea that, melding immigration with terrorism could bring unintended consequences, by igniting a new "Clash of cultures" between the U.S. and Mexico. In this scenario, the two nations have equal responsibility: each of them needs to solve its own anti-terrorist strategies' shortcomings, in order to build a trusting relationship, based on mutual understanding, cooperation and cultural tolerance. The US needs to understand that immediate electoral gains³³ that could be obtained by waving the anti-immigration flag will not last forever. If this tendency continues, it will just extend the weaknesses that sit in their bilateral relations. It is

not only about damaging the relationship with a trade partner (currently the third most important). Closing the border would also fix a new security perimeter that would isolate many American citizens who does not live in the homeland. Mexico needs to reduce social inequity and poverty, and also to offer public security to its citizens. The development of an effective national security policy would assist in both.

Notes

¹ General Díaz holds three times the Presidency of Mexico: (1876), (1877-1880) and (1884-1911).

² By its terms, Mexico ceded 55 percent of its territory, including parts of present-day Arizona, California, New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah, to the United States.

³ The concept of Homeland security was also discussed after the two great wars and particularly, trough the so called "The Red Scare" during McCarthyism.

⁴ President George W. Bush, Introduction to National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February, 2003, p.1.

⁵ For instance, during the 1930s, the moral justification behind the Marihuana Tax Act (1937) was surrounded by discriminatory campaigns. In that occasion the target were Mexican people, as one could learn from anti-immigration campaigns: "Marihuana, perhaps by now the most insidious of our narcotics, is a direct by-product of unrestricted Mexican immigration...Mexican peddlers have been caught distributing sample marihuana cigarettes to school children..." Quoted by Walker III, W. O. Drug Control in the Americas, Albuquerque, 1981. p. 102.

⁶ North American Free Trade Agreement.

⁷ Jorge Bustamante warns that: "The exacerbation of nationalists sentiments provoked by the events of September 11, 2001, brought a xenophobic wave which identifies any foreigner element as a potential threat to (US) national security" in *México-Estados Unidos: realidades y equívocos políticos*, *Metapolítica*, Vol. 11, January-February. 2007., p. 38-39 (Author's translation).

⁸ "So as a matter of common sense, the United States must be prepared to take action, when necessary, before threats have

fully materialized. Pre-emption is not a new concept. There has never been a moral or legal requirement that a country wait to be attacked before it can address existential threats. As George Shultz recently wrote, "If there is a rattlesnake in the yard, you don't wait for it to strike before you take action in self-defense". Condoleezza Rice, The President's National Security Strategy, *The Neocon Reader*, p.82.

⁹ According to the 9/11 Commission Report, none of the terrorists who participated in the attacks entered into the U.S. by land.

¹⁰ Sen. Robert Byrd observed during a Senate session: "Mexico is asking the U.S. to cooperate, ignore the invasion and then provide aid to stranded illegals. Mr. Speaker, this is absurd. Our Federal Government's loyalties lie with the American people, not with illegals that are colonizing America. The U.S. must stand firm against the Mexican government's unlawful, illegal invasion into our homeland. And that's just the way it is. The United States House of Representative. Jan 9, 2007, Section 12, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/>.

¹¹ This bill according to President Bush: "Authorizes the construction of hundreds of miles of additional fencing along our southern border. The bill authorizes more vehicle barriers, checkpoints and lighting to help prevent people from entering our country illegally. The bill authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to increase the use of advanced technology, like cameras and satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles to reinforce our infrastructure at the border. We're modernizing the southern border of the United States so we can assure the American people we're doing our job of securing the border. By making wise use of physical barriers and deploying 21st century technology we're helping our Border Patrol agents do their job." George Bush's address during the sign ceremony of The Secure Fence Act of 2006, October 26. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/immigration/>.

¹² There were at least 15 people identified as Mexicans according to the Association September 11, 2001 Victims. See http://www.september11victims.com/september11victims/victims_list.htm. The Tepeyac Association, which helped search for many of "The Disappeared," also investigated 68 cases, of which at least 28 were never counted on the list. The majority were Mexicans, but there were also three Colombians, two Peruvians, three Ecuadorians, four Dominicans and two Hondurans. See, Edwin

Andrés Martínez Tutek, Special to am New York. September 7, 2006 <http://www.newsday.com/news/local/newyork/>.

¹³ During the 1960's it is well known how Nixon's administration used the drug issue extensively through its political career, because the topic has usually a high media visibility. To Nixon's administration Mexico was seen as an important source of opium and marihuana, that if dislocated, would have a significant impact demonstrating Nixon's commitment in fighting drugs. In 1969 during a speech to Congress, Nixon stated that from being "essentially a local police problem" the drugs had been shifted into a "serious national threat to the personal health and safety of millions of Americans". The first international action carried on by Nixon's administration was closing the border with Mexico, through the so-called *Operation Intercept* on September 1969. The operation an US official explained later, "was not to seize narcotics but to pressure Mexico to control it at the source by eradicating the production of marijuana and opium poppies" or in other words, "the real purpose was to make the Mexican government more cooperative." See, Mario Arroyo, Drug Control Policy in Mexico: the US pressure, The London School of Economics, unpublished manuscript, London, 1997.

¹⁴ The Oklahoma bombings, and dozens of attacks against US targets each year around the world are proving this.

¹⁵ Actually, scapegoating is very deep tradition in all societies from ancient times. To learn more, see René Girard, *Le Bouc émissaire*, Paris, Editions Grasset & Fasquelle, 1982. There's an English translation with the title *The Scapegoat*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

¹⁶ The results of study which assessed the geographic knowledge of young American adults between the ages of 18 and 24, found that: "Despite near-constant news coverage of conflict in the Middle East, young Americans have a weak knowledge of the geography of this region. Six in ten (63%) cannot find Iraq or Saudi Arabia on a map of the Middle East...Nine in ten (88%) cannot find Afghanistan on a map of Asia...". National Geographic-Roper Public Affairs, 2006 Geographic Literacy Study Final Report, prepared for The National Geographic Education Foundation National Geographic Society, May 2006, p.8.

¹⁷ In January 30, 2006, at 22:00 ET, CNN aired the show Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, with the topic Mexican Border Insecurity, the abridged transcript reads 'Up next, the tunnel

beneath us, how did authorities find it? And, more important, what was sent through the tunnel? How long was it in operation for? How many drugs got through?... It is the longest tunnel U.S. authorities here, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, have ever ground underneath this border. They found more than two tons of marijuana inside the tunnel. But who knows how many drugs were brought through since the tunnel was first constructed... Since the attacks on 9/11, agents have uncovered 20 other tunnels, 20 that we know of, but, nothing, they say — nothing — like this one.' [Ihttp://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/060130/acd.01.html](http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/060130/acd.01.html)

¹⁸ In the infamous private recordings of Governor of California (April 3, 2006), Arnold Schwarzenegger, published by Los Angeles Times, he said Californians get annoyed when they see so many signs in Spanish and when immigrants treat California like guests who refuse to chip in. "In Lynwood. I mean, it's spectacular, when you see that shopping mall. Literally I felt I was in Mexico City, because I was in Mexico City for months and months and months doing my movies there. And it felt like I was down there. Everyone only spoke Spanish, every shop was in Spanish, every sign was in Spanish. They create a Mexico within California." To see the full version and a more in context reading the reader can visit: www.sacbee.com/static/weblogs/insider/archives/04-03%20Speechwriting.pdf

¹⁹ To Samuel P. Huntington: "The continuation of high levels of Mexican and Hispanic immigration plus the low rates of assimilation of these immigrants into American society and culture could eventually change America into a country of two languages, two cultures, and two peoples. This will not only transform America. It will also have deep consequences for Hispanics, who will be in America but not of it. Lionel Sosa ends his book, *The Americano Dream*, of advice to apprising Hispanic entrepreneurs, with the words "The Americano dream? It exists, it is realistic, and it is there for all of us to share'. He is wrong. There is no Americano dream. There is only the American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican.Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English." See, *Who are we?* Simon & Schuster, New York, 2004, p. 256.

²⁰ Speech to Congress by Democrat Senator Robert Byrd. Source The United States Senate, September 28, 2006, Section 15.

²¹ According to Wayne Cornelius: "Scapegoating Mexico is easy, but it doesn't get us anywhere. Mexico is eager for the U.S. to liberalize its immigration policy but sees no reason to change its own. With as much as \$20 billion flowing into the country from migrants working in the U.S. this year — money that supports more than one of five Mexican households — why should it? It is not a lack of capacity but a lack of will that prevents Mexico from policing its border with the U.S. See, Wayne A. Cornelius "There's no point in flailing at this piñata", *The Los Angeles Times*, May 29, 2005.

²² Zimmermann Telegram — Decoded Message. Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, 1756 — 1979, National Archives and Records Administration.

²³ The so called Monroe Doctrine was established by President James Monroe's 1823 annual message to Congress, it stated that: "as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference." Extracted from Message of President James Monroe at the commencement of the first session of the 18th Congress (The Monroe Doctrine), 12/02/1823; Presidential Messages of the 18th Congress, ca. 12/02/1823-ca. 03/03/1825; Record Group 46; Records of the United States Senate, 1789-1990; National Archives).

²⁴ Theodore Roosevelt's Annual Message to Congress for 1904; House Records HR 58A-K2; Records of the U.S. House of Representatives; Record Group 233; Center for Legislative Archives; National Archives.

²⁵ Trough several communications (including also the presidents of Brasil and Chile), he wrote to Victoriano de la Plaza, President of the Republic of Argentina: "I take the liberty of calling to your attention the potential dangers of a new policy of interference on the part of one or several nations of this continent in [others'] internal affairs, [affairs] that lie exclusively within the

domain of their sovereignty... I hope that your acts will be inspired by the ideas and sentiments that I have just expressed, for it would be an unpardonable error and a criminal act against our [Latin American] race, if that Government contributed to the provocation of war between two [Latin] American nations, because a powerful government attempted to impose its will upon a free, independent, and sovereign People, violating their rights and nullifying the victory they have just won by force of arms, in order to establish once and for all the reign of liberty and justice... Source: *Del Pueblo* [Of the People], August 10, 1915. (Translation by Felix Cortes.) <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/4940/>

²⁶ Quoted by Walker III, W. O. *Drug Control in the Americas*, Albuquerque, 1981. p. 41.

²⁷ Transcript of a Speech at the House of Representative, Jan 11, 2007, Section 39. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/>

²⁸ The interested reader must consult the SPP key Accomplishments since June 2005, in its web site: <http://www.spp.gov>

²⁹ In the The 2007 State Of The Union Address, under the heading *The United States Must Secure Its Borders*, President Bush said that: Border Security is the basic responsibility of a sovereign nation and an urgent requirement of our national security. We have more than doubled border security funding from \$4.6 billion in FY 2001 to \$10.4 billion in FY 2007. We will have also increased the number of Border Patrol agents by 63 percent — from just over 9,000 agents at the beginning of this Administration to nearly 15,000 at the end of 2007. We are also on track to increase this number to approximately 18,000 by the end of 2008, doubling the size of the Border Patrol during the President's time in office.

³⁰ In the Mexican state of Baja California Sur, federal agents seized a person who supposedly participated in the 9-11 terrorist attacks and was related with Al-Qaeda. The General Attorney Office performed this action in request of the U.S. authorities, days later he was released free of charges. *El Universal Online*, June 22, 2005.

³¹ According to Reuters, "the threat appeared in the al Qaeda Organization in the Arabian Peninsula's e-magazine, *Sawt al-Jihad* (Voice of Holy War), which was posted on a web site used by Islamist militants. The message reads: "It is necessary to hit oil interests in all regions which serve the United States, not just in the Middle East. The goal is to cut its supplies or reduce them

through any means,” “Targeting oil interests includes production wells, export pipelines, oil terminals and tankers and that can reduce U.S. oil inventory, forcing it to take decisions it has been avoiding for a long time and confuse and strangle its economy”.
<http://uk.news.yahoo.com/14022007/325/>.

³² Until now Mexico has signed thirteen international instruments related to combat terrorism.

³³ This position seems to be shared by Senator Edward Kennedy, that during the voting process of the Secure Fence Act stated that: “The American people want realistic solutions, not piecemeal feel-good measures that will waste billions of precious taxpayer dollars and do nothing to correct a serious problem... Sacrificing good immigration policy for political expediency and hateful rhetoric is not just shameful—it is cowardly...Let us be frank. This is about politics not policy... I urge my colleagues to choose good.

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH ASIA: FROM TACTICAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP TOWARDS A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

SWATI PARASHAR

ABSTRACT

September 11, 2001, introduced, among others, two new features in the international system, which would have a bearing on inter and even intra state relations. The terrorist attacks on the three icons of American Power¹ ushered in an era of "American Primacy" firmly entrenched in political, economic and military dominance of the world. It also marked the beginning of a rethinking of strategic and security alliances. In the new scenario that has emerged, South Asia is a region of great opportunity for the United States and both sides could do well to develop a meaningful relationship on several fronts. Significant strategic developments in South Asia-US relations that has emerged includes: an alliance with Pakistan in the "global war on terror"; a new-found comfort level with a civilian nuclear deal with India; cooperation with states in the region in the reconstruction of the war ravaged Afghanistan. However, despite these new developments, the quandary of engagement enhanced by global power politics and regional dynamics has hampered constructive, balanced and sustainable US ties with India, Pakistan and the rest of the region. This article seeks to address some of the concerns related to this "quandary of engagement". It examines the reasons why the tactical security alliances have not been able to translate into a sustainable strategic partnership. It also argues for some policy changes and considerations so that the full potential of the engagement between South Asia and the United States is realized and both sides can maximize their benefits for a long term, sustainable strategic partnership.

"In the next century, nations as we know it will be obsolete; all states will recognize a single, global authority. National sovereignty wasn't such a great idea after all."

Strobe Talbot, Clinton's Deputy Secretary of State, as quoted in *Time*, July 20, 1992

1. Introduction

Strobe Talbot's prediction of 15 years ago has only been strengthened by the events of 9/11 and the developments thereafter. While it is widely construed that September 11, 2001 shattered the American sense of invulnerability,² which had emerged at the end of the Cold War, what followed was a powerful and invincible America that the international community would have to confront and deal with. If the perpetrators of 9/11 were expecting to challenge the post Cold War American hegemony, then they only served to confirm it for the foreseeable future. Close to a decade after the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc, the United States had found an opportunity in the events of 9/11 to reaffirm its global military, economic and political might. This is the second phase of American primacy, after the end of the Cold War. Preserving primacy, therefore, has been the unifying theme underlying American foreign policy and grand strategy.³

Among the several challenges that confront the global order post 9/11, the two most pertinent are terrorism and American Primacy and both are interlinked in many ways.⁴ The responses to both have to be nuanced depending on their myriad manifestations. While there is some kind of consensual understanding as to the nature of the threat from terrorism and the ideologies behind it, American primacy is understood differently in different parts of the world. It also implies different

things to diverse entities like non-state actors, nation states and international institutions.

The international community is currently engaged in what Stephen Walt aptly describes as taming American power.⁵ The responses to American Primacy have been varied and options have included: balancing through mobilizing internal resources; or through bilateral and regional alliances. Minimum adherence to the United States' demands and thereby hindering its global reach has also been a way of putting pressure on the global superpower to conform to international norms and institutions. Blackmailing and de-legitimizing American power have been employed as a tactical measure by some states. Among the positive strategies included were "band-wagoning" and bonding with the super power.⁶ The challenge before the United States on the other hand has been to deal with these varied responses of opposition and accommodation and to convince the world that its intentions are for global good and its power and primacy are for benign and benevolent purposes.

South Asia-US relations have to be viewed in this context of US primacy, states' efforts to tame American power and post 9/11 security concerns and strategic developments. "Differing objectives and outlooks have made past US engagement with South Asia episodic and often strained."⁷ Regional powers like India and Pakistan have viewed the United States with much apprehension at different times while the US engagement in the region has often been dampened by regional rivalries and conflicts. There is a persisting dilemma on both sides on how to engage the other. They cannot afford to ignore each other in the pursuit of their interests and this love-hate and uneven relationship should transform into a more sustainable and meaningful engagement. Before we analyze the constraints on both sides that perpetuate this "engagement quandary" and the ways and means to remove the constraints it is pertinent to look at this

relationship pre 9/11. It is also important to evaluate the strategic and security concerns post 9/11 that could be the guiding force behind the strengthening of ties between South Asia and the United States.

1.1. South Asia

South Asia comprises of the states of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives. Over One billion people and one fifth of humanity inhabit this region. War ravaged Afghanistan and turbulent Central Asian Republics are towards the northwest. The People's Republic of China shares borders on the northeast; while on the eastern frontier are the South East Asian countries, which are of great strategic importance to both South Asia and the United States especially in the maritime domain. Towards the south are the oceans and seas, which give South Asia a considerable maritime advantage.

The buffer between Southeast Asia and Central and West Asia, this region is of great significance for both traditional and non-traditional security reasons. On the traditional front, the region is home to two non-NPT signatory nuclear powers, which are also archrivals — India and Pakistan. Inter-state wars over territorial claims and political issues have been common in the subcontinent and conventional army deployment and engagement have been frequent.⁸ The “global war on terror” would be seriously incomplete without addressing the concerns of this region. Pakistan and its border with Afghanistan along with emerging terror trails in Bangladesh, and even Sri Lanka, are hot beds of trans-national terrorism.

Among the non-traditional security challenges that confront the region are issues of ethnic and religious violence, crises of governance and democracy leading to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and parts of India, border

problems and the issues of illegal migration, poverty, HIV AIDS etc. The importance of this region is therefore twofold: its conventional militaristic inter-state rivalries; its intra-state conflicts related to non-traditional human security concerns.

Postcolonial state formation in the region has been a slow and gradual process and states have been plunged into crises of governance and democracy at different times. This in turn has also prevented strong bilateral and regional ties between states in the region. The American involvement in this highly volatile region has been sporadic and based on immediate strategic interests. As a result, a deep rooted strategic and security partnership between the powers in the region and the United States is yet to materialize. In fact, this region has rarely been high on the US foreign policy agenda.⁹

1.2. US-South Asia Relations Pre 9/11

The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 made bitter rivals of the two newly independent states of India and Pakistan. Even though India and Pakistan were aligned on opposite sides during the Cold War their colonial experience and common concerns, made them view the global super power rivalry between the Soviets and the Americans with profound mistrust¹⁰. The lopsided economic development in India made the "mixed economy" appealing to the Indian leadership post independence. Vying for capitalist and communist aid from the two blocs made Nehru and others play a pioneering role in the Non Aligned Movement, which ultimately led to a growing mistrust of India by the United States. It began to cultivate its regional rival Pakistan even as the Communist Bloc courted India into tactical alliances on issues of common concern. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 further strengthened the ties between Pakistan and The US. A massive arming of Pakistan to

fight the Soviets caused a further rift in Indo-US relations.¹¹

Throughout the Cold War, US ties with South Asia were also held hostage to the Indo-Pak rivalry. Once the Soviets withdrew, so did the US interests in South Asia and there was low-key engagement on tactical issues for a number of years especially after the Cold War. Pakistan, once a staunch ally of the US fell out of favour because of its nuclear weapons programme and its tacit support to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Islamist¹² terrorists fomenting trouble in Indian part of Kashmir. Sporadic efforts continued to improve ties with India, with the boost to trade partnership and call for the bilateral settlement of the Kashmir issue. However, inter-state rivalries and the intra-state conflicts in the region would serve to keep South Asia off the US political, economic and military radar.

2. The Regional Dynamics Post 9/11

2.1. Pakistan

9/11 brought South Asia back into the US spotlight, as Afghanistan became the initial theatre for the “war on terrorism” declared by the Bush Administration and there was a pressing need to reorder US relations with the countries in the region. As Afghanistan’s immediate neighbor and the supporter of the Taliban, Pakistan had a tactical edge over India. President Pervez Musharraf wasted no time in announcing his unconditional support to the US war against the Taliban as part of the “global war on terror”.

Gen. Musharraf saw in this opportunity to ally with the US in the Afghan campaign, an advantage over archrivals India. He also understood well that this would not only secure international legitimacy for his military regime, it would also entail long-term economic and

military prospects for Pakistan as a close ally of the super power. On the material side too, this cooperation and tactical relationship in the “war on terror” translated into massive economic and military aid to Pakistan.¹³

However, the shift of the anti terror campaign from Afghanistan to Iraq has highlighted the inherent weaknesses of this tactical partnership between Pakistan and the United States. With democracy being the war cry of the US fighting in Iraq, close alliance with the military dictatorship of Gen. Musharraf prevents the US from legitimizing its primacy in the region. The accusations of double standards behind the American relationship with Pakistan while it continues to champion the cause of promoting democracy in the world has resulted in a review of the US-Pakistan relationship.¹⁴ The American leadership has often reiterated that Pakistan needs to do enough to reign in the terrorists at the Pak-Afghan border destroying the delicate and fragile peace in Afghanistan.¹⁵

Among the other concerns that have prevented the growth of a steady strategic partnership with Pakistan include, the constant reports about the involvement of Pakistani nationals in acts of terrorism, the declining Pakistani government support to the Karzai administration in Afghanistan to fight the new emerging Taliban, and possibilities of an outright military conflict and nuclear war with India.¹⁶ The US-Pakistan relationship has always been fragile and in the present circumstances, a long-term strategic partnership seems more ambitious if not impossible.

2.2. India

The relationship with India post 9/11 has also gone through a number of phases. An indignant India has looked at the tactical relationship between the US and Pakistan with great apprehension. Quite clearly, a nation

that has been bled consistently by cross border terrorism from terrorists based in Pakistan sees Pakistan as part of the problem along with Afghanistan, rather than a potential ally in the "global war on terror". However, efforts to improve relations have continued.

A major strategic development in Indo-US relations post 9/11 was signing of the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal on July 18, 2005, that has been viewed with great interest and apprehension worldwide. The deal received the approval of the US Congress even though the Republican as well as the Democratic leadership was taken by surprise when the Bush Administration announced this concession to a non-NPT state in South Asia. The author's visit to the United States in Jan-Feb 2006, for the Fulbright-State Department Programme on *US National Security and Foreign Policy post 9/11*, and subsequent interactions with scholars, academics and the policy community, revealed that there were serious concerns over this unexpected decision of the second Bush Administration, which they saw as having implications on the NPT regime. This pessimism was marked and most analysts argued that the Congress would undo the damage by not ratifying the treaty. The optimism on the Indian side, however, has been significant as it would mark the official recognition of India as a responsible nuclear power.

2.3. Terrorism

9/11 made terrorism the "mantra" of the strategic and policy community across the world and states and non-states actors became engaged in a global fight against terrorism. Afghanistan, the epicenter of international jihadi terrorism was the theatre of the first war against global terrorism. Both the major regional powers including Pakistan and India found themselves in a tight spot with regard to the US led war on Afghanistan. While India offered unconditional support to the US and

initially offered the use of its territory, which could not get political consensus within the country, Pakistan, which had nurtured the Taliban for years suddenly deserted its friends and became the US ally in the “war on terror”. It was again, a tactical arrangement on all sides. For the US, Pakistan was a better ally than India to wage a war in Afghanistan. In addition, the US was aware of Pakistan’s tacit support to the Taliban and terrorists on the eastern frontier in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir, waging a proxy war with India.

9/11 was an opportunity for the US to rein in Pakistan. A hostile Pakistan would be a bigger threat to US interest in the region compared to India. Pakistan on the other hand, wanted to seize the moment to cultivate its friendship with the superpower and get an advantage over India. Pakistan knew that its role would be crucial if the US were to win the war in Afghanistan. India felt much maligned at Pakistan being the US ally in the “war on terror” arguing that, as a victim of terrorism for two decades, it should have been a natural ally in any global campaign against terror.

Now that the war has shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq and Pakistan has lost its tactical advantage, the US and India have emerged as partners especially in the efforts to rebuild Afghanistan. The US is now pressurizing Pakistan to restore democracy at the earliest and has even announced reduction in aid because of Pakistan’s failure to usher in a democratic political system.

2.4. The nuclear imbroglio

Both India and Pakistan announced their nuclear status to the world in May 1998. These tests in the subcontinent by the two rival powers unleashed new dynamics in the international system and clearly displayed the failure of the US policies on the issue of nuclear weapons. Some quick adjustments had to be made to deal with these two nuclear powers. Even though

the Clinton Administration announced sanctions as a punishment for proliferation, it was in contradiction to the commerce policy for this region wherein the US was trying to take advantage of the vast markets in India and Pakistan.¹⁷

The Kargil war that broke out between India and Pakistan in the summer of 1999 saw the deployment of nuclear missiles by Pakistan and an unprecedented use of air power by India. It was a conventional war along the Line of Control and had the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict. It was a talk with President Clinton at Washington in July 1999 that led Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to decide to restore the Line of Control. According to a Stimson Center publication,¹⁸ a senior South Asia specialist reportedly said that the Clinton Administration was unwilling to mediate in the Kargil conflict because South Asia until that time was low on their priority and secondly the US did not have any direct interests in the region. This approach revealed the short sightedness of the US foreign policy during this period since the problems of North Korea and Iran proliferation were looming large and therefore, a nuclear stable South Asia was pertinent for US security and primacy in Asia.

The second Bush Administration understood that a strategic depth in South Asia could be achieved only by incorporating the two nuclear powers in the region and building a strategic partnership with India on the nuclear issue. This thinking led to the announcement of the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal in July 2005, followed by a detailed agreement on the same in March 2006. The U.S. Congress faced the difficult task of either rejecting the deal and a strategic relationship with India and protecting non-proliferation or accepting the deal and risking non-proliferation. It preferred the latter.

Given the constraints of this chapter, it is not possible to offer a detailed insight into the proposed US-India

civilian nuclear cooperation. Suffice to say that the NPT regime has failed to prevent proliferation. The A Q Khan proliferation network in Pakistan was unearthed and taken to task, but fact remains that the great powers have been intentionally and unintentionally, proliferating. Given the problems of a nuclear Iran and North Korea, the United States would do well to differentiate between potential trouble-makers and states with a good track record of non proliferation. There is a fresh rethinking required on the non-proliferation regime.

For the US, according nuclear status to India and a civilian cooperation means a great leap forward in building a strategic relationship with India and a greater strategic control and depth in South Asia. The US would also achieve some nuclear non-proliferation goals with the separation of India's civilian and military nuclear programmes, while putting the civilian facilities under international safeguards and observations as a requirement of the deal. It also means international legitimacy and credibility for India as a nuclear power, with the much needed acquisition of civilian nuclear technology. It has also meant recognition for India, within the international community, as a responsible nuclear power in congruence with India's aspirations to be a global, political and economic power.

2.5. The China factor

A significant perception held by the present administration and the American public in general that this author gathered in her US trip was the threat posed by China. The repeated use of the word "threat" from China and the ambiguities associated with it convinced the author that the American's have still not understood the nature of Chinese economic, military and diplomatic power and continue to be affected by the mysterious "Middle Kingdom" syndrome. While China is a formidable

player in the world with the largest population, a booming economy and military prowess, its recent attempts to resolve its bilateral border disputes with neighboring countries and its quest for economic development vis a vis military might has earned this nation-state a lot of good will and trust in Asia.

China's peaceful rise as advocated by its leaders since the mid nineties as part of the new security strategy has largely conveyed that its economic and military development is not a threat to peace and security in the world. This "soft power" approach has seen China emerge as a potential opportunity rather than an economic and military threat in Asia. The Americans are still to recognize and understand the nuances of China's new security concept. China has sought to avoid confrontation with the United States, despite considerable misgivings about American "unilateralism" and strongly felt differences over a host of issues from Taiwan to human rights.¹⁹

The South Asian powers have also greatly benefited from China's recent diplomatic efforts to end its bilateral disputes. China has considerably warmed up relationships with India and they are now working jointly to resolve all its border disputes²⁰, while its tactical friendship with Pakistan has survived numerous geo-strategic changes that include post 9/11 alliance between the US and Pakistan, and improving Sino-Indian relations.²¹

The US policies in South Asia and the development of strategic ties with either India or Pakistan have been hindered by the "China factor". The US has always tried to cultivate one power or the other to balance what it has perceived as Chinese interests in the region. The latest civilian nuclear deal with India is also considered as a short-term measure to cultivate India as a natural strategic ally, or a reliable partner in containing China²². Thus, balancing China has been an important policy consideration while dealing with South Asia and has prevented a long-standing strategic engagement.

3. Towards a Synthesis of Interests

"The developing coherence of Asian regional thinking is reflected in a disposition to consider problems and loyalties in regional terms, and to evolve regional approaches to development needs and to the evolution of a new world order."

Richard Nixon, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1967

In spite of the failure of institutionalized regionalism like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), there is a commonality of interests among nations in South Asia, similar to what binds South East Asians, Central Asians and the Middle East together. Big powers in the region, namely Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, which are at logger heads with one another, understand the need for mutual cooperation and bilateral ties and have reiterated that the conflicts in the region can be resolved through confidence building measures and bilateral engagements. However, realizing the nature of the international system where isolationism would not work to their advantage, they also welcome genuine interests of the global powers in addressing issues in the region.

3.1. Cooperation in the "global war on terror"

The US led "global war on terror", cannot exclude South Asia. International jihadi terrorism continues to be inspired by elements within Pakistan, Afghanistan and now Bangladesh, which has emerged as the new hub of terror. With India and Bangladesh home to the second and the third largest Muslim population in the world, radicalization of Muslims from South Asia is unabated. Some of the world's dreaded terrorists are still hiding in the Afghan-Pakistan border and the Taliban has

waged a spectacular comeback, to disrupt the fragile peace in Afghanistan.

Both India and Pakistan realize that fighting against and responding to terrorism is in their interest and important for their survival. India, has for long, been a victim of terrorism, while Pakistan is threatened by its own Frankensteins. Bangladesh is presently in the state of denial, but will eventually realize the dangers that its social and political structures face from the mushrooming of terrorist groups and networks within the country. The United States cannot win the war on terrorism without taking into confidence these three vital countries of South Asia; they are the key in reducing Islamist militancy in the world. As the global superpower, the countries of the region also look up to the United States to address their terrorism concerns and work closely with them to eradicate the menace that threatens their core of existence.

The National Security Strategy of the Bush administration released in March 2006²³ declared the US to be a "country at war" against global terrorism. The hard coercive power is what the US relies on in this "global war on terror". This is undermining the goals of long-term US primacy. It is only through the efforts of "soft power" arising out of a country's culture, political ideals and policies that can prevent terrorists from expanding their base and recruitment among the moderate majority.²⁴ The hard power that the Americans have employed in this "global war on terror" has not yielded any substantial result. Even the capture and killing of a large number of Al Qaeda operatives including the death of the dreaded Al Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi²⁵ has had little impact on either the Iraqi insurgency, or on the re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan. The worldwide jihadi terrorist network continues to flourish, as no concrete signs of victory are

in sight for the United States and its allies in their fight against terrorism.

The “soft power” appeal of South Asia lies in its ancient and tolerant civilization and culture that is popular across the world. This explains why the Indian Muslims have kept away from the global Al Qaeda movement and are still radicalized in lesser numbers and mostly as a response to internal and local issues and concerns, the Gujarat riots of 2002 being prominent. The US needs to enhance its “soft power” potential, which can be beneficial to its long-term objectives.

The “global war on terrorism” cannot be global and effective without a clampdown on terrorist activities of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. As of today this is the only terrorist group which has both maritime and air power capabilities. The LTTE and other such politically motivated non-religious terrorist and extremist groups in South Asia like the Naxalites in India, suggests that the global threat of terrorism does not come only from radical Islamists.

3.2. Need to resolve intra-state conflicts

Ethnic and identity based conflicts that are a harsh reality in almost every country in South Asia, also provide a tremendous opportunity to the United States to build goodwill in the region. Parts of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka are inflicted with intra-state conflicts of ethnic, religious and sectarian nature. These conflicts take a huge toll on life and property and threaten the social and political fabric of these countries. In Sri Lanka and Nepal, conflicts have escalated into civil wars. Apart from the role of regional powers like India, there is a need for an active US engagement with these conflicts if its claims of promoting liberal democracies and restoring human rights are to have some meaning beyond the rhetoric. These conflicts

may not pose a direct threat to US interests, but given their nature and capability to unleash instability in the region, they could undermine American interests in the region. However, they also offer a window of opportunity to the United States to play a constructive role in South Asia, in return for the recognition of its global status. While states would be resistant to any US meddling in their internal affairs, especially with regard to their internal conflicts, efforts by the international community and particularly the United States, should be to work together with the South Asian states to find resolutions to these conflicts.

3.3. Promoting democracy in the region

The crisis of democracy in South Asia is more pronounced than elsewhere in the world including the Middle East. Failed democracy and governance in states in South Asia can destabilize the region, lead to armed confrontations between neighbors and even full-scale civil war in some cases, which are bound to have serious implications on the international community.

Politically polarized Bangladesh is currently going through a crisis with violent clashes between the government and the opposition. Elections have been stalled till normalcy is restored and most political leaders are looking for exiles. Islamist radicals are also increasing their stronghold in Bangladesh. Pakistan too, facing similar crisis of governance and political and religious violence, will have to pave way for democracy and the military will have to relinquish its hold on political power if the genuine aspirations of the people are to be met.²⁶ Nepal has fought a severe Maoist insurgency in recent times. The Nepalese monarchy seems redundant and democratic institutions are in a nascent stage. Sri Lanka's bitter ethnic civil war between the Sinhalese and Tamils is also a case of failed governance and lack of an inclusive

democratic structure. India, with all its global aspirations, also faces issues of governance in the Northeast. Almost twelve states within India are engaged in a fierce struggle to control the Naxalites, or left wing extremists who have taken up arms against what they perceive as state failures to meet the aspirations of the poor and the landless people.

The US with its global aspirations, will have to engage in the processes in South Asia. If it fails to show a keen interest in South Asia's crisis of governance and democracy, its credibility and legitimacy with both suffer in a region of strategic importance.

3.4. Non-traditional, human security concerns²⁷

The political and strategic side of the US-South Asia relationship cannot rule out the socio-economic-human security spectrum. South Asian countries have newly found independence, have different forms of government, their democratic institutions are still developing and there is a civil society that is still struggling to define its space. On the other hand, South Asia has some of the poorest people in the world and is plagued by illiteracy, ethnic discord and other oppressive social structures. Alleviation of poverty, hunger, disease, and dealing with identity issues and illegal trans-border migration, human and arms trafficking are important concerns for the governments in the region. HIV AIDS, a major threat in the region, killed 4 lakh people in 2005, in India alone. In some of the cases, unstable and inefficient states themselves are the source of these insecurities and problems.²⁸ The United States could provide economic, diplomatic, and political aid to these countries in the region, to deal with these human security threats that have kept an important strategic region backward and underdeveloped.

4. Conclusion

South Asia is a region of great opportunity for the United States to seek legitimacy for its primacy and global role. The tactical, issue based relationship with the countries in South Asia have impinged upon a longstanding relationship between one of the most geo-strategic regions and the global superpower. American primacy is dependent upon greater legitimacy and credibility through regional stability. To graduate from this tactical relationship to a strategic partnership there is a need for the United States to give priority to building and expanding governmental and private sector ties with South Asia. It is also important to develop a broad, balanced, and integrated strategy towards South Asia that is sustainable over a long term²⁹ as ad hoc policies based on balancing one state against the other has yet to yield results for the US.

Conversely, countries of the region will also have to understand the nature of American primacy and develop adequate response mechanisms that can best serve their interests. India's aspiration to be a global power is linked to the nature of a strategic partnership it can develop with the United States. Similarly, for Pakistan, the challenge is to build a non-reactive and stable relationship with the United States without worrying too much about India's aspirations or Indo-US relations. States in the region have to stop viewing their ties with the US as a potential leverage against their regional rivals.

Among the other great powers, both China and Russia continue to show considerable interest in South Asia with their role in the region going back to the Cold War period. If the objectives of American primacy are to be realized, South Asia should be high on the priority list for the US. China and Russia are also waiting to seize the opportunity to engage in the region on a range of issues. China and Russia are not an immediate threat to American hegemony and primacy in the world but are important

rivals and competitors. The extent of American prowess cannot be ignored at this critical juncture in international relations when states are grappling with a plethora of problems, local, regional and international, which include threats, but they cannot afford to ignore each other!

Notes

¹ The 9/11 planned attacks on the Pentagon, World Trade Center and the U.S. Capitol were an act of challenging the global order through attacks on the symbols of American military, economic and political power. After the end of the cold war the incident of September 11, 2001, marked a new beginning of international relations and was a turning point in determining the challenges that confront the world today that include, religiously motivated terrorism and growing influence of non state actors like terrorist and extremist groups.

² Jim Wallis, *God's Politics: Why the American Right Gets it Wrong and the Left Doesn't Get it*, Lion Husdon plc, Oxford, England, 2005

³ Sourced from a Talk, *The Global War Against Terrorism: A Progress Report* by Dr. Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, February 23, 2005

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power*, W W Norton and Co., New York, 2005

⁶ Ibid Pp- 109-217

⁷ Satu Limaye, *South Asia and the United States after the Cold War*, Asia Society

http://www.asiasociety.org/publications/saandus_intro.html

⁸ India and Pakistan have fought four major wars in the last fifty years since their independence. 1948, 1965, 1971 and the last one in Kargil in 1999.

⁹ Satu Limaye. *South Asia and the United States after the Cold War*, Asia Society.

http://www.asiasociety.org/publications/saandus_intro.html

¹⁰ Amitav Acharya, *The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies*, Occasional paper Number 28, York Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, March 1995. This paper articulates the concerns of the third world states in the security domain and argues for the widening of the definition of security to include the vulnerabilities of the third world states arising out of limited resources, and lack of material human and institutional capacity to deal with transnational threats. South Asian states namely India and Pakistan during the cold war and even after have been a part of this third world security dilemma and this has dominated their interactions and relationship with the United States.

¹¹ For details about the US engagements in South Asia during the cold war and esp. in the Indo Pakistan rivalry refer to Chintamani Mahapatra, *Indo-US Relations: Into the 21st Century*, Knowledge world, IDSA Publication, New Delhi, 1998.

¹² *Islamic* refers to institutions, practices, beliefs, and so on, that have no specific ideological or political connotations. Thus, Islamic architecture, Islamic ceramics, Islamic philosophy, and so on. *Islamist* refers to political parties and movements that seek to legitimate or subvert a political order based on their interpretation of Islamic principles. Though these movements go back to the 1940s and 1950s (in Egypt), the term became more commonly used in the 1980s, after the Khomeini revolution of 1979.

¹³ "The U.S. gave Pakistan nearly \$3 billion in foreign aid assistance between 2001 and 2005. President George Bush, in 2005, announced a \$ 3 billion assistance package for his frontline South Asian ally in the "war on terror". Spread over five years, the amount was to be split equally between Pakistan's defence and social sectors." Nirupama Subramanian, *Pakistan faces cut in U.S. Aid*, the Hindu, June 12, 2006.

¹⁴ Presidents Bush's visit to the subcontinent in March 2006 was marked by a high profile state visit to India and a very low-key one-day visit to Pakistan without any significant bilateral developments.

¹⁵ Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, denied any nuclear deal with Pakistan on the same lines as India, thereby expressing openly that American concerns over the A Q Khan proliferation and the lack of a democratic political structure in Pakistan stood firm and grounded.

¹⁶ For details on the potential collision points between Pakistan and the United States, refer to Polly Nayak, *US Security Policy on South Asia Since 9/11- Challenges and Implications for the Future*, Occasional paper series, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu.

¹⁷ Richard N. Haass and Morton H. Halperin, *After the Tests: US Policy Toward India and Pakistan*, an independent task force report sponsored by the CFR and the Brookings Institution, Sept. 1998.

¹⁸ Zhang Guihong, *US security Policy toward South Asia after Sept. 11th and its implications for China- A Chinese Perspective*, Stimson Center Publication, January 2003.

¹⁹ *China: Peaceful Rise*, The Economist, June 24, 2004, http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2792533

²⁰ refer to Devika Sharma, *Resolving The Boundary Dispute: China's Reasons And India's Choices*,

http://www.ipcs.org/India_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1993&country=1016&status=article&mod=a

²¹ For more details see *Pakistan-China Relations: recent Developments, (Jan — May 2006)*, IPCS Special report 26, June 2006, <http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-26.pdf>

²² Stephen Philip Cohen, *A Deal too Far?* March 2, 2006, ORF-Brookings paper.

²³ National Security Strategy, March 2006, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/print/intro.html>

²⁴ Joseph K Nye Junior, *Soft Power-The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York, 2004.

²⁵ The capture and killing of several Al Qaeda operatives, including the most recent killing of Abu Musab-al- Zaraqawi the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, on June 7, 2006, has not really meant an end to terrorism. Infact, the world has become more insecure since the "global war on terror" was launched due to revenge killings and the ongoing global jihadi campaign. Al Qaeda still operates terror cells in as many as 65 countries. Some of the largest cells are in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Hundreds of Al-Qaeda operatives are believed to be hiding in Pakistan's northern tribal areas and the country's Baluchistan Province. Most U.S. intelligence officials believe Bin Laden is hiding in Pakistan's northern tribal areas. South Asia is closely linked to this "war on

terror” because of Al Qaeda’s Pakistan and Afghanistan connection and the terrorist network that has spawned in Bangladesh.

²⁶ There will be international pressure on Pakistan to move towards democracy. Japan, the other major aid donor to Pakistan apart from the US has also shown concern over the lack of democratic process in Pakistan.

²⁷ Human security has emerged as a security paradigm in the context of the third world to expand the concept of security to include non-traditional security concerns like gender security, migration, ethnic and other identity based conflicts. It is seen as a binary concept to traditional security that includes a militaristic understanding of security emanating from inter-state conflicts and wars. This author’s contention is that human security should be seen in conjunction with the traditional security concerns. While the traditional issues of security remain the same even in the present context, human security is a comprehensive approach to deal with the security concerns. In the context of South Asia, states are not only the source of insecurity and a range of problems but in the absence of a vibrant civil society and an effective regional organization, are also the only political institutions that can remove these threats to human security. The referent in human security is the individual and not the state but in terms of who is going to secure the individual, there does not seem to be an alternative to the state esp. in South Asia.

²⁸ *Human Security Index for South Asia*, Group Report of the Winter Workshop on Non Traditional Sources of Conflict in South Asia, organized by the RCSS at Kathmandu, October 2004. The author had participated in this workshop and was part of the group project on human security. The report is available at

http://www.rcss.org/human_security_group_report.doc

²⁹ Satu Limaye, *South Asia and the United States after the Cold War*, Asia Society.

ROMANIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE USA WHY DOES IT EXIST, WHAT IS ITS PURPOSE?

MIREILLE RADOI

— Who's not with us could be considered against us or who's not against us could be considered with us?

— If you really want to know who's with or against whom, you need a conflict!

— Everyone is involved in a conflict, no matter how hot or frozen it is...

Then, what about a partnership?

ABSTRACT

Romania, like most of the new EU members from the Central and Eastern European countries, is strongly Atlanticist and pro-American oriented. Therefore, the launch of the Strategic Partnership Romania — USA seemed a natural extension of the nation's development, initiating an era of intense cooperation in the fields of common strategic interest: military, economic, regional security, unconventional risks. Concurrently, Romania now needs to find the resources, the expertise, and the political wisdom to fulfill both its main Euro-centric engagements: as a NATO member — the development and provision of military capacities and capabilities, as an EU member — to reveal the role that our EU identity requires, within the field of security, strategic intelligence and transport while supporting the development of democratic societies and institutions. Hence, in all of these areas, this Strategic Partnership with the U.S. plays at least a facilitator's role, if not a constantly essential one.

1. National Security — a circumstantial concept and a state policy...

National Security's (NS) institutional expression can be found principally in the military, the intelligence services, domestic affairs and public security, but also in some economic, social or technological bodies. Moreover, in all areas that is related to competitive or cooperative interests, which could help promote or endanger the harmonious development of the nation. Therefore, this kind of national project is crucial to the understanding of what we mean by present and future national interest. The state, through its political and intellectual classes, needs to define the main direction of this evolutionary process, or at least identify some reference points and stages within this development.

The concept of the NS is dependent on both the realities and the aspirations of the nation's individuals. After obtaining a more or less a clear picture of what these are, we can draw up a map of priorities, potential achievements and failures. Consequently, the national interest becomes a permanent process of social construction, resulting in a constellation of values, material and spiritual — some of these issues make up the hard core of this concept, others sit on the periphery with a rate of change more accelerated than the rest. For instance: once Romania had decided as a matter of national interest to finally join NATO and the EU — what comes next? Hence, the overriding need to identify the new horizon of expectations... not only in institutional terms, but within the essential dimensions of the nation.

According to democratic logic and the resultant drive for effectiveness, this concept should be translated into a legitimate strategy. The National Security Policy must be a state policy, neither departmental, nor related to a specific group, or personal ambition. Usually, the responsibility for the accomplishments or for the under-

achievements of this policy is attributed to the Executive branch. However, the Legislative and Judiciary should have their own part to play in maintaining its overall meaning.

A National Security Policy would therefore envisage the principal risks to the national interest and the subsequent transformation into reality of its projection. How do you agglutinate the values and the interests of the most relevant political and social forces in the country? By ignoring meaningless declarations and empty words, and producing a common and diffuse sense of how secure the citizen feels, so we can openly consider, how well represented is the citizen?

Confidence and trust in this policy are fundamental to the "internal public" and to the nation's external partnerships. The coherence and the sustainability of the national security policy should be guaranteed by the highest authorities, and in Romania, as in many other countries, this is represented by the National Council headed by the President, which released the National Security Strategy. In the latest strategy assumed by Romania¹¹, the Partnership with the USA is viewed as a strategic opportunity.

Simple Questions — Difficult answers

Q: *Why does Romania still need a Strategic Partnership with the USA, once it has become a full member of NATO?*

A: Not all NATO's security agenda issues meet Romanian's needs. We lack the stability safeguards for the Black Sea area, given the frozen conflicts on its north-east shore. "Active Endeavour" (Mediterranean Sea) could be a successful model to implement. The strategic partnership with the USA could also complement Romania's NATO membership. In particular, because Romania, being a NATO border country, could export security know-how to the region, by firmly supporting

the “neighboring” nation-states such as the Republic of Moldavia, Ukraine and Serbia on the two NATO’s dimensions: *political* — the creation of an essential stable democratic climate — and *military* — the conceptual professional improvement of the nation’s armed forces; providing the means for interoperability.

Q: *To what extent was the EU integration process affected by the European perception of this Strategic Partnership?*

A: Any Strategic Partnership should imply significant advantages for all those involved, but I can suggest division of loyalty. For Romania, the current perception is that there exists an intense and systematic pro-American public opinion. Hence, during the EU Romanian integration process, this massive preference for the Americans was considered by some established members as a weakness: the traditional European powers remained wary. France for instance, expressed its dissatisfaction on several occasions. Thus, Romania risked additional criticisms with its continued adherence process. However, given the domestic advantages of this “special relationship” with the USA, in economic and security terms, at the domestic level, this partnership was perceived as a lasting opportunity, if not a strong-point, from where the Romanians could join the EU.

2. What is this Romania — USA Strategic Partnership actually about?

For ease and accuracy we will adopt an institutionalized way of analyzing and answering this question. Hence, we will highlight the most important developments, initiatives and reasoning in the recent enhancement of the relationship between Romania and the USA, ending in the creation of this Strategic Partnership².

2.1. The significance behind the launch of the Strategic Partnership.

During the past 16 years, the defining trait of the bilateral Romanian — American relationship has been in its positive progress, characterized by different degrees of depth and speed as the relationship moved from one stage to another.

The launch of the Strategic Partnership Romania — USA³, on July 11th, 1997, signaled the end to the normalization stage of the bilateral relationship (1989 — 1997) and the commencement of fulfilling its real potential, in the common fields of strategic interest: military, economic, regional security, unconventional risks. The cooperation mechanism represented by the Strategic Partnership was viewed in the context of the security dynamics at that time, especially in the Balkan area. Therefore, in hindsight, we can conclude that the Partnership proved its usefulness in the shared values of supporting peace and stability in Southeast Europe.

The intense political dialogue that drove this process was not hampered by the changes that occurred over the political administrations in Bucharest and Washington, during 2000. On the contrary,⁴ efforts within the Partnership were substantially reinforced, with positive consequences for the Euro-Atlantic endeavor at our nation seemed to desire.

When the Partnership was launched, the initial efforts were aimed at clearly defining the cooperation mechanisms within it (1997-1999). As a result, in November 1997, working groups were set up in order to promote the goals in the four fields of mutual strategic interest. Subsequently, these groups meet on a regular basis, having drawn up the action plans for the governmental agencies and institutions of the two states, supporting bilateral economic, commercial, military and diplomatic initiatives and activities.

The mobility, training and the interoperability of the Romanian armed forces with the NATO troops has been one of the main, if not the most important achievements in *the military field*. An office for co-operation in defense issues was opened in Bucharest, and the USA Defense Department and the Romanian Ministry of Defense have worked closely in the process of restructuring the armed forces, with Romania receiving American assistance for restructuring its armed forces⁵. Further cooperation was then established within SFOR and KFOR operations in former Yugoslavia, and within ISAF and "Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is crucial to highlight the conclusion of the SOFA⁶ Agreement in 2001 and of the Bilateral Agreement regarding the International Criminal Court, as they set the grounds for endorsing military relations as the key dimension to the Partnership. Consequently, our country, as NATO partner, enlarged its range of activities within the Partnership for Peace, with Romanian officers being assigned to the staff of the PfP Coordination Cell in Mons / Belgium.

Reinforcing the importance of this Partnership, at the 2nd of May, 2007, the Romanian Parliament adopted the text of the Agreement signed in 2005 between Romania and the United States of America referring to the presence of the American troops on Romanian soil. According to this decision, 3000 American soldiers will be stationed for ten years on our national territory. The document reconfirms the engagement of Romania in the Global War on Terror, together with the other allies of the US.

Proving the excellent commitment of Romania as a NATO member, in 2008, the Summit of the organization will be held in Bucharest.

In *the economic field*, the bilateral commercial transactions have improved, offering enhanced investment opportunities in Romania by a series of institutional and technological initiatives supported by both sides:

- new communication connections through the Internet, as well as between the Romanian institutions dealing with privatization and the American Department for Commerce, the Trade Development Agency (TDA) and the Overseas Private Investments Corporation (OPIC);
- American consultancy in developing the trade of *futures* options and of options for general merchandise; revising the legal framework in the field of foreign investments and privatization; improving the transparency at the level of the governmental institutions; countering corruption.

Another important step in developing these bilateral relations was taken when the US Administration granted Romania "market economy" status, on March 10th, 2003. The *American Chamber of Commerce*, an important factor, played a major part in promoting the investment opportunities of the Romanian business environment. Especially, as the inflow of US capital was primarily directed to the "top end" of the Romanian economy: communication technology, energy, transport etc⁷.

Concurrently, a coherent strategy for *preventing cross-border crime, terrorism and proliferation of weaponry* was also developed:

- modernization projects of the Romanian customs authority within the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), which included improved activity of the customs check points, the harmonization of the legal framework, as well as improved training of the customs personnel for the identification, investigation, respectively seizure of nuclear, biological or chemical material;
- The setting up of the SECI Center, in Bucharest, for countering corruption and cross-border crime, which has had remarkable results in the fight against regional immigrant and narcotics smuggling networks. Mainly because of the added

advantage of receiving support from American security enforcement structures (advice, financial assistance, consultancy from FBI, Secret Service and Drug Enforcement Agency experts);

- developing the legal system and the law enforcement system in Romania, by granting consultancies to help draw up the legal framework and by creating new tools in this field: the National Counter-Corruption Prosecutor's Office; the enhanced training of Police officers, the prosecutors and the judges; financial assistance for developing specific law enforcement projects; exchange of information;
- assuring the functionality of the mechanism devised to control strategic exports;
- the signing of an Agreement concerning nation-state cooperation against nuclear proliferation (March 1998).

All these developments have raised the profile and the importance of this Partnership to another level, by encouraging and complimenting the nation's aspirations towards integration into the North-Atlantic Alliance that had first been set out by the allies at the Summit in Washington in April 1999, when the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched.

2.2. The Intensified Strategic Partnership and Romania's acquirement of NATO membership

The launch of the Intensified Strategic Partnership, on February 3, 2000, occurred at the same time as the initiation of the National Preparation Plan for acquiring NATO membership (based on the MAP). This stage took place at the Prague Summit (November 2002), when Romania received the invitation to join the Alliance.

The structure of the National Preparation Plan for acquiring NATO membership identified political-economic, military and defense goals, resources, security challenges and legal framework aspects. The Intensified Partnership Romania — USA substantially contributed to resolving these issues within the deadlines set.

This period provided an extremely rigorous examination of the NATO candidate states. The USA being interested in Romanian membership helped the nation make substantial progress in the areas perceived as defective, nominated in the so-called "laundry list": countering corruption; restructuring the economy (speeding up and making the privatization process more transparent, as well as improving the business environment); acquiring judicial independence; reforming the public administration (reducing bureaucracy, promoting meritocracy; efficient functioning of the administrative structure); protecting classified information; the Jewish issue.

The framework document of the Intensified Partnership reflected the guidelines of this new stage and therefore, the priorities that related to four fields deemed as strategic: military, economic, regional security, unconventional risks. Hence, the defining elements of the Intensified Strategic Partnership focused on:

- the development of the economic dimension and the establishment, to this end, of a bilateral structured economic dialogue, that would help support the Romanian government's efforts to increase the predictability and the transparency of the Romanian legal framework, including the non-discriminatory treatment of trade with the USA and American investments. Due to American involvement, collaboration with the World Bank and with the IMF, Romania was drawn up and applied to the macroeconomic and structural policies that favored direct foreign investments in

joint ventures, in privatizations and in acquisition projects;

- pragmatism when defining and following common goals at regional level;
- the coordination of bilateral actions both in the Euro-Atlantic area (aimed at acquiring NATO membership), and in Southeastern Europe (USA's support for special involvement by our nation in issues surrounding the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe and the decision taken by both sides to work together towards stimulating the collaboration among the countries in the area within the regional initiatives);
- continuing and finalizing Romanian military reform, creating an efficient and modern army, an army interoperable with the Alliance structures, as well as paying special attention to the restructuring of the arms industry;
- supporting Romanian authorities' efforts aimed at countering corruption and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, of launch systems and of related technologies, as well as of sensitive material.

Hence, the most significant results of the Romanian — American cooperation within the Intensified Strategic Partnership are: the invitation to join NATO on the occasion of the enlargement, in Prague 2002, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, as well as the status of "functional market economy" granted by the USA in March 2003, which represented an important step in the development of the bilateral economic relationships.

2.3. From a strategic partner to an integrated ally, what next?

The support given to the actions initiated and carried out by NATO in order to bring and consolidate

peace in the Balkans, as well as the immediate and firm decision [of Romania] to involve itself in the fight against international terrorism (participation in the operations in Afghanistan), have demonstrated Romania's will and capacity to take action as a *de facto* member of the Alliance, before becoming a *de jure* ally at the Summit in Istanbul (June 2004). This Summit was the first event in which Romania took part as a full NATO member and confirmed the success of the democratic reforms in the politic, military, economic and social fields; a process that was consistently supported by the USA. The USA Congress, on the initiative of the Bush Administration, granted Romania in the second half of 2005, \$17 million for modernizing and strengthening the capability and capacity of our armed forces, from *The Coalition Solidarity Fund (CSF)*⁸. This amount was in addition to the American military assistance for Romania, included in the budget for 2004-2005, which rose to approximately \$11 million.

Hence, the development of the Romania — USA partnership, from “confidence building” to “secure confidence” (Romania's status as NATO and EU member) and the political and geo-strategic developments at international level has determined a common Romanian — American program focused on drafting a new strategic perspective on the bilateral relations.

The intensification of this political dialogue between Romania and the USA at all levels is directly connected to: the consolidation of Romania's status as “a trusted ally” of the USA in the new international environment; the assertion of the strategic profile for Romania at regional level; promoting a cooperation framework that also satisfies the interests of our American ally. Naturally, continuing special attention will be paid to political-military and economic cooperation.

Aside from the deepening cooperation and the joint actions in multilateral structures (NATO, EU), the main coordinates meant to "update" the bilateral agenda are:

- *placement of American military facilities on Romanian soil*, based on the Access Agreement signed on December 6, 2005, on the occasion of State Secretary Condoleezza Rice's visit to Bucharest. The American military presence on the territory of the new allies, including Romania, assists in the adaptation of the "new" political and military realities in the Black Sea region, covering areas of strategic interest for the European community and the North-Atlantic community (the Caucasus, Central Asia, Extended Middle East);
- *an active and articulate role played by Romania in the Balkan and Black Sea regions*. Regarding the Black Sea, the following common approach elements can be identified: the consolidation of stability, peace and cooperation relationships, which is beneficial to all the countries in the area — allies or partners — , but also in introducing stability in the Extended Middle East; promoting a *soft security*-type strategy, especially from the point of view of NATO and EU involvement in the region, without ignoring the potential for conflict of the region; adequate coordination of the existent regional initiatives, with a view to a participation of all the actors in the region (including Russia).

In order to promote liberty and democracy in the region, the USA is supporting the deepening of this particular Romanian initiative — the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue. Moreover, against the general background of preoccupations with the diminishing European dependency on the Russian energy market monopoly, one cannot rule out the development of an energy component to the Strategic Partnership

Romania — USA. Considering the potential our country possesses in alternative sources of energy (for example, nuclear energy), but also the transportation routes of the energy resources from the Caucasus / Caspian Sea via the West⁹.

Romania is also maintaining its long-term commitment to fighting terrorism. The participation of the Romanian troops, side by side with the American forces, in the stabilization and reconstruction missions in Afghanistan and Iraq represents one of the most relevant examples of the success of the Romanian — American cooperation in issues of international interest. Moreover, identifying solutions in fields of particular interest, such as the international adoptions or Romania being accepted in the *Visa Waiver* program, which is a current preoccupation.

Changing the political will into coherently articulated actions supposes a pragmatic, open and flexible approach of the bilateral relations.

3. Conclusions

Our nation's perception and opinion concerning USA may well reflect how many in Eastern Europe view Washington. However, it certainly does not represent how all members of the EU understand US-European relations. As previously observed, Romania, as well as most of the new EU members from the Central and Eastern European countries, is still strongly Atlanticist and pro-American oriented. Yet, this stance seems fairly uncontroversial, since numerous other nations from "Old Europe", especially Great Britain, Spain, and Italy continue to support Washington's involvement, via NATO, in European defense and security matters.

Moreover, only recently Germany's position has begun to shift to a similar position. "Former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder gave priority to relations with the EU

and France. However, his successor, Angela Merkel, has made clear that she intends to give priority to NATO and strengthen the relations with the United States¹⁰. Merkel seems determined to rebalance the German foreign policy and encourage greater U.S. cooperation. Moreover, Washington's own attitude towards the EU does not seem to put Romania into an ambivalent position, since the USA considers that they continue to share common values with the EU, as well the practical costs of managing the world in such a way that it should become "a better and safer place"; an expression that has seemed to become our mutual political leitmotiv.

The USA-EU differences over ESDP have partially reflected different defense priorities on the two sides of the Atlantic. "The United States has concentrated on fighting major theater wars and highly-intensity conflicts. Peacekeeping and stability operations have until very recently been neglected or given short shrift. The EU, by contrast, has taken a much more holistic approach to conflict management that emphasizes both military and non-military elements and resources."¹¹

Currently, there is a growing recognition within the Pentagon of the importance of the post-combat reconstruction phase. During the first visit by an American president to the EU, in February 2005, G.W. Bush not only paid a visit to NATO HQ, but his speech, delivered in Brussels, explicitly stressed that the United States supported a strong and cohesive Europe¹² not a division of labor, but a partnership in security matters. Hence, not an EU that "is doing the dishes" — cleaning up after the USA — but an EU willing and capable of completing the US efforts in managing the current security challenges. In other words, the USA have confronted unconventional conflicts at the low end of the conflict spectrum which requires different capabilities than the combat phase: police, election organizing and monitoring, civil affairs units, assistance in building rule

of law, promoting the development of civil society¹³ — almost impossible to imagine to be accomplished without the involvement of the EU.

Since the beginning of Romania's process of joining the EU and then NATO, it has assumed a new institutional sense of belonging. For Romania is now successfully managing to harmonize both roles as a full member and active player. Moreover, none of these recent developments contradict the nation's deepening relationship with the USA.

For, as we initially observed, Romania still needs to find the resources, the expertise and the political wisdom to fulfill its expanding regional and external responsibilities: as a NATO member — we still have to develop further and provide military capabilities where its presence is necessary — as an EU member — we must continue to reaffirm our EU identity and the responsibilities that ensue; regional security, strategic intelligence and transport, while supporting the incremental development of democratic societies and institutions. Overall, the Strategic Partnership with the USA continues to play a facilitating role, if not an essential one, in this evolving political, economic and social process.

Notes

¹ Romania's National Security Strategy: "A European Romania, a Euro-Atlantic Romania", released at 17 April 2006.

² We would like to thank the people who have provided us the official information.

³ Conceived as an advanced cooperation instrument drafted in order to promote the strategic interests of both countries.

⁴ Relevant to this extend is the speech that President Bush delivered, on the occasion of the Romanian Ambassador's accreditation to Washington, in the beginning of 2001: "Our excellent relations with Romania represent one of the pillars of the USA policy in Southeast Europe".

⁵ The "Kievenaar Study" was the background for the Romania's preparations to join NATO (intensive cooperation to elaborate and implement the National Annual Plans for NATO accession).

⁶ Status of Forces Agreement.

⁷ e.g. - Qualcomm invested 350 million USD; General Electric, in a joint venture with Turbomecanica, invested in manufacturing airship components.

⁸ Worth 200 million USD, the CSF is one of the components of the Urgent Law on additional funding for supporting the American military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its goal is to support the allies who are participating in the stabilization and reconstruction efforts in the mentioned countries.

⁹ The supply and demand equations define the terms of the Energy Security. Consumer countries assure the security of supply complemented by the producer countries which gives the security of demand. Romania could play the interface, even the mediator, with the huge resources and flows of the Caspian area, Russia, Azerbaijan. (Nabucco project - 2,841 km pipeline stretching on the route Turkey - Bulgaria - Romania - Hungary - Austria, transporting 100 million tones; expected construction start-up in 2009, will become operational in 2012). From East are coming the Energy flows and from West - the investments flows, and Romania is in between. Besides all these, in energy terms, Romania is the fifth most independent EU country, and more, in June 23rd 2007 it is scheduled to start working the second civil nuclear facility - Cernavoda 2.

¹⁰ Larrabee F. Stephen, *The United States and the European Security and Defense Policy: Old Fears and New Approaches*, pp. 173, 2006.

¹¹ *Idem*, pp. 180.

¹² <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050221.html>

¹³ We refer to nation building operations.

FROM CONTAINMENT TO PREEMPTION: THE EMPIRE SHOOTS ITSELF IN THE FOOT

ERICA ALMEIDA RESENDE

ABSTRACT

The 2002 National Security Strategy constitutes a break-away in US foreign policy-making. If the strategy of containment during the Cold War was said to have been undeniably legitimate, anchored by a defensive and liberal approach towards world order, the same cannot surely be said of the current policy of pre-emptive intervention. For the first time in history, the hegemonic superpower has declared its intention to review a currently favorable status quo*.

1. Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century, the post-Cold War system, hybrid and uniquely configured, has required the United States, currently under the George W. Bush administration, to urgently reflect on their global strategic priorities. The terrorist attacks on the cities of New York and Washington during September 11, 2001 confirmed the pressing need for a thorough strategic review of U.S. Foreign Policy.

* Actually, the status quo in U.S. foreign policy has always included the option of pre-emptive intervention, read the U.S. Constitution. From 1814 and Madison's attempts to capture Canada, 1898 McKinley with Cuba and the Philippines, Latin America throughout the 1800's and early 1900's, the Middle East, Africa and the Far East during the 1911 [J.K. Kennard].

For Gaddis (2002:23-24), the first impression is that, more significant and important than the collapse of the Twin Towers, was the fall of the inviolability myth of the continental United States. It was, importantly, the acknowledgement that "the geographic position and the military power of the United States are not sufficient to ensure that they are secured." Few countries outside of North America had enjoyed such a sustained period of "unconcerned" "national security." With the exception of Pearl Harbor, the United States had not suffered a foreign attack on its soil, since the English troops set the White House on fire, in 1814. Therefore, the terrorist actions of 11th September removed one of the few remaining certainties concerning international security, demonstrating that "free security" as Van Woodward identified no longer existed. The superpower that had finally achieved victory in the Cold War was no longer inviolate to external threat, and therefore, no longer an "exceptional" nation.

If what had happened in 2001 was qualitatively unheard of and unique, what were the implications for U.S. foreign policy? Just days after the terrorist attacks President George W. Bush announced a new path for the United States: the country would find itself in the middle of an endless war against terror, one in which the enemies were diffuse and the means to fight them would have to be equally so. The following year Bush's new doctrine became formalized, as it took the form of a document sent by the Speaker of the House on September 20, 2002, entitled "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America". Quickly called "Preemptive Doctrine", the new strategy seemed to constitute a major departure from the U.S.'s traditional approach to international relations.

In view of these significant changes in U.S. foreign policy it becomes incumbent upon us to question if the Preemptive Doctrine, as a new project of global

governance, could constitute an adequate response to the transformations suffered by the international system since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Especially, how legitimate is it for the U.S. to adopt a pre-emptive approach to the use of force in the international arena? Hence, the objective of this chapter is to analyze the main changes introduced by the new security doctrine and reflect on the impact that these alterations to U.S policy has had on the international system.

2. The Cold War and the Doctrine of Containment

The end of the Second World War had not only provided the final blow to the old European imperial powers, but it also revealed the characteristics of a new design for the international system. These can be summarized within four elements.

Firstly, the problem of uncertainty with regards to the future; The Euro-centric balance power system that had operated from 1815 to 1914 was now clearly no longer robust or relevant enough to deal with a world that was creating more independent nation-states, while demanding greater economic and political interdependence. This condition was now providing an additional element of insecurity.

Secondly, 1945 also marked the polarization of power in the world as the United States and Soviet Union now looked to promote their own particular and opposing view of international society. On the one hand, the United States' economic and military power had now become self-evident as they pushed the Axis powers towards submission. Yet, on the other hand, without the Soviet Union's "liberation" of Eastern Europe the Allies successful march on Berlin the war would have still been "undecided".

Thirdly, the relative asymmetry of the United States power, compared to that of other States. This condition

was due largely to the wartime destruction of other competitive industrial economies in Western Europe and Japan; compared to the relatively safe environment of the U.S. industrial complex. This allowed the United States to finally rid themselves of the economic shadow that was the Great Depression and therefore, some of the isolationist instincts that had sat atavistically within American politics. Hence, American governance became more centralized and stronger.

Finally, the existence of vanquished enemy was now recognized, allowing the allies to declare a clear and unchallengeable victory. For Roosevelt, the commanding lesson learnt from the First World War was that the Versailles Treaty had been akin to a "gentlemen's agreement" that lacked rigour, clarity and finality. Hence Roosevelt saw unconditional surrender of the Axis and the subsequent occupation of their territories as a *sine qua non* condition.

Therefore, the reality of the immediate post-war period pointed to a favorable condition for a true superpower that possessed a real material and political hegemonic capability¹. From a material standpoint, the United States now generated around half of the world's economic production, while holding the lead in international technological development and primacy in military power.

Regarding political capability, the active participation of the then-president of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, during the conflict, reinforced the notion that future involvement by the United States in international affairs was essential if international order was to be restored and maintained successfully. This recognition of the United States' newfound capacity and capability to influence external affairs was a departure from the political diffidence that had followed Woodrow Wilson's initial attempts to provide a new world order.

Until midway through the Second World War, the U.S foreign policy seemed to support a detached approach to

administering the international system, as was shown by the unwillingness of Washington to support Wilson's ideas surrounding the League of Nations. However, as this global conflict drew to a close, foreign policy-makers in Washington recognized that they were now in a unique situation to adopt the position as world leaders. For they not only possessed the material capability, but now held the political capability and willingness to devise a new strategy for global governance. At the centre of this new thinking was the United States' status as a superpower. This recognition drove one of the broadest reorganizations of international society through managerial institutionalism.

Between 1944 and 1951, guided by the logic of a bipolar configuration of power and the future need to contain the Soviet Union, the United States newfound leadership now helped build an intense network of political, economic and military institutions. This development was clearly illustrated via Truman's containment speech in 1947.

With the Truman Doctrine, we can note two of the many measures that were aimed at introducing and maintaining a policy of containment: the Marshall Plan whose principle objective was to link political consensus to financial aid in Europe; the creation of the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) to provide a secure environment for the West. Concurrently, political, economic and diplomatic institutions, which were first instigated during Roosevelt's administration, were now offering a global perspective to U.S. values and principles.

Between 1947 and 1960, after the UNO, the IMF, and the World Bank, were established, the world saw the implementation of additional networks of inter-governmental connections (GATT) and, in their corresponding sphere of influence, the creation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (The Rio Treaty), of the Organization of the American States (OAS), of the

Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), of The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), of the Baghdad Pact, of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

The overall effect of the creation of these numerous regional and global, multilateral and bilateral institutions was a connected and layered international organizational network. Ikenberry (2000) indentifies this strategy as "locking in" and "binding mechanisms" offering not only the notion that all nations were now interconnected, but generating the feeling that this process of international order was underpinned by political legitimacy. Moreover, this policy of containment suggested that although the United States was now in a position of pre-eminence they were willing to restrict the exercising of their power by strategic limitations. This would be achieved by offering stability and predictability in future international relations and the promise of involvement and representation for nations-states that seemed to lack the overt political and economic power that was previously required for international involvement.

For the United States, this condition meant that they could exert their hegemonic position at a significantly lower cost than by utilizing the old established imperial model. Hence, the image created was one of a "reluctant power"² or one of a "benevolent empire" that would secure U.S. power within consensually negotiated parameters, while enabling active participation for those states that had historically been excluded from international institutional arrangements.

Accordingly, Pecequilo (2003), suggests that the United States had now foregone their exclusive unilateral outlook to their foreign policy, even though they continued to protect their right to intervene. For Washington now saw their political and military influence being more

efficiently utilized via the agendas of alliances and institutions. Hence Pecequillo observes that in the long term, this new international order had attributed a power of its own.

To demonstrate the strategic logic of this self-limitation to U.S. power we can offer two examples: through regulating the right of nation-states to go to war (*jus bellum*) after 1945 through the United Nations Charter and the related rules of behavior³; the adoption of consensual rules when forming international military alliances within the context of the Cold War and Containment.

Therefore, it is worth noting that this new world order as opposed to the Paris Treaty (1919) did not try to abolish war from all international relations, but offered realistic limitations within a legal framework that was clear to all nation-state members. In this sense, we could argue that the creation of the United Nations Organization (UN), in June 1945, represented an extension of the strategic thinking that now underpinned the United States self-limitation when exercising their pre-eminent power. For this all embracing international organization, which had first been envisaged by Roosevelt, looked to establish a balance of power amongst its signatories while still acknowledging the special status awarded to the victors of the Second World War.

The UN Charter, instituted a system of collective security under the umbrella of a collegiate organ- the Security Council — whose joint role was to consider and reconcile questions concerning peaceful coexistence and the use of limited warfare. Therefore, these issues would now establish rules, norms, and principles that held international status as opposed to just possessing individual nation-state legitimacy. Hence, the Charter is often seen as offering a solution to the paradoxical position of legitimate state sponsored violence within the international arena: opposing the old doctrine that it was

the right of sovereign states to consider the use of armed forces against another if it was for a "just cause." In effect, the legitimacy of military acts by individual nation-states were now to be considered by international society.

Another indication of the U.S. strategy of self-limitation relative to their power can be inferred by the consensual characterization of the decision-making processes that now existed in the international organizations that they had helped construct during 1944-1951. In a European context, an example of this was the creation of NATO. According to Lord Ismay, this new alliance had been constructed to "keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in" further demonstrating the new multi-dimensional institutional nature of security relations employed to protect the newfound bond between the United States and Western Europe. Moreover, the United States had proposed that despite their military superiority this security alliance should adopt the principle of unanimity in their decision-making process. Suggesting that consensus amongst the western allies was an integral part of U.S. strategic thinking.

This apparent discarding of realist considerations by the U.S. in favor of self-limitation is identified by Ikenberry (2000) via three elements: the open character of the U.S. political system; the perceived reluctance to utilize overtly their hegemonic position; the binding character of the international institutions. This combination was making self-limitation an attractive one.

Consequently, Ikenberry saw the open and decentralized character of the U.S. political system as allowing the opportunity of other nation-states to be heard when consideration was being given to future international order. This condition also minimized individual nation-state isolation and superpower domination. Reflecting the flexible and accessible nature of liberal thinking that now existed in the new

international system of transnational and trans-governmental relations.

Moreover, because the U.S. federal political system seemed to be transparent, decentralized and consensual, other nation-states could calculate with more surety the direction in which U.S. foreign policy was headed. Therefore, being able to verbalize their disagreements without fear of reprisals and therefore dispelling some uncertainty and building confidence over the identification of new avenues for cooperation.

Unsurprisingly, Gaddis (1998:43) seems to agree with Ikenberry's analysis that the U.S. political system made cooperation with Europe over security and economic issues easier. Since according to Gaddis, even after the war had finished the chief strategists in the United States considered that their policies should continue to incorporate and accommodate third-party demands. In other words, Washington recognized the need to adopt an inclusive approach to European ideas and needs.

The second issue that Ikenberry highlights is the United States perceived condition as a reluctant hegemony. This idea suggests that because the U.S. was reserved in its approach to administrating the international system their national greatness was awarded not won. In this sense, Ikenberry brings Ernest May to mind⁴ by reinforcing the point that as political greatness would not be actively pursued by the United States; it would simply occur⁵.

The third issue underpinning this self-limiting option resided within the constraints that norms, rules and procedures that the international institutions now managed the new world order. This meant that although nation-states now had more room for diplomatic maneuvering bi-laterally as well as multi-laterally they were still framed by the commitments that the allies had made during 1945.

Among the institutions that created the most binding commitments were those emanating from military alliances. In this sense, NATO represented a self-limitation exercise for United States' power. Firstly, because it offered the logic of deterrence with regards to potential Soviet aggression. Secondly, because the United States, by its membership to NATO, had signaled its intentions to stay within a consensual European military alliance for the long-term.

Although the United States clearly enjoyed the leading position within this alliance, it was the institutional mechanisms based on consensus and negotiation that had helped reduce the consequences of power asymmetric among the nation-states.

Therefore, in some measure, as Ikenberry concludes, the United States "bought" the agreement of their European allies to the legitimate post-war order through their commitment to institutional bonds. Generally, they granted their allies more favorable conditions than was necessary, in exchange for legitimating and institutionalizing their own hegemony. So, self-limitation, commitment, and institutional bonds were the price paid by the United States as they looked to promote their own understanding of a new world order. Hence, the Doctrine of Containment, can be clearly seen as a universal political strategy aimed at expanding, extending, and then consolidating, the extraordinary degree of hegemonic power that the United States enjoyed after the middle of 1945.

Although we recognize that the initiatives contained within the Doctrine above all, served the interests of the United States, the architects of this strategy understood that these interests would not be best served if the United States maximized their political and economic advantages to the detriment of their allies. By making concessions in the short term, they reduced the fear of isolation among other nation-states as well as militating

against the natural oppressive nature of U.S. supremacy. Therefore, guaranteeing their long hegemony within the international sphere.

The result, according to Pecequillo (2003), was the construction of an international system that was “open, transparent, fragmented and porous, limiting unrestricted exercise of power” which encouraged foreign demands. In the post-1945 order, Pecequillo continues, “mechanisms of controlling and binding have been created, thus establishing commitments and links between the country and their partners, and hegemony would be exercised in an open and permeable manner”. Hence, the United States’ central position in the international system — the Atlantic Alliance and the Pacific Alliance — would stimulate more of an egalitarian approach, especially, in Western Europe and Japan, allowing any future use of force to possess a layer of legitimacy and legality.

While in the overall international system, which had now become more receptive to global governance, the promotion of these ideas of collective security — economic and military — by the United States was the principal agent in offering greater world-wide stability and surety.

However, although the Doctrine of Containment provided a great number of new alliances and institutional relationships for the United States, it also generated international political order that had become a hugely valuable commodity.

3. September 11th and the Preemptive Doctrine

The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 symbolized and objectified the end of the Cold War. For nearly forty years, the wall had graphically represented the bipolar nature of international politics. Offering a centre from where we could observe the continuing tensions that framed the

Cold War and the seemingly irreconcilable features of East and West thinking. The disintegration of the Soviet Union two years later not only placed the agreements made at Yalta and Potsdam into the "no longer needed" file, but triggered a radical shift in international relations as the world suddenly became managed via a unipolar structure headed by Washington.

As the United States was the remaining surviving power⁶ from the Cold War it now faced the need to build a new international order. The environment was unique so previous structures and policies seemed inappropriate and ineffectual. According to Nye, this new era required new strategic choices so that the United States to cope with this new potential for instability and insecurity.

The need for Containment had now disappeared as the Soviet Union imploded, yet, the "American way of Life" still demanded that their understanding of liberalism should be proselytized. Although the "barbarians" were no longer banging at the gate the wish to convert all through a cosmopolitan understanding of liberal thought continued. Yet the U.S. administration seemed to lack the vision and strategic thinking to deal with this new international condition. Therefore, the 1990's saw various attempts in Washington to identify new threats and possible future conflicts.

Out of this period four different strategies gained ground: neo-isolationism; primacy; cooperative security and selective engagement. These theoretical positions generated intense political debate throughout the decade⁷ and according to Ross and Posen (2001:3-51) this led to a combination of these ideas being used. The outcome was one of disappointment as ten years after the Cold War had ended none of these ideas had been able to successfully replace the Doctrine of Containment as their new political strategy.

Khalilzad (1995:vii) confirms this view that there had been a lack of clear strategic leadership during the 1990's

by noting "During the Cold War, the United States were relatively certain of their objectives. This I not true today. In spite of the efforts of Cheney's Office of the Secretary of Defense, during the Bush Administration and of analogous moments during the Clinton Administration no great strategy was devised".

Consequently, we could argue that September eleventh had the immediate effect of creating the political conditions — domestic and foreign — to resume the project for hegemonic reassertion, that had faltered in 1992. For although George Bush's victory had reinstalled the Republicans after his father's defeat by Clinton the foreign policy status quo had not reasserted itself because the context had suddenly changed. The terrorist attacks had provided a more receptive environment for change, one which was conducive to making primacy enforceable and legitimate.

When analyzing this new strategy of primacy we can identify five essential elements; redefining the geography of national security; establishing the relationship between power and principles; the re-evaluation of the needs of domestic and international security; defining the concept of multilateralism; changing the temporal perception of threats and preventive action.

The first element in this strategy is the acknowledgement of a change in the geography of national security. Historically, the spatial relationship was defined by inter-state borders, as the potential for conflict emanated from the nation-states. The significant change is that the new threats do not stop at the borders: their sources can be intra-society, but they are often articulated in a way that transcends conventional boundaries and borders. The nature of contemporary terrorism as the main threat confirms this process. However, the nomination of pariah states and their "terrorist clients" within the Preemptive Doctrine suggests that the traditional "terrorism of the State" has not been

eradicated, moreover, that the principle threat can still be located intra-state.

Pena argues (2003:5): Terrorism, as practiced by the Al Qaeda is not state-sponsored; it is private terrorism, unconnected to any Nation-State. Naturally Al Qaeda will benefit from a volunteer host, such as the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However, Al Qaeda's ideology and agenda have a domestic motivating force, which are not the political extension of a government. (...) If Al Qaeda is not the client of a pariah State, then the focus given by the national security strategy will not be able to fight Al Qaeda's terrorist threat.

The second element suggests that moral values are central to the Preemptive Doctrine. U.S. foreign policy has always reflected the dualistic nature of realism and idealism, but now the doctrinal concept of "balance of power that favors freedom" is declared, suggesting that W. Bush's administration is placing greater emphasis on power and values. Hence, they claim that they are able more clearly to establish a difference between "good and evil" and "right and wrong."

The doctrine's concentration on moral values is derived from reaffirming the relationship between the State and the individual, thereby re-emphasizing the liberal-civilizing traditions of universal freedom. The historic source of this type of moral underpinning can be found in the myths that surround American Exceptionalism⁸ and Winthrop's "city on a hill".

The third element in the Preemptive Doctrine concerns the re-evaluation of internal and international security, especially with regards to the transformation of the nation's armed forces, defense and intelligence institutions. Consequently, the influence of strategic primacy becomes clear as the need to maintain a global military presence to ensure power superiority is reinforced. Therefore, the strategy of national security becomes less and less "national" and more and more

“international.” The logical outcome being that national defense becomes more of an exercise in U.S. global reach.

The fourth element deals with the concept of multilateralism. The American understanding of this approach includes sovereign authority, *accountability* and political power, underpinned by a dose of pragmatism. Its defenders argue that this cocktail of understanding should not be characterized as a debate between American unilateralism and European multilateralism, but a genuinely alternative approach.

Therefore, it could be argued that as the U.S institutional preference is to now utilize diplomatic methods and solutions from several sources that their approach is more flexible and pragmatic. It no longer takes it lead from abstract principles that are destined to fail, but from international institutions that prioritize results and efficiency. This approach emphasizes *accountability* instead of false neutrality, consensus instead of merely symbolic decisions, preferring multilateral strategies aimed at preserving the sovereignty through the adoption of international law. This establishes a link between sovereign power and the sources of political authority.

However, this form of multilateralism does produce a form of relational ambiguity between international alliances and institutions. On one hand, it highlights the need for collective action in their fight against terrorism. Yet, on the other hand, it is clear that the United States would not hesitate to act alone should they not achieve the consensus of action that they are initially seeking.

The fifth element relates to the redefinition of national security within the contemporary technological environment. Historically, conflict between nation-states has often taken a long time to develop. However, with the ability and facility to now move armies further and faster without warning conflict can now escalate in much shorter periods. Moreover, because this conflict can now

be non-State related, diffuse and of a transnational nature, new threats do not necessarily follow the traditional paradigms of war.

At this point it is worth stating what we consider the expression "preventive action" to mean. Since, to characterize this approach as the existence of imminent attack⁹ is inadequate. However, what this new strategy does endorse is preventive war: an attack on a possible threat before it becomes real or imminent. In truth, such logic constitutes a prescription for a permanent state of war, since, according to the terms of the doctrine the mere existence of conditions that breed a possible threat is sufficient for engaging the enemy.

This position over "preventive war" gives rise to a series of concerns. Firstly, that the Preemptive Doctrine could pose a threat to international peace and security because it is valued by one nation-state. Secondly, that this condition could allow the United States to use this approach to justify any future use of force. Thirdly, the only way to assess the true impartial implementation of this doctrine would be via the United Nations Security Council. However, and finally, this process would undoubtedly infringe the right of the United States to self-defense.

Therefore, as Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister Celso Amorim (2002/2003:61) suggests, by placing human values, preventive war, war on terror, universal moral principles and new threats into this one contextual doctrine it not only "places fundamental notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the authority of the Security Council in check, but also, in a dangerous way, blurs the boundaries, states in the UN Charter, between enforcement and self-defense".

Ikenberry reminds us (2004:13-14) that this type of concern over legitimacy of action does not necessarily mean that the United States should yield power to the United Nations or even allow other foreign nation-states

to veto their right to use force. Indeed, he suggests, that good leaders are capable of establishing national objectives and exercising power in such a way as to attract the support of other nation-states, since they understand that international legitimacy means transforming coercion and domination into authority and consensus. Rousseau once observed, "the strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless one transforms strength into right to rule and obedience into duty." Moreover, as Ikenberry reminds us "Those who defend the fundamentalist power of post-September 11th believe that they are wise practitioners of Realpolitik. However, they easily confuse strength with power and power with authority".

Hence The Preemptive Doctrine reveals itself to be the product of a neo-conservative view of the world, one which advocates a new era of global domination that emphasizes the unilateral exercise of military power, the gradual disengagement of multilateral institutions and an aggressive crusade for democracy and freedom. Interestingly, the adoption of this type of strategy suggests that overall the United States' sovereignty has actually weakened.

Moreover, this strategy poses a danger for all future international relations. The disdain that the United States has recently shown towards their allies and international institutions, by breaking cooperation agreements, by sabotaging institutional international consultation and coordination mechanisms, by imposing their interests over those of other nation-states suggests how little they trust their own interests.

As Ikenberry (2004:13) correctly observes, issues of legitimacy are not restricted to academic debates; legitimacy is an intrinsic aspect of power. "It has been the object of the U.S. concern during the times they have achieved their most significant victories". Furthermore, the great lesson of the Cold War and Containment is that

the West won because it was united. "The United States led the construction of a multilateral order in the economy and in the area of security, which generated unprecedented prosperity and protection. The United States established self-limits and open themselves to their western allies, thus becoming an important engine for political cooperation and geopolitical power".

Therefore, the Preemptive Doctrine is wrong to define the fight against terrorism as the organizing principles of the national security strategy by reducing itself to the maxim of "kill them before they kill us". In that sense, this new global strategy is based upon threats and fears that does not encourage inter-state cooperation or develop a overall feeling of legitimacy.

4. Conclusion: a shot in the foot?

In March 2006, approximately three and a half years after the initial publication of this new strategic document, the National Security Strategy was revised to even out that relationship between international institutions and allies. However, it still reasserted the main premise of "preemptive war". Generally, the revision reaffirmed the main guidelines of 2002, but it did introduce some new points. Among them was the notion of "diplomacy of transformation," and the characterization of the moment of disorder as an "opportunity". It refutes the causality between terrorism and war, and it also introduces the development of democracy as an essential element.

However, the main purpose of this strategy is the clear commitment to change the regimes that exist in nation-states that are hostile to U.S. interests and values. For the first time in history, the hegemonic power takes a revisionist profile with regards to a favorable *status quo*. Hence, the project continues to subordinate the international system for the sake of national self-interest.

Therefore, these neo-imperialistic characteristics justify and expand the fear, abandonment, and domination that now exist in other nation-states.

As the United States entered the 21st century, just as in 1945, they presented a new global project for the promotion of world order. Suggesting a radical change in their foreign policy objectives as the ideas of containment and dissuasion were no longer appropriate. However, the switch from a defensive approach to an offensive one has generated huge concern amongst the United States' natural allies because of the potential instability that it has brought.

For many the Doctrine of Containment can be characterized as a defense strategy when applied to the Soviet threat and liberal construct when applied to the institutionalized political, economic and cultural order that followed. However, the Preemptive Doctrine seems to break away from this paradigm. They have now adopted an approach that lays emphasis on a more proactive aggressive approach that generates instability instead of international continuity.

Europe in particular has suffered from this strategic change as they become more marginalized in the decision-making process. The hegemonic stability that emanated from the U.S. relationship with Western Europe in 1945, and further reinforced during the Cold War, has been diluted as Washington has adopted a more unilateral approach, with the expectation that other nation-states would eventually "tow the line" in fear of American economic and political retaliation.

Such behavior of incentives and threats is reminiscent of the approach adopted by the great powers during the 1930's. Ironically, this was the exact type of behavior that the U.S. had been so anxious to fight against during the Cold War. Therefore, the self-limitation that had been practiced by the U.S. during the fifty years that followed the Second World War had been replaced via a

recanting of commitments and institutional power structures that they had helped construct.

Hence, our conclusion is that the Preemptive Doctrine, reconfirmed by a 2006 revision document¹⁰ lacks the necessary legitimacy for it to be sustained. Because the U.S. has shifted its understanding of power from one of liberal institutionalism to unilateral coercion in spite of this change creating greater not less instability in the international arena.

Therefore, this Preemptive Doctrine represents an inadequate response to the transformations that the international system has experienced since the fall of the Berlin Wall. For it not only breaks away from the strategy of self-limitation but it has also alienated traditional allies, and therefore, devaluing the institutional organizations that were set up to manage international order.

International rules and institutions should not be seen as the enemies of power and interests. In fact, power becomes more profound, true and durable when it incorporates rules and principles of international order. The so-called American values have been largely and widely disseminated on this very basis.

Javier Solana, the current High Representative for the European Common Foreign and Security Policy, in a conference at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, on April 7th, 2003, argued that: "A rules-based approach is not a ploy to constrain the US. Americans wrote much of the great body of international law that has served us so well in the post-war period. Upholding and strengthening the rule of law is the best means for America to preserve her position as the benign world power and to continue to project her values." In this sense, it is possible to argue that the success or failure of a global strategy is ultimately determined by the legitimacy afforded by other nation-states.

If the United States does not take on a role pursuant to its own power and responsibilities, and that includes, especially, tolerance to differences, this century may well be marked by a strong retrocession in terms of stability. A power that is hegemonic in nature but which is not legitimate and is dissociated from the norms and the post-war international institutions, a power that insists in opting for an extremely belligerent and neo-imperial behavior will unleash higher degrees of antagonism, resistance and instability. The United States will then be left to face a world which is even more hostile and divided.

The fact that the current U.S. administration has incorrectly, if not falsely appropriated the “how to rule” metaphor has created the new problem of “how to convince and to lead.” If the American neo-conservatives continue to celebrate the primacy of U.S. military force they are making a serious misjudgment, for they should not act as de facto imperial power if they wish to continue to play the central role in international affairs. For these reasons, the Preemptive Doctrine shows how the U.S. administration has “shot themselves in the foot”.

Notes

¹ For a detailed account of the U.S. hegemonic capability at the end of the Second World War, see Krasner, S. “American Policy and Global Economic Stability” in Avery, W. P. and Rapkin, D. P. (Ed.). *America in a Changing World Political Economy*. New York: Longman, 1982.

² On an image of reluctant power, see Holt, R. and Unda, J. *The Reluctant Superpower: A History of America's Economic Global Reach*. Kodansha International, 1995.

³ In view of the anarchic structure of the international system, the decision of when, how, against whom to go to war in the case of conflict would be up to the State, which would have to justify this decision. Such outlook created a situation in which the right to go to war started to “be confused with the power of the States

itself, therefore, an unconditional subjective right to break the peace at any moment and to make war at their will and for any reason", according to Silva Soares (2003).

⁴ MAY, E. *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power*. New York: 1961, p. 270. This expression has been inspired by a quote from William Shakespeare's "Twelfth Night": "Some of us are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them". Act II, Scene 5.

⁵ Except for the naturalization problem of the hegemonic condition of the United States, the corollary of this proposal is that the U.S. foreign policy would be an answer to external factors. The United States, therefore, would not act in accordance with some predetermined logic of expansionism, but only react to circumstances.

⁶ We prefer to call it "surviving" rather than "winner" for it is our understanding that the end of the Cold War has not generated any spoils of war to be distributed. One cannot firmly talk of a U. S. victory against a URSS defeat in this case.

⁷ For a comprehensive series of articles illustrating this debate, see Brown, M., Lynn-Jones, S. and Miller, S.; *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995; Allison, G. and Treverton, G. F. (Ed.). *Rethinking America's Security. Beyond Cold War to a New World Order*. New York: WW Norton, 1992; Brown, M. E.; Coté Jr., O. R.; Lynn-Jones, S. Miller, S. (Ed.). *America's Strategic Choices*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001; and Ikenberry, G. J. (Ed.). *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*. 4th Edition. New York: Longman, 2001.

⁸ For a thesis on exceptionalism, see Tocqueville, A. *Democracy in America*.; Sombart, W. *Why is there no Socialism in the United States?* White Plaines: Sharpe, 1976; Lipset, S. M. *The First New Nation: the United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective*. New York: Basic, 1963.; and *American Exceptionalism; a Double-Edged Sword*. New York: Norton, 1996. On the impact of the myth of exceptionalism on the United States foreign policy, see McDougall, W. *Promised Land, Crusader State: the American Encounter with the World since 1776*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997; and Mead, W. R. *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World*. New York: Knopf, 2001.

⁹ A classic example of preventive active in self defense would be the military action undertaken by Israel against Egypt, Syria

and Jordan in the War of the Six Days of 1967. For further reading see Oren, M. B. *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East*. New York: Ballantine, 2002.

¹⁰ *The National Strategy the United States of America*. NSS-2006. The White House. March 16.

CEE: THE END OF IDEALISM IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS – TIME FOR A HEALTHY PARTNERSHIP

VERA RIHACKOVA

ABSTRACT

Since the regime change of the late 1980s and the process of democratization and emancipation boosted by their membership in NATO¹ and EU², the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have been redefining their foreign and security policies. A strong partnership with the US was appropriately regarded by the most of the CEE elites as the cornerstone of their foreign and security policy in the 1990s. At the same time, the transatlantic link was considered a privileged partnership by the CEE elites who sought to develop and maintain special relations with the US following the collapse of communism as a pillar of their own national security. With changing strategic threats and political developments, this policy-making built on the emotional ties with the US is losing ground in the region albeit unevenly. In some countries³, the position of the ruling political parties on the left-right spectrum is gaining salience⁴ as a crucial variable determining their transatlantic policy making. Focusing namely on the Czech Republic, this article argues that this period of "idealizing the transatlantic relationship" by the Czech elites in terms of privileged access has reached an end. However, the transatlantic link and NATO in particular continue to be seen as one of the crucial pillars of the Czech foreign and security policy in this changing environment. The end of idealism in transatlantic relations translates into day to day politics, marks a new phase in Czech-US relations based on an emotion-free and balanced foundation, while also providing for major transatlantic opportunities. The EU accession and

membership experience are seen as one of the crucial elements in this process.

1. Introduction

The idea to write this article originated during the Winter Institute on US National Security with our Romanian colleague Mirelle Radoi providing the impetus to the whole project. While crossing the Atlantic to study US foreign and security policy-making on their home ground, one striking observation I made was that Europe and the European Union do not score very highly on the US foreign policy agenda. Despite this fact, emotional ties and historical reminiscences towards the US still play strongly and stereotypically within the CEE region. Focusing upon recent developments, this article explores whether these stereotypes still translate into the current relations of the CEE countries, especially within Czech-US relations. This analysis cannot be exhaustive within the scope of this article and certain simplifications will be made. Nonetheless, it seems that the policy-making built on the emotional ties towards the US is gradually beginning to lose ground in the region. The process is however uneven; besides other regional specifics, this article argues that EU accession and membership is an important variable in this development.

It is often argued that the CEE countries display different level of Atlanticism⁵ at the moment and it will probably remain so in the future, but the de-idealization of the US foreign policy priorities is important for both sides. Europe is sometimes preoccupied with the transatlantic link in a way the US is not, with some of the old EU member states trying to find a non-US⁶ stance at all costs. Others like Denmark and the UK together with "new" Europe⁷, albeit somewhat sporadically, continue to support US policy. A European

consensus then has to incorporate the vigorous and hesitant Atlanticism of some of the EU member states, the neutrality or isolationism of some of the small, old member states and a non-US stance of the rest. Leaving the period of idealization behind, the CEE can contribute significantly both to the effective transatlantic policy-making within the EU opening the space for more balanced debate; and to efficient EU-US partnership and new discourse in transatlantic relations. Especially in the security field, the tasks before both Europe and the US are too complex and imminent to waste time on competition or cherry picking⁸.

The EU is not a state; different by its nature, it provides its members with the opportunity to make other countries transform and exert an influence they would never be able to as individual state actors. This claim is valid for both the powerful and small EU member states; the EU transformative power⁹ potential impacts on foreign policy-making of the acceding countries. With the development of the eastern EU foreign policy where the new member states are heavily involved, the shifts in the foreign policies of the CEE countries in terms of reforming their form of Atlanticism can be expected¹⁰.

It is often said that the war in Iraq was in some cases a turning point in the transatlantic policy making of the CEE states. It is true that in all the countries of the region, at the public level, if not always on the level of national governments, the war in Iraq and the rhetoric surrounding the war on terror made close association with the US security policies less desirable¹¹. The "emancipation" of the CEE elites from idealistic perception of the transatlantic link had started even before, but as an uneven process both in terms of countries' differences and elites' differentiation. The claim that the elites in the Czech Republic are clearly Atlanticist¹² has not been proved. In the Czech Republic, the position of the ruling political parties on the left-right spectrum is

gaining importance, closely linked with the way given political party sees the future of the EU and European policy as such. The period of idealizing the transatlantic relations by the Czech elites in terms of privilege access has reached an end and the efforts to start employing the standard tools for attempting to influence the US policy making¹³ if necessary are being pursued, even with mixed results so far.

2. The CEE countries and Atlanticism

European integration process and the EU accession have been key factors in stabilizing the democratic regimes in the CEE countries influencing any political elites in power. During the first two years of the membership, the eight CEE countries have increased their role and influence in the international scene¹⁴. The accession of the CEE states to the EU was frequently perceived in the former EU-15 as strengthening the Atlanticist element in the Union. After more than two years of their membership, it seems the importance attached to this fact has been overestimated¹⁵. Transatlantic relations are declared priorities of all CEE governments in the EU, the priority endorsement is however questionable. Also the public opinion in the region is not as Atlanticist as in some of the former EU-15¹⁶.

The CEE region is not homogenous neither as far as CEE countries' level of atlanticisms is concerned¹⁷, nor in their domestic politics and their party systems development and stability. It is claimed that Poland together with the Baltic countries is, and in the future, will most likely remain the most committed to Atlanticism. The smaller CEE states such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia tend to voice their support for US policies more cautiously¹⁸. One of the obvious reasons which can be found elsewhere¹⁹ is

that for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary, the perception of external threats is much less intense than that of the Baltic states or Poland, and most likely also for Romania and Bulgaria after their accession. The threat perception is largely given by historical experience and the demand for hard security in the Baltic region (including Poland), as well as in Romania and Bulgaria is much stronger than in the Central Europe. It seems that the strategic considerations of most of the CEE states are still rooted in the past, but with the changing nature of the global security environment and threats it becomes quickly outdated. With further development of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as with the further intensification of the EU response to the threats posed by non-states actors most of the burning issues will be dealt with or at least tackled on the EU level with the CEE countries taking part in the decision-making. The US policy in the region on the other hand, seems to pursue the short-term incentives, especially focusing on easy access to the Black Sea region and Greater Middle East, i.e. probably the regions of the conflicting interests in the near future.

EU is perceived as an actor which can provide its neighbors with rules and democratic norms and deliver a long term results in terms of stabilizing and democratizing her near abroad²⁰. The current enlargement fatigue EU is facing and possible impact it can have on the countries like Ukraine or Georgia²¹ can add to the future efforts of Romania and Bulgaria to stabilize the Black Sea region where the EU, Russia and US interests clash. The rivalry in the field of energy policy together with a long-term goal of achieving security and transformation of their neighboring states will influence the Bulgarian and Romanian transatlantic policies after the EU accession since the US plays first and foremost in her own interest and the democratic development of

the region as such does not occupy high levels of US foreign policy priorities. The US policy in the region does not allow for being seen as willing to use its power and resources to promote freedom and democratic norms at the moment.

Right-left division and the scale of Atlanticism, with the parties on the right being rather Atlanticist and the parties on the left rather pro-European displaying lower level of Atlanticism, is a general assumption. Like the Western Europe²², the CEE region has undoubtedly its specifics²³, especially with regard to the party systems development and stability. In this regard, further deep analysis is needed. In Hungary, for example, FIDESZ, although largely Atlanticist and a dominant right-wing party used in the past anti-American rhetoric in order to attract more nationalist voters. Another special case is Poland, which throughout 1990's demonstrated long-lasting and consistent support for US foreign policy over many issues, starting with the first Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan and later Iraq. Atlanticist attitude was never questioned by Polish political elites. Poland's pro-US stance remained constant despite the fact that the political scene had changed frequently during this period. According to some²⁴ this situation has started to change with some political parties²⁵ challenging the traditional bases of Polish foreign policy, including the strong Atlanticist orientation. Another phenomenon, which is observable within the Western European parties too, are the attitudes of individual elites deviating from the general party lines. Since the party systems in the CEE countries are still in the making, some speak rather of cross-party cleavage on transatlantic issues²⁶ drawing usually three basic categories: those in favour of a stronger and more independent EU role on the world stage, those who favour the primacy of NATO as a source of stability and prefer a balanced partnership between the US and EU, and finally those who would prefer to

keep a strong bilateral tie with Washington even at a cost of not acting along with the other EU member states. Nevertheless, despite blurred picture the CEE countries sometimes produce in the transatlantic policy issues, with regard to the findings presented in the following chapter, it seems the right-left cleavage regarding the overall party elites discourse is gaining salience²⁷.

Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe is not a blank cheque. Longer the CEE countries are members of the EU, the more pragmatic their foreign policy will become. The Western European countries relations with the US after the WWII can be described as those of dependence and independence. The anti-American and a-American feelings are caused largely by the power relations and its perception²⁸; and these motives keep translating into their transatlantic policy-making. Not having such an experience and leaving the idealization of the transatlantic partnership behind, the CEE countries have a potential to facilitate and contribute to the efficient transatlantic policy discourse providing for new healthier partnership.

3. Czech elites²⁹ and Atlanticism

It has been observed that the CEE elites are convinced Atlanticists with some exceptions like Slovenia³⁰ despite the alienation with the public opinion during the Kosovo or Iraq crisis for example. The generation of "dissident elites" who played crucial role in their countries' transitions to democracy, recognized the leading US role in toppling communism and in facilitating the integration of the CEE countries into Euro-Atlantic community, is slowly backing away from the top politics in their home countries. The emotional ties and history often played role in their decision-making³¹ despite their positioning on left-right political spectrum. Together with some of the new elites trained in the US universities they

usually create strong Atlanticist clusters in the CEE countries but the spectrum of CEE elites and the opinions they voice on the transatlantic policy-making is more diversified.

This part deals with the Czech elites focusing on the period starting with the first election victory of the Czech social democrats (CSSD) in 1998 up until now. It is a period within which the Czech Republic entered NATO, several crises (Kosovo, Iraq) occurred and the Czech political elites had to deal with the domestic policy issues with a transatlantic dimension³². A symbolic change in US–Czech relations was marked by a presidential alteration. In February 2003 Vaclav Klaus took office after Vaclav Havel, right in the middle of the Iraq crisis. After an idealist and strong atlanticist who emphasised the values shared by democracies on both sides of Atlantic and a leading figure of the US–Czech relations with privilege relations both with the US president Bill Clinton and his second term Foreign secretary Madeleine Albright³³, the Czechs got a pragmatic realist, a “euro-sceptic” who soon even got the label of anti-Americanist.

Social democrat Jan Kavan³⁴ (CSSD) took the office of the foreign minister in the CSSD minority government after the general election in July 1998³⁵. Stating his main goals in the office for the Czech press immediately after the inauguration, he said: *“There will be no radical shift. The main priorities remain the same— the accession to NATO and EU. We will play an active role in NATO but I would not welcome the Czech Republic to be perceived as a Trojan horse of the US in Europe. It does not mean the US is not one of our closest allies. It simply means we are part of Europe and we should co-operate on strengthening the European defence identity.”*³⁶ The minority government was bound to consult the foreign policy issues with the opposition.

The Czech Republic’s membership in NATO is closely linked to the US leadership and security guarantees.

Prior to NATO's 1997 invitation to join the Alliance, public support in the Czech Republic for NATO membership had ranked among the lowest of all the NATO candidate countries. There was a lack of a public debate regarding defence and military issues and responsibilities of the Czech Republic during the 1990's related to NATO membership. Czech elites prepared, negotiated, and implemented the entire process, with little public involvement. An opinion widely shared among Czech politicians that the citizens have a passive or even a negative view towards military issues and alliances³⁷ was the main reason why there was no referendum on the NATO membership. The Czech Republic became NATO member through the consensual political elites' decision with the exception of the KSCM, a communist party which immediately incorporated a need to leave NATO into its election programme. Right after the accession³⁸ the Czech elites had to face the first critical situation in connection to NATO intervention in Kosovo issue and military campaign against the former Yugoslavia. Even though the Czech public opinion supported the efforts of the international community during the first Gulf war (1991) and the war in Bosnia (1995) the Kosovo crisis turned critical.

When NATO released its air strikes at the end of March 1999, President Vaclav Havel welcomed the attack and the leaders of the two smaller opposition parties, liberal Freedom Union (US) and the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) supported the campaign, too. The other party leaders were more reluctant. The Communists' position surprised no one, but unexpected was the position of the strongest opposition party ODS. Its chairman, former PM and future president Vaclav Klaus went on record a day after the attacks were launched, stating that the use of force could not produce a sound or long-term solution. His forthright anti-NATO stance stunned not only president Havel, the other two opposition parties

(US, KDU–CSL), but several members of his own party as well since the Czech Republic's accession to NATO had been one of the linchpins of ODS agenda when in power³⁹. The Czech minority government (CSSD) officially supported the air strikes, but in practice adopted a hesitant approach. Efforts were made to prevent the opinion differences from damaging the Czech Republic's image abroad. Foreign minister Jan Kavan kept denying there was any discrepancy between the president and the government on the support to the NATO military action. When it occurred that NATO would be undertaking ground operations, Prime Minister Milos Zeman pre-emptively announced that Czech soldiers would not participate in the land invasion. In response, President Havel accused him of betraying the Alliance⁴⁰.

President Havel argued for new "Pax Americana". He consistently supported resolute military action during the Gulf war, war in Bosnia and later the Iraq operation. The ethnic cleansing in Kosovo troubled him so much that he not only welcomed the strike against Yugoslavia, but used such a discourse that had the Czech public dumbstruck. He spoke of an ethical war claiming that, by virtue of an air strike in Yugoslavia, human rights are placed above the legal system⁴¹.

After the 9/11, NATO invoked Article 5 — collective defense clause, and another challenging period emerged. The Czech Republic played its part in showing the solidarity with the US offering help in the fight against terrorism. The Czech Republic dispatched a specialized radiation, chemical and biological protection battalion to Kuwait and Milos Zeman's government also dispatched the Czech army's sixth and eleventh field hospitals to Afghanistan⁴². Czech Special Forces later went to Afghanistan to take part in the counter-terrorism operations and peacekeeping under the NATO led International Security Assistance Force. These issues were

of general consensus not only in the Czech Republic, but also within the Alliance.

Next general elections were held in June 2002. The social democrats (CSSD) won again and created a weak 101 seat majority government with the Christian democrats (KDU-CSL) and the liberals (US-DEU)⁴³. The post of the foreign affairs minister was offered to the coalition partner and Cyril Svoboda (KDU-CSL) acceded to office⁴⁴. On the verge of the Iraq crisis, the Czech Republic now had new weak coalition government and Vaclav Havel's term in the Presidential office was about to expire⁴⁵. Consequently, the Czech government and other political leaders began to take clear positions on the issue of a possible military strike against Iraq, based on UN Security Council resolution No. 1441, Vaclav Havel demonstrated his position on the future of Iraq by his signature of the "Letter of Eight", addressed by the representatives of eight European countries to the Wall Street Journal⁴⁶. This letter illustrated support for an American military strike against Iraq. But the president's signature could not be considered as constituting the real position of the Czech Republic since the government was not consulted and did not approved it⁴⁷. Even though the world media thought the opposite⁴⁸ the "Letter of Eight" was not an official position of the Czech Republic⁴⁹. Vaclav Havel confirmed his position as a strong Atlanticist, he was also encouraged to sign the letter by pro-American circles within the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially by the deputy foreign minister Alexander Vondra, a former ambassador to Washington and close confidant of his.

After the Parliament elected Vaclav Klaus as president, he adopted a clear attitude on Iraq. It stemmed from the idea of using force in international relations as a last resort in times of crisis. This criteria according to Klaus, was not fulfilled either in previous Kosovo crisis or in case of Iraq. Klaus further asserted that the US

led coalition did not want primarily to destroy weapons of mass destruction. He even doubted Saddam Hussein's regime had such weapons⁵⁰. However, on March 31st he sent a letter to President George W. Bush, in which he stressed Czech support for the coalition. The support was given within the spirit of the Czech government resolution⁵¹ and given a parliamentary mandate. President Klaus declined to declare whether the Czech Republic was taking the side of the US and Great Britain, that is the leading countries of the war coalition, or the side of France and Germany, the strongest objectors to the military intervention. He stated that the Czech Republic had its own position, the goal of which was assistance in averting a humanitarian disaster in Iraq, but also the effort to bridge the divisions within Europe and revitalize the weakening transatlantic link. By making such statements Klaus articulated the fears of a considerable number of Czech politicians, who felt uncomfortable in being confronted with the necessity of having to make a choice between both sides. PM Vladimír Špidla's (CSSD) government was split on the issue, two small coalition parties — Christian democrats and liberals advocated for explicit support of the war coalition. Furthermore, they advocated that the Czech Republic become involved in military operations in Iraq, but other ministers from the senior governing party (CSSD) held completely opposing attitude.

The complexity of the Iraqi situation led Czech political parties to adopt similar positions to the ones they adopted during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. As was the case five years earlier, Czech political parties' divided into two camps. Centre-right⁵² parties generally supported the war in Iraq while left wing parties condemned the war. It is important to note from the outset that the division between these two camps was not based on the government coalition being pitted against the opposition. It is interesting the Czech political elites did not have the

informational resources to analyse the Iraqi situation and formulated purely political statements. Conversely, it is necessary to point at the fact that there were also variety and contradictory opinions within some of the Czech political parties,⁵³ namely in the senior than ruling CSSD and the Christian democrats (KDU-CSL).

The right wing ODS held a clear pro-American position in relation to Iraq. The opinions of its key representatives corresponded with the positions adopted by deputy foreign minister Alexander Vondra and (former) president Vaclav Havel. For example, the ODS fully supported Havel's decision to sign the "Letter of Eight". ODS, the second largest party in the lower chamber also ensured that the government resolutions were given a smooth passage through the Parliament⁵⁴. The pro and anti-war division arose within the senior governing party (CSSD). As a result, there emerged an incongruity in the positions of the CSSD dominated cabinet and the position adopted by a majority of the CSSD parliamentary party members⁵⁵. Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla (CSSD) played a key role when the governmental resolution was being debated. Being a pacifist he was well aware that the Czech Republic had to satisfy her allies in some manner. While the position adopted was contrary to his own personal opinions, he eventually pushed forward what was in his view the best stance for the Czech Republic.⁵⁶ The communists (KSCM) was the most vocal party in the lower chamber and in the media expressing unequivocal opposition to the war in Iraq and set itself against all government actions in relation to the situation in Iraq.

The formulation of the Czech government policy on the Iraq crisis was extremely difficult with public opinion and part of the political parties opposing any participation and support to the operations of the US led coalition. It is unlikely Czech Republic would participate in any other ad-hoc coalition under the US leadership

since the possibility of influencing its policy is close to zero⁵⁷. Even the United Kingdom, the closest ally of the U.S. in Europe, did not score any points over Iraq in this sense.

With the EU accession⁵⁸, the Czech Republic increased its potential to influence the international developments in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) promoting rather idealistic approach to several policy issues like the EU stance on Cuba. The attitudes towards CFSP and EU-US relations have been among the most controversial topics that keep splitting up the Czech political elites. Some claim there are four different orientations⁵⁹ Czech political elites prefer largely regardless of their party affiliation. Europeanists favour the cooperation in the EU, Atlanticists are mainly oriented on the US, internationalists would like to cooperate with both the EU and the US and isolationists oppose orientation on any of these partners. Since there are supporters of different orientations in virtually all political parties with the exception of the Communist Party, it is claimed the picture of the Czech foreign policy priorities has always been rather blurred, in particular from the external perspective. Nevertheless, despite the contrasting attitudes of some individuals within several Czech political parties⁶⁰ and with regard to the findings presented in this chapter, the right-left cleavage regarding the overall party elites discourse is gaining salience and can be regarded as a crucial variable in the transatlantic policy-making. This tendency has crystallized during the policy crisis in this given period.

The Czech political elites transatlantic discourse has developed in the EU with the necessity to voice positions on the important issues namely in the security field⁶¹. Before the June 2006 general elections, the political parties' positions on the foreign policy were stated, too. The CSSD led government of the last four years had balanced between the US and its European critiques,

between the atlanticist (OSD) opposition and their own party's Europeanist left wing. The government's mission statement stressed the importance of both NATO and the EU for the Czech Republic's security. On the issue of terrorism, the government admits that NATO still plays the most important role, but warns at the same time that it is not "an effective tool against the new threat of international terrorism anymore"⁶².

CSSD endorsed a stronger role for the EU and further process of European integration deepening. On the security level, the CSSD followed the European Security Strategy⁶³ highlighting a multilateral world, the UN Charter, an "early, quick [...] and robust military action"⁶⁴ according to the international law and rejecting pre-emptive wars. The Christian democrats (KDU-ČSL) have also supported EU political integration deepening. The party insisted that the Czech Republic should belong to the core of European integration⁶⁵ and support a communitarization of CFSP,⁶⁶ which would strengthen the EU role on the international scene. The party prefers multilateral and non-military means as these are the basis of the soft power perception the EU enjoys in the world.⁶⁷ On the particular topic of European security, KDU-ČSL insists that NATO remains the core aspect. However, as far as it has no ambition to elbow aside or substitute NATO, the EU should proceed with the ESDP, especially in order to be able to solve its own European problems.⁶⁸ The Civic Democrats (ODS) are the traditional atlanticists on the Czech political scene. They oppose federalization of the CFSP claiming it would be disadvantageous for the Czech national interests, although they believe that the EU should adopt common positions towards the neighboring regions, such as North Africa or Middle East "on voluntary principle and by unanimity"⁶⁹. The CFSP should be organized in a way that provides the "highest equality among states"⁷⁰. The most important, however, remains the transatlantic link,

which is described as the "guarantee of peace and freedom in Europe"⁷¹. A common Euro-Atlantic political, economic and security area is from the ODS point of view the "core of the world democratic civilization"⁷². The ODS regards the Czech membership in the NATO as the "biggest success of the Czech foreign policy after 1989"⁷³ and all future actions of the CFSP must not lead to the weakening of NATO or withdrawal of US soldiers from Europe. The EU should create more capabilities of its own, but strictly complementarily with NATO.

The position of the communists (KSCM) is again based on a rejection of both the NATO and CFSP. The KSCM's most prominent target is traditionally NATO, which is seen as a residue of the Cold War and a factor that boosts threats to the security of Europe. Therefore, Communists want the Czech Republic to contribute to the dissolution of the Alliance or to give up its membership.⁷⁴ The main problem of the international affairs is the United States' endeavour for world hegemony and therefore, the ESDP leads to a "full adaptation and subordination to strategic conception of the US and NATO"⁷⁵. The party also rejects the CFSP in general, because it leads to a militarization of the EU. It also opposes deploying troops abroad, which is described as servility and support to the aggressive policy of the US⁷⁶. All foreign policy action should be attached to resolutions of the UN Security Council and more emphasis should be put on the OSCE.⁷⁷ Overall, the Czech political elites stress the importance of the transatlantic link, but without the esprit of idealism that Vaclav Havel and the cluster of his associates were used to. It is based rather on pragmatic calculations and other party specific factors like in the case of Christian democrats (KDU-CSL). With the new government in the process of building, it is hard to assess the future main policy line on the transatlantic issues, but it is obvious that the ruling elites will rather follow their parties' lines.

4. Conclusion

When the authors of *The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe*⁷⁸ ask whether the historical resentments towards the US continues to resonate in the CEE region, the answer is most likely yes, despite the policy of the current US administration, which seemed to override the positive feelings of the region's population in some cases. The CEE policy-making and the elite's attitudes towards the transatlantic agenda is a different issue. It seems that the period of idealization of the transatlantic link has reached its end, although the region cannot be treated as a homogenous entity. The future relations of the CEE countries with the US are likely to be based on pragmatic choices, emotion-free and balanced foundation. Their EU membership plays largely and gradually a role in this process as well as the ruling parties positions on the right-left political scale.

Such an approach to the transatlantic policy-making creates room for better cooperation between the "old" and "new" EU member states and provides an opportunity to work on healthier and perhaps even stronger transatlantic partnership in the future.

Despite the contrasting attitudes of some individuals within Czech's political parties and with regard to the findings presented above, it can be said that the right-left cleavage regarding the overall party elites discourse is gaining salience in the Czech Republic and can be regarded as a crucial variable in the transatlantic policy-making. The claim that the Czech elites are overall Atlanticist is thus untenable.

Notes

¹ The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have been NATO members since 1999. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania were invited to enter the Alliance

during NATO summit in Prague (November 2002) and joined on March 29, 2004.

² The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia entered the EU on May 1, 2004. Bulgaria and Romania are supposed to access the EU as of January 1st, 2007.

³ The Czech Republic is a prime example.

⁴ In so doing, the parties actually copy development in some of the Western European countries.

⁵ (Asmus, Vondra 2005), (Bugajski, Teleki, 2005), (Bugajski, 2005), (Kral, 2005).

⁶ For the difference between anti-, non- and a-Americanism refer to Valasek. (Valasek, 2005).

⁷ U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld divided Europe into "old" and "new" in his speech in January 2003 emphasizing inconveniently and not accurately the cleavage.

⁸ Some US policy analysts argue for active "desegregation" of the EU through a modern-day version of "divide and rule." This would involve dealing selectively with European partners, favoring some states over others, promoting political disputes between the European allies, rewarding the most loyal capitals, and undercutting any emerging common EU foreign and security policy (Bugajski, 2005).

⁹ Term used by Mark Leonard, (Leonard, 2005).

¹⁰ In case of Bulgaria and Romania in the future, too.

¹¹ (Valasek, 2005), (Rihackova, 2005).

¹² (Asmus, Vondra, 2005).

¹³ For example a Visa waver program issue; when the Czech government realized there is no support in the EU for common position on the visa waver program enlargement, the discussion on lobbying the U.S. Congress through Washington-based think tanks and other common means started.

¹⁴ To demonstrate the change, one can point at some examples of their foreign policy issues which become not just their national stake but to certain extent, a European one too. The Czech Republic took strong stances on Cuba; Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary on the issue of (not) opening the accession negotiations with Croatia; Poland and the Baltic states attempted to shape the EU relations with Russia and Poland has played an important role in engaging the EU in Ukraine, especially during the electoral crisis in 2004 trying to build a coalition which would lobby for

Ukraine recognition as a candidate country. Some CEE countries are being very active in Belarus, too. Also an EU pressure on the visa waiver programme for the CEE citizens (with the exception of Slovenia) can be an example.

¹⁵ (Kral, 2005).

¹⁶ According to German Marshall Fund Transatlantic survey (2004), the thermometer which shows that the "warmth" of feeling towards the US is reaching 56° in Poland, but still lower than for instance in the UK (62°) or Italy (61°). Moreover for Poland this figure represents a decline of five points since 2003. On the contrary, Slovakia (50°) can be found at the very opposite end of the spectrum, with only Turkey (28°) and Spain (42°) exhibiting significantly lower degrees of sympathy towards the United States. On the other hand, looking at sympathy towards the EU, Slovakia ranks much higher with a score of 72° (even higher than France) and Poland with 65°. Therefore for example the Polish public feels (9 points) warmer toward the EU than the US. An Atlanticist index, developed from the Transatlantic survey places Poland in the middle of the countries surveyed, with a score of 47° which is lower than Germany (53°), Italy (57°), UK (58°) or the Netherlands (60°), while Slovakia is at the bottom of the table with a score of 37°. See www.gmfus.org

¹⁷ (Asmus, Vondra, 2005), (Kral, 2005).

¹⁸ See the chapter on the Czech Republic below.

¹⁹ (Asmus, Vondra, 2005), (Kral, 2005).

²⁰ Comparing to the EU, the U.S. way of democratization proved to be more costly with doubtful results, most notably in Iraq but also for example in Colombia.

²¹ Lack of vision from the EU side can result into reluctance to make commitments and possibly to non-democratic developments.

²² For example French Gaullist (right wing party) promoting policy of "grandeur" which was clearly if not anti-American than at least a-American.

²³ (Sitter, 2002).

²⁴ (Zaborowski, 2004).

²⁵ e.g. Lepper's Samoobrona (Self-Defence) Party (Zaborowski, 2004).

²⁶ (Drulak, 2006), (Stastny, Gabelova, 2004).

²⁷ Further analysis is needed. The facts presented in following chapter deal with the Czech Republic only.

²⁸ (Crockatt, 2003).

²⁹ Meaning only political elites for the purposes of this article

³⁰ (Asmus, Vondra, 2005).

³¹ Vaclav Havel, for example.

³² Issues like Radio Free Europe, deal with China on hi-tech radars or government tender on supersonic jets.

³³ Madeleine Albright is of Czech origin.

³⁴ His nomination to the post raised some criticism. As a opposition deputy, he become famous during the debate on NATO membership asking whether it is possible to step out of the alliance. President Vaclav Havel was said to have opposed his appointment as foreign minister because of his "remarkable talent for causing scandals" (Mlada fronta DNES, 23 July 1998).

³⁵ CSSD won with 32.31% of votes and gained 74 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (200 seats), ODS (Civic Democratic Party) 27.74% and 63 mandates, KSCM (Communist Party) 11.03% and 24 mandates, KDU-CSL (Christian Democrats) 9% and 20 mandates and US (Freedom Union, liberals) 8.6% and 19 seats. The minority CSSD government ruled the country with support of the main opposition party ODS.

³⁶ (Mlada fronta DNES, 23 July 1998).

³⁷ Namely Warsaw Pact due the invasion in 1968. Right after the regime change and Warsaw pact dissolution, the Czech elites led by President Vaclav Havel argued for abolishing NATO as a redundant military organization.

³⁸ March 1999.

³⁹ 1992–1998.

⁴⁰ Their ensuing verbal duel ended with a meeting between the foreign minister Jan Kavan and the president. After the meeting, Havel remarked that, although he had explained his point of view to the foreign minister, he doubted that his opinion would be accepted.

⁴¹ The Czechs did not accept this argumentation and the Kosovo war marks president's declining popularity.

⁴² (Kral, Pachta, 2005).

⁴³ CSSD won with 30.2%, giving the party 70 seats, Civic Democrats (ODS) got 24.5% and 58 seats, Communist Party (KSCM) won 18.5% and 41 seats and Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) and the Freedom Union (US-DEU) coalition gained 14.4% and 31 seats.

⁴⁴ Ex-minister Jan Kavan became a President of the U.N. General Assembly despite President Vaclav Havel opposition to his nomination. Jan Kavan initiated for example 3 U.N. resolutions on Cuba during his mandate, suggesting the US should lift the embargo due to the inefficiency. US State secretary Colin Powell allegedly complained over his Cuba resolutions proposals to Vaclav Havel.

⁴⁵ February 2, 2003.

⁴⁶ Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; the letter was published in the *Wall Street Journal* on January 30, 2003.

⁴⁷ According to Czech Constitution the president has a leading role in the foreign policy but the executive head of the country is the government. The president is largely regarded as a symbolic and representative figure; he/she has to consult the government on foreign policy issues.

⁴⁸ Some even claimed the Czech PM signed the letter.

⁴⁹ Havel's signature was merely an expression of his own personal opinion. On the other hand, it is not possible to ignore the fact that Havel signed the letter on January 30, 2003 while still holding a constitutional mandate. For these reasons, the foreign media and some politicians (e.g. French president Jacques Chirac) assigned considerable significance to this gesture (Kral, Pachta, 2005).

⁵⁰ The nature of Klaus' attitude on Iraq was also reflected in his conflict with American ambassador to Prague, Mr. Craig Stapleton — a conflict that was watched relatively closely by the media. Although the exact details of the meeting between president Klaus and the American ambassador are not known as it took place in Prague Castle behind closed doors, both of them after the meeting admitted differences in opinion. According to unofficial sources, the president asked the ambassador to send a clear message to Washington that the Czech Republic was not a country that was supportive of the coalition of willing. According to other sources, Klaus went further and stated that he did not believe that the allies would find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. By making such a statement he was implicitly casting doubts on the official justification made by the US administration for a military strike against Iraq (Kral, Pachta, 2005).

⁵¹ On the eve of the initiation of the operation against the Saddam Hussein's regime the Czech government adopted a

resolution (March 19, 2003), in which it expressed the Czech Republic's position without clarifying whether the Czech Republic was, or was not, a part of the war coalition. The government regretted that it was impossible to solve the crisis through peaceful means but it attributed the responsibility for the culmination thereof to the absence of cooperation on the side of the Iraqi regime. As a new mandate from the United Nations Security Council had not been obtained, the government declared the Czech Republic would not directly participate in the military action. However, the Czech Army battalion specialising in radiological, chemical and biological protection dispatched to Kuwait earlier within the Enduring Freedom operation, was set to intervene in Iraq if use was made of, or there was reasonable suspicion of, the use of weapons of mass destruction against civilians or the coalition forces. The government further expressed its will to provide Iraq with humanitarian aid and participate in the post-war reconstruction of the country (Kral, Pachta, 2005).

⁵² Even though the Christian democrats with hesitancy. Foreign minister Cyril Svoboda (KDU-CSL) believed in importance of international law and the key role of the UN and there was the negative attitude to the war by the Catholic Church that was important given his position of Christian democrats' leader. His attitudes are generally also rather "pro-European" and combined with the fact that the Czech Republic was at the time of the Iraq crisis only a few months before an EU accession referendum made an ardent pro-war stance was difficult.

⁵³ The existence of contrasting attitudes among political parties abroad (e.g. British Labour Party or the French right wing) was an additional complicating factor.

⁵⁴ The ODS experienced once again a problem with the founder and the long-time chairman of the party and at that moment also the president Vaclav Klaus. Like during the Kosovo crisis, ODS overwhelmingly supported the strike whereas Vaclav Klaus did not. The party had some difficulties when trying to make comments on the Iraq crisis following the initial disapproving attitude of the president and it had to reconcile Klaus's opposition with their support for US led military action in order to avoid public embarrassment. The ODS agreed with the president on the fact that weapons of mass destruction were not the primary objective of military action against Iraq, the key goal was in fact the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's dictatorial regime. The key

contradiction between the ODS party and the president was that the latter did not see this goal as a legitimate grounds for war.

⁵⁵ An antiwar resolution was adopted during the CSSD congress attacking the government position from within the ruling party. (Kral, Pachta, 2005)

⁵⁶ Vladimir Spidla when answering some journalists' questions, about which chair the Czech Republic was sitting in (meaning whether the Czech Republic was taking the pro-war or anti-war side) the PM replied that the Czech Republic was sitting in the Czech chair (Kral, Pachta, 2005).

⁵⁷ (Khol, 2004).

⁵⁸ May 1st, 2004.

⁵⁹ Division according to Drulak (Drulak, 2006).

⁶⁰ As mentioned above, it characterises not only "new" Europe but some Western European political parties, too.

⁶¹ Next part draws heavily on the parties election programs for 2006 general elections as well as for the European parliament elections (June 2004). The last general elections took place on June 2-3, 2006. At the moment of writing, the composition of the new government is unclear. ODS won by 3%, the composition of the Chamber gives equally 100 mandates to the parties forming right wing coalition (ODS, KDU-CSL, Greens) as well as to the left (CSSD, KSCM).

⁶² (Paroubek, 2005).

⁶³ A Secure Europe in a Berger World — the European Security Strategy, December 2003, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

⁶⁴ CSSD: Zakladni (dlouhodoby) program. Otevrenost novym vyzvam — vernost tradici (The basic (longterm) programme. Openness to new challenges — adherence to tradition), adopted in Brno on 25-27 March 2005.

⁶⁵ KDU-CSL: Volebni program — volby 2006. Klidna sila (Elections programme — general elections 2006. Still power), p. 84, http://www.kdu.cz/video/Media_15075_2006_2_27_13_35_22.pdf

⁶⁶ KDU-CSL: Evropsky volebni program (European elections programme of the KDU-CSL), April 2004, <http://www.kdu.cz/default.asp?page=510&idr=10222&IDCl=12127>

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ ODS: Realismus misto iluzi — modra sance pro ceskou diplomacii (Realism instead of illusions — blue opportunity for

the Czech diplomacy), November 2004, p. 10, http://www.ods.cz/docs/publikace/modra_sance-zahranici.pdf

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 9.

⁷¹ ODS: Modra sance pro Evropu: stejne sance pro vsechny (Blue opportunity for Europe: equal opportunities for everybody), European Parliament elections programme, p. 4, http://www.ods.cz/eu/download/docs/program_EP.pdf

⁷² Ibid., p. 3.

⁷³ ODS: Realismus misto iluzi — modra sance pro ceskou diplomacii (Realism instead of illusions — blue opportunity for the Czech diplomacy), November 2004, p. 12, http://www.ods.cz/docs/publikace/modra_sance-zahranici.pdf

⁷⁴ Different positions can be found in various party documents, see for example: Spolecna zahranicni a bezpecnostni politika EU; ozbrojene sily EU — postoj KSCM (Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU; military force of the EU — position of the KSCM), Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the KSCM, 15 July 2005, <http://www.kscm.cz/viewDocument.asp?document=3035> or Pristup KSCM k zahranicni a vnitřni bezpecnostni politice CR po vstupu do EU (Position of the KSCM on the foreign and internal security policy of the Czech Republic after the entry into the EU), 2004, <http://www.kscm.cz/viewDocument.asp?document=2733>

⁷⁵ KSCM: Spolecna zahranicni a bezpecnostni politika EU; ozbrojene sily EU — postoj KSCM (Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU; military force of the EU — position of the KSCM), Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the KSCM, 15 July 2005, p. 3, <http://www.kscm.cz/viewDocument.asp?document=3035>

⁷⁶ KSCM: Pristup KSCM k zahranicni a vnitřni bezpecnostni politice CR po vstupu do EU (Position of the KSCM on the foreign and internal security policy of the Czech Republic after the entry into the EU), 2004, p. 4, <http://www.kscm.cz/viewDocument.asp?document=2733>

⁷⁷ KSCM: Spolecna zahranicni a bezpecnostni politika EU; ozbrojene sily EU - postoj KSCM (Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU; military force of the EU - position of the KSCM), Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the KSCM, 15 July 2005, p. 4, <http://www.kscm.cz/viewDocument.asp?document=3035>

⁷⁸ (Asmus, Vondra, 2005).

THE US AS A "NATION AT WAR"

JOHN SIMON ROFE

ABSTRACT

The central focus of this paper is to investigate the notion that since 9th September 2001 the United States is a "Nation at War". To President George W. Bush the answer is clear and as such it has certainly been the defining theme of his presidency — a "War" Presidency. However, rather than accept this view at face value one goes further by asking more revealing questions surrounding contemporary US National Security. The purpose is to establish a more rounded, inclusive and demonstrably accurate understanding of the present dangers to the US. Consequently, we conclude that the United States is not a nation at war in any conventional sense. In fact, the gap between the rhetoric of "war" and the reality is a stark one as this is not a "war", if this word must be used, that one nation can fight. That said there are elements in the United States' government, military, and indeed society that are involved in an on-going conflict — suggesting that the nation, to a degree, is at war. Therefore, if the American nation is truly under threat any sensible measure of whether the United States is a "nation at war" must be considered by looking at how its component parts perceive and put into practice their involvement. For any notion that the American nation is indeed at war needs to be assessed by considering the different elements of this hydra-headed being that is the nation of the United States.

1. A parochial observation and an assessment...

The rationale behind this paper was born from my time spent in the United States at the beginning of 2006 as a Fulbright Fellow on a program entitled "US National Security in a post 9/11 World." A recurrent theme in the presentations and briefings we subsequently received from academics, policymakers and practitioners was that the Administration of President George W. Bush wholeheartedly believed that the United States was a *nation at war*. Such a proposition seemed very distant given my own understanding of war and the comfortable surroundings that I now found myself in. However, the campus of the University of California, San Diego is within a few miles of the massive Naval Station NAVSTA in San Diego, from which US military power can reach around the globe. Yet during my time in the United States I saw very little practical evidence to suggest that the United States was at war, despite the fact that over 60 US servicemen and women had been killed in Iraq during this particular month of January.

Initially, I somewhat parochially concluded that the George W. Bush administration was in danger of replicating the mistake that befell a previous Texan to occupy the White House — Lyndon B. Johnson — when a "credibility gap" grew from the Vietnam conflict, eventually crippling Johnson's presidency. This political phenomenon arose due to the observable difference between the administration's rhetoric and the reality of war that the American public could observe via their televisions. As Walter Cronkite so famously stated, "*To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion*".¹ Cronkite's sage like words of almost forty years ago now seemed only too apposite when applied

to Iraq and the notion of the Global War on Terror. Robert Jackson and Philip Towle have subsequently observed, "while violence in Iraq continues unabated ... daily reports on US television are cursory or non-existent."² Consequently, from this a series of queries the substance of this paper emerges with the strength of this administration's protestations as to the United States being a *nation at war* providing us with the starting point for this paper.

Hence, the paper begins by investigating the notion of the Executive as war-maker in the United States; an assessment of George Bush as a War President. Subsequently it considers the wider historical evaluation of the relationship between the United States and War and the related question of an *American Way of War* within all the deliberations surrounding US National Security. As these lines of enquiry are themselves subject to considerable discussion it seems necessary to clearly define the parameters of this paper as it does not seek to engage with the numerous debates over the nation-state and war that have framed International Relations. Though it is self-evident in a piece of this kind, it is nonetheless worthwhile to state unambiguously that this paper does not attempt to offer an explicit critique of the George W. Bush Administration. Furthermore, it accepts that where comparisons are made they are done so in the knowledge that each security challenge brings with it unique circumstances and therefore, post comparative analysis can never provide the full answer. Therefore, this paper seeks to identify the pertinent themes that now exist within American foreign and security policy. In other words, it looks to provide an assessment of the contemporary dilemmas in United States national security and foreign policy within the appropriate historical context. In doing so, it draws on the wealth of contemporary literature addressing the foreign policy of the United States; it's labelling as a Hyper-power,

Hegemon, or Imperial Power. Finally, offering prospects for the future resolution of the United States security dilemma.

Before going any further into the substance of this subject it is worth noting that War is "*Dirty, Disgusting, Dangerous business.*" These are the words of the British Component Commander for Operation Telic (the British military's name for their operations in Iraq beginning in March 2003), Air Marshall Sir Brian Burridge. As a civilian I would add a forth D-word to this description which should not be overlooked: *Deadly*. In what follows I do not intend in any way to slight the men and women who, increasingly, have fallen in the wars that have helped create the United States in its history. In simple terms, war is something that should never be considered lightly.

2. The American Way of War

This part of the paper will critically examine the relevance of an American "way of war"; its practical manifestation and the key debates that surround this subject. When investigating an American "Way of War" Russell Weigley's *The American Way of War: A History or US Military Strategy and Policy*, still remains the natural starting point. However, crucially, this is idea is more than just a form of words. As Lt Col. Antulio J. Echevarria II has subsequently observed, it is perhaps more accurate to describe this process as an American "way of battle" rather than an "American Way of War".³ Echevarria argues that the Americans have considered war as "an alternative to bargaining, rather than part of an ongoing bargaining process" in the Clausewitzian sense.⁴ This has meant that Americans have not always considered or planned for the consequences of their military actions. As Echevarria continues, the American "concept of war rarely extended beyond the winning of

battles and campaigns to the gritty work of turning military victory into strategic success".⁵ It does not take great research skills or a leap of faith to see this view align with the post-war situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted that American policy toward Iraq after the 1991 conflict "brought about yet another demonstration of America's congenital difficulty with translating military success into political coin."⁶ Yet while the shadows of Vietnam may naturally flicker across the contemporary situation, when American victory does follow military engagements the consequences are often ill defined. Henry Cabot Lodge, speaking in support of US victory in the Spanish-American War (1898), stated in its immediate aftermath, "The war of the United States with Spain was very brief. Its results were many, startling, and of world-wide meaning."⁷ Lodge's words though prophetic were not describing the intended consequence of when the USS Maine blew up in Havana harbour some months before this conflict took place. The point being that the United States, historically, has had only limited success in translating its national interests into a beneficial post-war environment.

Before we investigate the "exception" that proves this "rule", it is worth noting the heritage to American foreign policy. The word of Jefferson's inaugural speech: "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none", have had a longstanding influence upon US foreign policy makers. James Monroe's Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams famously stated twenty years after Jefferson's words that the United States "did not go overseas in search of dragons to slay". Adams would then establish through the Doctrine, which bore Monroe's name, a mantra which governed US involvement in international relations.⁸ The point being as Historian Norman A. Graebner suggests is that the Founding Fathers knew they could not afford to

overextend itself beyond “the country’s means or real intentions”.⁹ While the contemporary intention of some in Washington in the post-Cold War, and particularly post-9/11 environment was that the United States has the means to pursue its interests globally. However, Graebner goes on to consider further the Founding Father’s heritage by stating that the “United States would serve human society by pursuing its real interests, nothing more.” This view neatly fits into the notion of “Manifest Destiny”; that the United States *could* serve “human society”. Equally, such an assessment requires those in positions of power to have a sound grasp of what US interests truly are.

Hence, the paper now consider one instance when the President did have a thorough and clear understanding of American interests, the dangers to them, and was eventually able to secure the long term welfare of generations of Americans. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administrations achieved many things, but the most relevant to this discussion was his administration’s ability to influence the international environment at the end of the Second World War. Those who suffered the great hardships of the Cold War will know that the United States was not able to influence every aspect of the international scene, but what was remarkable was that Roosevelt’s global understanding was generally accepted by America’s opponents as international norms. To paraphrase Dean Acheson, a new world order had been “created”. Acheson’s work supported by a generation of his colleagues in the State Department clearly indicates deficiencies in American foreign policymaking in other eras.

As Europe and the Far East hurtled towards crisis in the late 1930s the United States, still in the grips of the Great Depression, was seemingly unwilling to play anything but a bit-part role in international affairs. A series of “Neutrality” laws, appealing to a widespread acceptance of isolationism amongst the American people,

sought to protect the United States from the impending crisis.¹⁰ However, after war had been declared in Europe in September 1939 Roosevelt with his long serving Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, realised that to secure American interests in the future they would need to have a seat at the table whenever peace was made. Various moves during the early part of 1940, such as the creation of the Advisory Committee on Problems in Foreign Relations in January 1940, a forerunner to Leo Pasvolsky's Advisory Committee on Post-War Planning — fully twenty-three months before the US became a belligerent — and an invitation to over forty other neutral nations to attend a conference in Washington, was aimed at preparing for the post-war world. The Roosevelt administration aimed to create a neutral consensus which the belligerents would be unable to ignore when it came to discussing the terms of peace. However, the United States was almost wholly peripheral in 1940, at least until August when it became clear to Roosevelt that the British were likely to survive the threat of German invasion. At this stage, those in Washington had been busy contemplating the challenges posed by a Europe dominated by Nazi Germany with the Royal Navy — the bastion of the Mahanist view of American security held by Roosevelt — having been defeated and turned over to Berlin. In order to preserve the vital American interests at the end of the conflict it became clearer to Roosevelt and those around him that he had an interest in influencing the outcome of the war. Given his domestic pressures, Roosevelt manifested this realisation in the Destroyers Bases deal in August 1940 and then more significantly in the Lend-Lease legislation of March 1941. In using the "fire hose" analogy to explain the latter to the American people, Roosevelt revealed how far American interests in the post-war world were dependent on influencing the outcome of the war. This pattern

continued up to December 1941 when Hitler declared war on the United States, therefore, taking the decision between war and peace that Roosevelt had dreaded making out of his hands. Nonetheless, the Administration realised as a belligerent throughout the rest of the war — most famously at the Bretton Woods gathering in 1944 — how important it was to shape the post-war world. This they did with no little success in conjunction with a gargantuan war effort to defeat formidable foes on either side of the globe. And, as the United States cast its image of the post-war world to its fellow states it did so with no little vigour and at considerable cost.¹¹ The institutions of the United Nations System were ones which served United States interests but at the same time constrained its power to act unilaterally. The American statesmen of that era understood that being apart from the rest of the world, no matter how distasteful some of it was, would not secure American interests. An engagement where the less powerful and less attractive were able to influence would ultimately allow Washington to secure itself as much as was possible.

Yet in further explaining the relationship between the United States and War, and Franklin Roosevelt's capacity to inculcate US interests and conflict during the 1930s and 40's the paper will now consider the case of Louis Ludlow. Ludlow is a little known character but one who came remarkably close to influencing the US Government's ability to wage war. He was a former Washington correspondent before serving as a Democrat in the House of Representatives for twenty years. It was during this time that he sponsored an amendment to the American constitution. It read "the authority of Congress to declare war shall not become effective until confirmed by a majority of all votes cast thereon in a Nation-wide referendum."¹² Had this amendment been passed it would have removed from the United States' elected

representatives the power to decide directly for the nation to go to war. Such a notion may seem contemporarily far-fetched since the world's most powerful person resides at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave, and to those who consider Franklin Roosevelt to be the embodiment of the modern presidency. Given the practical difficulties in securing any amendment to the U.S. Constitution one would have expected Ludlow's proposition to be easily defeated. However, the vote was close — 188 in favour and 209 against. Acknowledging that votes on amendments have increasingly been seen as a protest vote as there existed growing discontent with Roosevelt at the time due to the "Roosevelt Recession" and the reverberations over his Court-packing plan, Cordell Hull described it as a "striking indication of the strength of isolationist sentiment in the United States." He lamented further that "the Administration had to exert its whole force to prevent — barely to prevent — approval of a policy designed to take one of the most vital elements of foreign policy, the authority to declare war, out of the hands of the Government."¹³ The point to make here is that in the United States "wars" in their broadest sense (the decision to go to war; its definition as "war" and not "Executive Action"; its financing) have a distinctly domestic identity over an above other nations. What this means is that the "long-screwdriver" of American politics influences its foreign policy in ways that are a) not immediately obvious, b) take considerable (legislative) time to adjust, and c) can propagate a wholly detrimental appearance of, at best, indifference or, at worst, contempt for the outside world.

It would be impossible to talk of war without considering peace. Hence, we consider the words of the Benjamin Harrison, the twenty third president of the United States: "*With capability for war on land and on sea unexcelled by any nation in the world, we are smitten by the love of peace.*" In another era, Harrison's words

allude to the huge military capacity of the United States and the opportunity this provides. In 2006 this opportunity exists. Jackson and Towle point to the Bush administration's squandering of this opportunity. It is therefore unfortunate at best, and deceptive at worst for Bush to state that "when we talk about war, we're really talking about peace".

3. Conclusions

At the outset of the 21st Century the United States faces specific challenges when utilising its power, be that military or economic power or indeed its "softer" manifestations. The use of its military strength since 9/11 has left vast tracts of the world, including those within the United States, feeling far less secure. Does this state of affairs confirm or challenge the contention of the administration that the United States is a Nation at War? The actual challenges are brought about in two main areas: the fluidity of the contemporary security environment and set against the influence of its constitutional history which cannot meet these challenges in its present form. As Robert Jervis has said "The US political system was not constructed to support an active foreign policy" and one might add to that "war making". Moreover, President George W. Bush's attempts to address this through the Patriot Act have seen him become the archetypal "Imperial Presidency"; Arthur Schlesinger Jr. must shudder. But in conclusion, the words of two former presidents might help illustrate that whatever goes in Washington has and will continue to influence the rest of the world to an unprecedented degree, regardless of the fact that the United States may not be ready to take on board the responsibility that comes with such power. Firstly, Theodore Roosevelt stated: "I wish that all Americans would realise that American politics is world politics." This observation

might suggest to some that Americans do play the key role on the international stage. While detractors might point to the American fear of the resultant body-bag count, I would argue that Americans have the capability to absorb casualties, what they seemingly do not have is the capacity to recognise failure and defeat. As such they would do well to consider more words from Benjamin Harrison: "We Americans have no commission from God to police the World." In trying to do so, or even appearing to do so, the United States will make itself less, not more secure and in doing so create ripples of insecurity which will reach out across the globe.

Notes

¹ "Report from Vietnam," Walter Cronkite broadcast February 27, 1968.

² Robert Jackson and Philip Towle, *Temptations of Power — The United States in Global Politics after 9/11*, (New York & Basingstoke, 2006), p179.

³ Lt Col. Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Toward an American Way of War*, The Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, March 2004.

⁴ As generations of military officers who have attended staff colleges across the world in the past century can testify Clausewitz states in *On War* that war "is a continuation of politics by other means".

⁵ Echevarria, *Toward an American Way of War*, p.v.

⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy — Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, (New York, 2001) p.189.

⁷ Henry Cabot Lodge, December 1898.

⁸ For further discussion of the Monroe Doctrine please see: the Presidential Studies Quarterly Special Issue 2005 Presidential Doctrines. Vol. 35 No.2

⁹ Norman A. Graebner, *The Pursuits of Interest and a Balance of Power* in Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Patterson (eds), *Major*

Problems in American Foreign Relations Volume 1: to 1920 Fifth Edition (Boston and New York, 2000).

¹⁰ A discussion of “Isolationism” as non-entanglement is provided in the opening chapters of a new volume by this author: John Simon Rofe, *Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Foreign Policy and the Welles mission* (New York, 2007). A further contribution to this discourse flows out of research conducted by Jeremy Kennard at the University of Kent, who terms the phenomenon as “insularism”.

¹¹ For sources on the United State’s role in the development of the United Nations system see: Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the UN*, (London and New Haven, 1997); and Stephen C. Schlesinger, *Act of Creation — The Founding of the United Nations*, (New York, 2003). For a consideration of the role the United States played in creating the wider international system see: Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation — My Years in the State Department*, (New York, 1969); John Lambertson Harper, *American Visions of Europe — Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan and Dean G. Acheson*, (Cambridge, 1996); Thomas C. Howard and William D. Pederson (eds.), *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Formation of the Modern World*, (New York and London, 2003).

¹² <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Dip/PaW/101.html>

¹³ Hull, *Memoirs* Vol. 1, p.563.

U. S. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: - ORIGINS, PURPOSE, AND PERSPECTIVES

DRAGAN ZIVOJINOVIC

ABSTRACT

Despite the continuing controversy that surrounds it, The National Security Council is seen by many as one of the most successful personifications of the idea that knowledge and wisdom can rule the world. As this paradoxical understanding tends to obscure the *raison d'être* of this organization, the principal objective of this paper is to more clearly identify and explain its role and conduct in relation to American foreign and security policy. Therefore, we will structure our analysis utilizing five components: an explanation as to the origins of the Council, the reasons for its establishment, and a short history of their almost sixty years in operation; identification of the structure, organization, and performance of Council; the role of National Security Adviser and the NSC staff; the position and significance of the NSC within the U.S. government system highlighting some of the controversies that this role creates; perspectives on the future development of the NSC.

1. Introduction

If one were to take a brief survey amongst American citizens as to the most powerful institution in the U.S. concerning security affairs, the most popular response would surely be the National Security Council. However, even though there has been substantial effort to shed some light on the work of this body¹, "the Committee that Runs the World"² it still remains *terra incognita* for many Americans. This is in spite of the continuing controversy that surrounds the NSC and the resultant academic and

everyday debate that ensues³. Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to help clarify the real role that the NSC has in relation to American foreign and security policy and its resultant conduct. Hence, this essay will be broken down into five parts: an explanation as to the origins of the Council, the reasons for its establishment, and a short history of their fifty nine years in operation, identification of the structure, organization, and performance of Council, the role of National Security Adviser and the NSC staff, the position and significance of the NSC within the U.S. government system highlighting some of the controversies that this role creates, as well as perspectives on the future development of the NSC.

2. The establishment and brief history of the National Security Council

The death of the 32nd President of the U.S. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, on April 12, 1945, was referred to by a former Secretary of State Dean Acheson as “an end of an era”.⁴ As Vice-president Harry S. Truman, took over his new constitutional role of the U. S. President, he inherited a very difficult situation. Soviet troops had swept across Eastern Europe and were heading for Berlin, Japan had yet to capitulate, and the agreements that had been made by Roosevelt at Yalta had yet to be implemented. Moreover, Truman’s lack of experience in foreign affairs raised many questions as to his ability and competence to address the issues that now lay ahead of him.⁵ However, during the next seven and a half years of his presidency, President Truman managed not only to win a presidential election, but convince the U.S. Congress to support the Vandenberg Resolution, which for the first time in history, allowed the President to enter an alliance with other countries. Also, the so-called Truman Doctrine was duly revealed; the Marshall Plan launched and the NATO established on April 4, 1949.⁶

These ideas were not only to assist in the reconstruction of Europe, but to help all the free countries in the world threatened by communism. Responding to the attack of the North Korean troops on the South Korea, by entering the war, and altogether, Truman introduced the U.S. to the Cold War. Therefore, in consideration, we should note that during Truman's administration a strategic and institutional outline of this conflict was produced that framed international relations for much of the second half of the 20th century. It was strategic in the sense that the containment policy became "the corner stone of foreign policy", and institutional since Truman's administration established the institutions needed to bring this task to life, to wage the Cold War.⁷

One of the main institutions introduced was the National Security Council. Created upon a model of responding to security threats by forming appropriate institutions,⁸ it represented the most significant body in the U.S. which dealt with issues of foreign and security policy. Furthermore, the National Security Council became a role model for establishing other bodies in the U.S. (such as The National Economic Council, formed during the Clinton administration, or the Homeland Security Council established after the tragic events of 9/11)⁹. It also helped form similar bodies in other countries (The Russian Federation, India, Georgia, or the post-Taliban Afghanistan)¹⁰. The National Security Council (NSC) was established in 1947 by the so-called *National Security Act* passed in the U.S. Congress and signed by President Harry S. Truman. Along with the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the single Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were also formed. All those institutions were formed with the same goal to correct the mistakes in the functioning of the U.S. security system, which were noted during the Second World War. In other words, altered global circumstances had demanded radical changes in the security institutions.

The National Security Act envisaged that the main role of the NSC consisted of "advise the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security."⁹ Therefore, the NSC's goal was that the President (as the most powerful institution in the U.S. when it came to foreign and security policy related issues) could hear from all his leading officials in his administration through one coordinated body, avoiding the problems of information fragmentation between various state services, which had existed during the Second World War. With the growing responsibilities and resultant size of the U.S. administration this development was seen as necessary step to achieve clearer, more coherent and more legitimate foreign and security policy.

The initial problems that the NSC faced were huge, managing the machinery of military and foreign policy, run by a large number of different agencies and ministries, and all within the context of a global conflict that offered different visions of the next step to take. As the fear and the threat from the East grew, it demanded more specific actions, both in the changing the attitude on and off the battlefield. However, in the next 43 years, the U.S. managed to come out the Cold War victoriously, and, remaining the only super-power on the world stage, becoming "the hegemony by default"¹², and the most powerful country on the face of Earth, from the times of ancient Rome onwards.¹³ In all these developments the National Security Council played an important role, therefore, we will present a brief history of its contribution up to the present.

Professors Kegley, Wittkopf and Scott identifies five phases in the history of The National Security Council: 1) Institutionalizing the NSC System, 1947-1961; 2) Personalizing the Staff, 1961-1969; 3) The White House Ascendant, 1969-1989; 4) White House Centralization,

1989-2001; 5) The Past as Prologue, 2001 – to the present.¹⁴

1) During the first phase, or to be more accurate, the first years of its existence, the Council was very different from the body we know today. The National Security Advisor was actually the Executive Secretary, who prepared the necessary documentation for the meetings of the Council, the meetings President Truman rarely attended before the Korean War in 1950.¹⁵ But since then, the President held routine meetings every Thursday, missing “only seven of the seventy-one NSC meetings held between the beginning of the War and the end of his term in office.”¹⁶ Generally speaking, during Truman’s presidency “the NSC was there if the President wanted to use it. But it was no more nor less than he wished to make it.”¹⁷ However, if we can say that President Truman should take credit for having the sense to establish such an institution, then we should also acknowledge that it was President Dwight Eisenhower who was responsible for making the National Security Council a meaningful institution. Thanks to his organizational skills, which he brought as a successful military man¹⁸, he enabled the National Security Council to perform its tasks delegated to it by the National Security Act.¹⁹ Robert Cutler, after short period of time as a third Executive Secretary of National Security Council, became first Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,²⁰ and he eventually chaired, “an interagency planning board and operations coordinating board made up of midlevel officials from the relevant foreign policy bureaucracies”.²¹ This, “highly structured network of Committees”²² which “assisted the Council in its work”²³ and that “Eisenhower attended (and chaired) 326 of the NCS’s 366 meetings during his two terms and made these meetings the largest item on his weekly agenda”²⁴, additionally helped confirm the notion that the National Security Council was “at the

apex of national security policy making in the Eisenhower Administration.”²⁵

2) However, such a observation cannot be made of the National Security Council during President Kennedy’s truncated term. For the first few months of his administration, the position of the NSC rapidly faded. Namely, President Kennedy, was strongly influenced by the report of the Jackson Subcommittee²⁶ and its severe critique of the Eisenhower NSC system, and moved quickly to deconstruct the NSC process and simplify the foreign policy-making process, making it more intimate. In a very short period after taking office, the new President moved to reduce the NSC staff from 74 to 49, limit the substantive officers to 12, and hold NSC meetings much less frequently while sharply curtailing the number of officers attending.”²⁷ But after the Bay of Pigs incident and its failure Kennedy’s attitudes towards NSC changed with the Copernican twist. Kennedy soon realized its importance, especially as the National security Advisor could offer him dispassionate and non partisan briefings about different national security issues.²⁸ He moved the security adviser into the White House, and he strengthened and transformed the NSC staff into “a presidential staff becoming the agent of the president’s decision to exert greater control and direction over national security policy from the White House.”²⁹ All of this helped Kennedy cope with subsequent foreign policy crises, whereas the Cuban missile crisis stands out.

“Kennedy assassination in November 1963 brought to the White House a man with little interest and less experience in foreign affairs.”³⁰ The main characteristic of President’s Johnson NSC was informality.³¹ In practice, this meant that the State Department became “more directly involved in the planning and coordination of his administration’s foreign policy. Over time, this would lead to a certain amount of atrophy amongst the NSC staff, as well as a slight diminution in the role and

influence of the national security adviser.”³² However, by the end of his presidency, the National Security Advisor’s influence had returned, but the NSC as a forum for high-level policy decisions had been effectively downgraded.³³ In the shadow of Vietnam, it seems understandable that informality and the trusting to a few people replaced formal meetings and NSC procedures.

3) If we say that both Kennedy and Johnson used NSC “for educational, ratification, and ceremonial purposes”³⁴, then Richard Nixon even “during his campaign for the presidency... pledged to “restore National Security Council to its prominent role in national security planning”.³⁵ In practice, this meant that the White House would dominate in the field of foreign policy. As his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, wrote in his Memoirs, “He had very little confidence in the State Department. Its personnel had no loyalty to him; the Foreign Service had disdained him as Vice President and ignored him the moment he was out of Office. He was determined to run foreign policy from the White House.”³⁶ As a direct consequence, his National Security Advisor became one of the most powerful people to hold this position. President Nixon’s NSC staff, “with some fifty professional and eighty support personnel...was the largest staff in the Council’s history.”³⁷ Despite the fact America was in decline, both in hard and soft power, the NSC has living his most glorious days, successfully handling broad range of foreign policy issues, from opening of China to the U.S. Soviet relations and Peace negotiations with North Vietnam Government. Even after President Nixon resignation in August 1974 and during Gerald Ford Presidency, Henry Kissinger continued to lead the “one man show” in all issues regarding foreign affairs. Also, despite the fact that Brent Scowcroft became National Security Advisor in 1975, and that he “returned the adviser’s role to a closer approximation of its original description as a neutral

manager and coordinator of the Council's business... Henry Kissinger remained the dominant player within the NSC system."³⁸ However, this did not mean that Brent Scowcroft was a poor performer; it just meant that his time was yet to come. President "Carter began his term determined to eliminate the abuses he ascribed to the Kissinger NSC under Nixon and Ford. He believed that Kissinger had amassed too much power during his tenure as NSC Adviser and Secretary of State, and effectively shielded his Presidents from competing viewpoints within the foreign policy establishment. ...Initially, Carter reduced the NSC staff by one-half and decreased the number of standing NSC committees from eight to two."³⁹ Similarly to some previous administrations, the real struggle over power was between Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance and his National Security Advisor, former Columbia University Scholar, Zbigniew Brzezinski. "Brzezinski ... emerged as the pivotal foreign policy adviser, and eventually expanded his role into operational activities as well."⁴⁰ All this led to Vance resigning as a Secretary of State, "and by the end of Carter presidency, those differences — combined with the president's failure to resolve them — were aggravated by a series of foreign policy crises ranging from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the taking of American diplomatic hostages in Iran".⁴¹ However, in these post-Vietnam years it seemed almost impossible to see what else Carter could have done. After all, he did manage to start addressing some big issues, such as the internal state of affairs in the Soviet Union, especially with reference to the implementation of international agreements that they have signed. Moreover, he brought some foreign policy success, with the remarkable Camp David accords, with the National Security Council providing very strong role in all these initiatives.

Carter's successor Ronald Reagan, former governor of California, began to conduct foreign policy in "a more coherent way"⁴² than his predecessor. Very strong disagreement between his Secretary of State, George P. Schultz⁴³ and his first Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, had made it almost impossible for his six National Security Advisors to operate successfully. For example, when he offered the job of the NSA to Frank C. Carlucci, "the president said "Frank, I would like you to be my national security adviser because you're the only person that George and Cap can agree upon."⁴⁴ During his presidency, as David Rothkopf puts it, it was "morning in America but twilight at the NSC"⁴⁵. Namely, throughout Reagan's years, the United States regained their self-confidence, strongly challenged Soviet Union in many areas and America again become a super-power in the true sense of the word. But, at the same time, the NSC suffered from the fallout over the Iran — Contra affair. However, "by the end of Ronald Reagan's second term in office, national security advisers, Carlucci and Powell, had done much to repair the damage done to the President's NSC system by the Iran — contra affair, by battles between the heads of the departments and several national security advisers, and by years of radical shifts in NSC practices and personnel."⁴⁶ Nevertheless, his national security principals, like George H. W. Bush and Colin L. Powell remained at the core of the NSC also during the next four years.

4) If National Security Council during President Nixon years had its most glorious days, than President George H. W. Bush's NSC had produced its best performance. "Upon taking Office, President Bush was intent on establishing a coherent and sound approach to national security policy making. He selected people he had confidence in and who he believed could work together."⁴⁷ His organization of NSC, as we will see, became a model for future presidents and their National Security

Councils. This new bond between the NSC principals meant that “the NSC convened more frequently in 1989 and 1990 and three times in 1992. By mid-term, formal Council sessions had given way to informally called meetings of the president and others selected for the issues at hand. During the Persian Gulf War, there were meetings of the “Big Eight” — Bush, Scowcroft, Baker, Cheney, Powell, Vice-president Dan Quayle, CIA director William Webster, and White House Chief of Staff John Sununu — held more often than not in the Oval Office.”⁴⁸ To thesis that the presidency of George H. W. Bush was a “foreign policy presidency” we may just add that it was a very successful foreign policy presidency, which ended Cold War, waging Gulf war and “transformed the world”⁴⁹, making it a better and more secure place to live. The National Security Council played indispensable role in this new approach.

During the two Clinton administrations that followed, “economic dimension” was at “the center of ... national security policy.” In practice this meant that the newly established National Economic Council and especially, the assistant to the president for economic policy⁵⁰ became very influential, but “still the Clinton NSC retained emphasis on traditional security issues as well.”⁵¹ Moreover, “the Clinton NSC system was also White-House — centered, with the national security adviser and the deputy national security adviser chairing the Principals Committee and the Deputies Committee respectively.”⁵² During those eight years, his two national security advisers, Tony Lake and Sandy Berger, had a busy and demanding agenda:⁵³ the Balkans, the Middle East Peace process, Northern Ireland, Somalia, engagement with China, and the enlargement of NATO. The guiding idea surrounding these first four year was “enlargement” “as a kind of post-Cold War flip side to containment”⁵⁴. During Clinton’s second term “the

president and his team started to focus on a new class of *transnational threats*.”⁵⁵

5) These “transnational threats” would become the main enemy of George W. Bush National Security Council System. 9/11, and following Afghanistan and Iraq wars and “Long” Global War against terrorism, changed and George W. Bush administration national security priorities. “Again in times of national crisis (the gravest since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962), the NSC was proving to be a very flexible [political and policy] instrument, reflecting the president’s operating style and responding to his most urgent needs.”⁵⁶ As a result, that current NSC system has once again become the governing body overall national security related issues. Despite the fact that present NSC system has a lot of controversies following its work, the National Security Council was in the past and will be in the future, the governing body when we talk about national security related issues. The George W. Bush administration is not exception to that.

3. The Structure and Functioning of the National Security Council

The National Security Act stipulates that the members of the NSC are the President, the Vice-President,⁵⁷ the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. Those are the so-called “the statutory members”, in other words, they represent the real core of the National Security Council. The law also stipulates that the so-called “statutory advisers”, include the CIA Director and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In time, the number of those who attend the NSC meetings has increased to include the National Security Advisor (Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, which is the official title of this position),

the Secretary of Treasury, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Economic Policy Advisor, the Secretary of Justice, the Director of Budgetary Planning and Analysis. Depending on the subject, the list of attendees can be extended to some of the other most important parts of the administration. From April 2005, the newly established post of the Director of the National Intelligence (DNI) also got the role of the statutory advisor to the President and National Security Council.⁵⁸

After a great number of organizational changes the Council had experienced since its inception, to the biggest question mark over its role during the Iran- Contra affair⁵⁹, the National Security Directive 1 (NSD-1) from January 30, 1989, issued by the President George H. W. Bush, established a new NSC system, which remains to this day. Subsequently, both Clinton⁶⁰ and George W. Bush⁶¹ administration's accepted this as a model. Depending on different issues and their complexities, the NSC meetings are held at three levels: on the Principals Committee level, on the Deputy Secretary and Deputy Heads of Agencies level, that is, on the Deputy Committee level, and daily on the level of the administration members appointed by various U.S. government agencies, i.e. on the Policy Coordination Committee level.

The meetings are rarest on the Principals Committee level, except in cases of crisis when almost daily coordination is necessary. The meetings of this Committee are chaired by the National Security Advisor of the U.S. President, and the attendees are the highest members of the administrations, mentioned earlier in the text. The presence of the President to these meetings depends solely on his own judgment. We should also mention the presence of the Vice-president's National Security Advisor and his Chief of Staff.⁶²

THE NSC PRINCIPAL COMMITTEE (THE NSC / PC)		
Purpose	Membership	How It Works
senior interagency forum for considerations of policy issues affecting national security.	<p>regular attendees: vice president, the secretary of state, the secretary of the treasury, the secretary of defense, the chief of staff to the president, and the assistant to the president for national security affairs (who shall serve as chair).</p> <p>statutory advisors: the director of central intelligence and the chairman of the joint chiefs.</p> <p>attendees if is necessary: president (in consultation with the assistant to the president for national security affairs, he seems it appropriate) the attorney general and the director of the office of management and budget.</p> <p>when international economic issues are on the agenda of nsc / pc meetings regular attendees are also: secretary of commerce, the united states trade representative, the assistant to the president for economic policy (who shall serve as chair in that case), and when the issues pertain to her responsibilities, the secretary of agriculture.</p>	<p>the NSC / pc shall meet at the call of the assistant to the president for national security affairs, in consultation with the regular attendees of the nsc / pc. He shall determine the agenda in consultation with the foregoing, and ensuring the necessary papers are prepared.</p> <p>when international economic issues are on the agenda of the nsc, the assistant to the president for national security affairs and the assistant to the president for economic policy shall perform these tasks in concert.</p>

Figure 1: THE NSC PRINCIPAL COMMITTEE (THE NSC / PC) — purpose, membership, how it works⁶³

THE NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE (NSC / DC)		
Purpose	Membership	How it works
<p>serve as the senior sub-cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security.</p> <p>the nsc / dc can prescribe and review the work of the nsc interagency groups.</p> <p>the nsc / dc shall also help ensure that issues being brought before the nsc / pc or the nsc have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision.</p>	<p>same structure as in the case of the nsc / pc but just on the deputy level.</p>	<p>the nsc / dc shall meet at the call of its chair, in consultation with the other regular members of the nsc / dc.</p> <p>deputy national security advisor as chair, in the topics related to the economic field deputy assistant to the president for international economic affairs as chair.</p>

Figure 2: THE NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE (NSC / DC)
— purpose, membership, how it works⁶⁴

The second in order is the Deputies Committee, which consists of members in the rank of deputies Secretary, deputy CIA Director and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor. This committee is responsible for analyzing and preparing the issues and topics for the Principal Committee.

The Policy Coordination Committee is a body in charge of handling the daily issues of the national security. The members of this Committee, who are representatives of all the corresponding ministries and agencies of the American government, provide analysis for the members of committees earlier mentioned. The Committee consists of several smaller committees divided by regions of the world they cover, or by specific issues they are interested in. Each of them has an Executive Secretary who is a member of the National Security Council Staff.

THE NSC POLICY COORDINATION COMMITTEES (NSC PCCs)		
Purpose	Membership	How it works
<p>management and development of national security policy by multiple agencies of the united states government main day-to-day floor for interagency coordination of national security policy.</p> <p>they shall provide the policy analysis for considerations by the more senior committees of the nsc system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the president.</p>	<p>each NSC / pcc shall include representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the NSC / dc NSC/ PCCs (regional and by functional topics).⁶⁵</p>	<p>Each NSC/PCC shall also have an Executive Secretary from the staff of the NSC</p> <p>The Executive Secretary shall assist the Chairman in scheduling the meetings of the NSC/PCC, determining the agenda, recording the actions taken and tasks assigned, and ensuring timely responses to the central policymaking committees of the NSC system.</p> <p>The Chairman of each NSC/PCC, in consultation with the Executive Secretary, may invite representatives of other executive departments and agencies to attend meetings of the NSC/PCC where appropriate.</p> <p>The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at President's direction and in consultation with the Vice President and the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, may establish additional NSC/PCCs as appropriate.</p> <p>The Chairman of each NSC/PCC, with the agreement of the Executive Secretary, may establish subordinate working groups to assist the PCC in the performance of its duties</p> <p>Each of the NSC/PCCs is chaired by an official of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank to be designated by the Secretary of State.</p>

Figure 3: The NSC POLICY COORDINATION COMMITTEES (NSC PCCs) — purpose, membership, how it works⁶⁶

4. The National Security Advisor and the NSC Staff

It should be noted that the role of the National Security Advisor (NSA)⁶⁷ and his staff is of special importance to the functioning of the NSC.⁶⁸ It can be said that the role of the NSA personifies the Council itself. From the advisor's modest beginnings as the Executive Secretary of the NSC at the time of Truman's administration, through a significantly strengthened role during Dwight Eisenhower's presidency, to its current key status, the post of the NSA has become one of the most influential within the President's cabinet. Even though this appointment does not require confirmation by the U.S. Senate, the facts that the NSA office is only a few steps away from the Oval Office, and that he is constantly at the president's disposal and that the President spends more time with him than with any other member of his administration, only goes to confirm the words of former NSA Henry Kissinger, who said that "proximity, proximity and proximity" are the three most important rules of the Washington politics.⁶⁹

Besides Kissinger, a total of 22 people have been appointed as NSA,⁷⁰ including Zbigniew Brzezinski (during Carter's presidency), Brent Scowcroft (for President Ford and Bush Sr.). The current NSA Stephen J. Hedley succeeded the current Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Assisting the President in making better decisions, knowing his habits and preferences, maintaining daily contacts with the most important people in the Executive Office of the President and in the state security system, meeting foreign diplomats, traveling abroad if needed, coordinating the work of all those committees and the NSC staff, are only some of his tasks. In this sense, this person needs to have a very strong social intelligence and education, as well as good contacts with the worlds of politics, business, military, intelligence services and diplomacy,⁷¹ and have enough courage to tell the President when he is wrong and, most

importantly, to be capable of winning the trust of the man for whom he works. If latter is missing, everything else falls to pieces.⁷²

Executive Secretaries of the NSC; Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs	Tenure	Presidents to whom they have served
Sidney W. Souers	September 26, 1947- January 1950	Harry S. Truman
James S. Lay, Jr.	January 1950 - January 1953	
Robert Cutler	1953 - April 2, 1955	Dwight D. Eisenhower
Dillon Anderson	April 2, 1955 - September 1, 1956	
William Jackson	September 1, 1956 - January 7, 1957	
Robert Cutler	January 7, 1957 - June 24, 1958	
Gordon Gray	June 24, 1958 - January 13, 1961	
McGeorge Bundy	January 20, 1961 - February 28, 1966	John F. Kennedy
Walt W. Rostow	April 1, 1966 - December 2, 1968	Lyndon B. Johnson
Henry A. Kissinger	December 2, 1968 - November 3, 1975 (served concurrently as Secretary of State from September 21, 1973)	Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford

Brent Scowcroft	November 3, 1975 - January 20, 1977	Gerald R. Ford
Zbigniew Brzezinski	January 20, 1977 - January 21, 1981	James Earl Carter
Richard V. Allen	January 21, 1981 - January 4, 1982	Ronald W. Reagan
William P. Clark	January 4, 1982 - October 17, 1983	
Robert C. McFarlane	October 17, 1983 - December 4, 1985	
John M. Poindexter	December 4, 1985 - November 25, 1986	
Frank C. Carlucci	December 2, 1986 - November. 23, 1987	
Colin L. Powell	November 23, 1987 - January 20, 1989	
Brent Scowcroft	January 20, 1989 - January 20, 1993	George H. W. Bush
W. Anthony Lake	January 20, 1993 - March 14, 1997	William Jefferson Clinton
Samuel R. Berger	March 14, 1997 - January 20, 2001	
Condoleezza Rice	January 22, 2001 - January 25, 2005	George W. Bush
Stephen J. Hadley	January 26, 2005 - present	

Figure 4: Executive Secretaries of the NSC (1947-1953); Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs (1953- to the present)⁷³

In doing this work, the NSA can count on his staff to help him fulfill all these functions. The number of people employed has steadily increased as the role of the NSA has evolved. The "Staff" is organized according to regional

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In doing this work, the NSA can count on his staff to help him fulfill all these functions. The number of people employed has steadily increased as the role of the NSA has evolved. The "Staff" is organized according to regional

and functional principles.⁷⁴ Depending on different circumstances, the staff can always adjust themselves and introduce new areas of interest, or increase its activities related to different parts of the world that, at a certain point, become critically important for the U.S. national security.⁷⁵

According to David Rothkopf, staff members “ranging from very senior policymakers with the clout of cabinet secretaries (one, Richard Clarke, achieved principal-level status during the Clinton years as he led that administration’s counterterrorism experts) to much more junior analysts and support staff. Very often it is this staff that drafts the papers, the speeches, and the letters for the president to sign, that coordinates with other agencies, and that meets with foreign ambassadors, congressional staff, lobbyists, “friends of the president”, and the special interests groups. It is this staff that people most frequently refer to as the NSC in Washington.”⁷⁶

The “Staff’s” main products are the national security memorandums,⁷⁷ which analyze different issues and offer and remind the President of the various options that are at his disposal and the inevitable “pros and cons” argumentation. The aim is to reduce the surprise factor to a minimum (which is usually very hard to achieve) and help the President make better decisions, because, in the end, the buck stops with him.

5. The National Security Council – Its significance and the controversies that have surrounded it

At one level, the National Security Council represents a common struggle that faces most administrations; the struggle between form and essence, between theory and practice. The reasons for its creation, and provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America clearly

state who is in charge and responsible for the foreign and security policy of the country.⁷⁸ Without such a body, it is almost certain that an efficient foreign and security policy would not exist. The Council (as we had the opportunity to see) is the one that assists the President in making the decisions which will protect and enhance the security of the U.S.A. and its citizens. There is no higher cause and no duty more important than this, for any country in the world.⁷⁹ Without good foreign and security policy, there is no stable, prosperous and safe America.⁸⁰ In that sense, the National Security Council is on the first line of defense of the United States. "Every international issue of consequence affecting the United States comes to the attention of the NSC principals, whether sitting formally as members of the Council gathered in the Cabinet Room of the White House or in some other less formal configuration, like Kennedy's "ExComm"⁸¹ during the Cuban Missile crisis, Johnson's "Tuesday lunch",⁸² Carter's "Friday breakfast"⁸³ or the second Bush's war cabinet. The President has responsibility for deciding on the great issues that come before the nation; the purpose of the NSC system is to provide the best information and advice possible to help illuminate the options."⁸⁴

However, such meetings do not include everyone. For example, George W. Bush's War Cabinet "was composed of top national security officials from the White House, CIA, the State Department, and the Pentagon. Among them were Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, and George Tenet (the director of Central Intelligence)."⁸⁵ More significantly, when the actual decisions were being made, even less people were involved in this process of decision-making,⁸⁶ which therefore becomes relatively straightforward.⁸⁷ The President is in control, he has the final word, and in some situations, the National Security Council becomes

rather an instrument of confirmation, than an actual creator of policy.

So the first controversy "is related to the ongoing competition for the president's ear between the adviser and the secretary of state — often nothing less than a pitched bureaucratic battle over who will lead America's foreign policy."⁸⁸ The typical example is the battle over conducting the foreign policy between the White House (President Nixon and Henry Kissinger) and the State Department, culminating with the resignation of the Secretary of State at the time, William Rogers.⁸⁹ Although there are several examples of excellent cooperation between the president, his National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State,⁹⁰ we can clearly observe that the Secretary of State is "the most common and the most logical victim" in case the President wants absolute and utter control over the country's foreign policy. Although there are several opinions about the frequency of avoiding procedures and decisions which are made in a way not legally and normatively established, it seems that the best explanation was given by President Carter's former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. In an interview for David Rothkopf, Brzezinski stated, "Smaller groups obviously generate more discussion and give the President the opportunity to engage in a much more intimate view of the issues. You cannot make policy through informal procedures, but you can crystallize directions and then supervise both the implementation and coordination via the formal process".⁹¹ In other words, if you want to know where the real power in Washington lies, sometimes you must go beyond institution and formal procedures, which are of course important but sometime they just can't give us whole picture.⁹²

Secondly, the Council itself (National Security Advisor and NSC staff) can abuse its authorities and, instead of advising, start conducting the politics. The

biggest misuse of authorities was certainly in the Iran — Contra affair in 1986.⁹³ It means “that the Council’s staff had entered into covert operations abroad, straying far beyond its original mandate to “advise” and “coordinate” ... i.e. staff became an operations group deeply involved in the *conduct* of foreign policy, not simply its coordination.”⁹⁴ Instead of performing its original task, to “serve as an “honest broker” among competing department interest”⁹⁵ they created “confusion at home and abroad who speaks for the United States on behalf of the President: the secretary of state or the national security adviser.”⁹⁶ All of these operations were sanctioned without any regard to the legislative body or the American people, although these actions were apparently taken in their interest. Because, once again, as former secretary of state, George Schultz remarked in his book on his secretary of state years, the NSC advisor is “a non-statutory member of the National Security Council, someone not in the cabinet and not subject to confirmation by the Senate or the accountability of appearance before congressional committees to be designated in an NSDD⁹⁷ as the chairman of NSC meetings. Frank Carlucci⁹⁸ is not a member of the NSC, I said, you are the staff of the NSC. You serve the principals of the NSC, especially but not exclusively the president.”⁹⁹ This is really true, but in our opinion, with one additional sentence: the whole NSC system is more or less what President makes of it.

6. Perspectives of the National Security Council

In spite of all the problems it has faced during the 1980’s, the National Security Council survived the Cold War, and, as we have observed, fundamentally helped U.S. find its role and place in the world where it remained the only super-power. The numerous crisis and wars that the U.S. have dealt with, and the ones they are still

fighting, would have had completely different outcomes had not there been a body such as this. It is our strong belief that the National Security Council will continue to play its intended role in the future, thanks to its capability of adapting to altered circumstances. Being the one of the most successful personification of the idea that knowledge and wisdom can rule the world, an idea with a long history of rise and fall, since Plato to our times, the NSC carries along all the risks of the struggle between rational thought, and emotional, irrational and unpredictable reaction. Although this specific clash often ends with defeat of reason, the National Security Council is still alive and effective. Especially in a country like the United States of America, where ideals have, in so many cases, become reality.

Notes

¹ This is mainly about *The National Security Council Project* launched in 1999, as a cooperation between the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland and The Brookings Institution Washington, DC. Co- Directors of this project are Ivo H. Daalder and I.M. Destler, great authorities on the Council and the way it works, have gathered a number of significant persons who marked the work of the Council in different ways, in a so-called "Oral History Roundtables". Up to now it was next few Roundtables: *The Nixon Administration National Security Council* (December 8, 1998) *International Economic Policymaking and the National Security Council* (February 11, 1999) *The Bush Administration National Security Council* (April 29, 1999) *The Role of the National Security Adviser* (October 25, 1999) *China Policy and the National Security Council* (November 4, 1999), *Arms Control and the National Security Council* (March 23, 2000), Almost all transcripts of roundtables are available on next internet address: <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/nsc.htm>.

² The phrase is borrowed from the title of an excellent book by David Rothkopf on the NSC See: David Rothkopf, *Running the*

World-The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, Public Affairs, New York, 2005 or: David Rothkopf, "Inside the Committee that Runs the World", *Foreign Policy*, March/ April 2005, pp. 30-40.

³ Even "under normal circumstances, the NSC system is among the least publicized but most powerful units of the U. S. government". See: Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1999, Fifth Edition, p. 219.

⁴ See: Dean Acheson, *Present At The Creation- My Years in the State Department*, Signet, Signet Classics, Mentor and Plume Books, New York, 1970, p. 149.

⁵ According to the writing of the historian David McCullough, the news of Roosevelt's death left Truman speechless. Finally, he spoke to Franklin's wife, Eleonore and asked her if there was something he could do for her. Eleonore answered him with a question (the one that the whole nation would have asked him): "Is there anything we can do for *you*? For you are the one who is in trouble now." See: David McCullough, *Truman*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1992, p. 342. quoted in: David Rothkopf, *Running the World-The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 38.

⁶ According to David A. Lake, "The Vandenberg Resolution (Arthur Vandenberg, was at that Time Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee- remark by D. Z.) passed by the Senate on June 11, 1948, terminated the debate, at least in the Truman Administration and among congressional leaders, on the question of unilateralism versus cooperation. By a vote of 64-4, the Senate in effect gave its prior consent to any regional security arrangements the president might negotiate, and granted new impetus to the behind the scenes talks already underway between the United States, Britain, and Canada on an Atlantic area pact". See for more: David A. Lake, *Entangling Relations- American Foreign Policy in its Century*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1999, pp. 134-35.

⁷ The best and the most concise history of the Cold War is given in: John Lewis Gaddis, *Cold War- A New History*, The Penguin Press, New York, 2005. With this book, professor Gaddis concluded his 40-years long research on this topic. Also on the Cold War see: John Young, John Kent, *International Relations Since 1945*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004.

⁸ The historian from the Yale University John Lewis Gaddis sees consequential relations between national security threats and the setting up of institutions to respond to those threats. According to him, three major threats to the U.S. security (the War of 1812 against Great Britain, which culminated with the “Burning of Washington” two years later; the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001) resulted in new institutions aimed at increasing the security of the American nation and its citizens. See: John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security and American Experience*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004 or: John Lewis Gaddis, “The Grand Strategy of Transformation”, *Foreign Policy*, November / December 2002, pp. 50 — 57.

⁹ See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, pp. xiii — xiv.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 24.

¹¹ See: Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy — Pattern and Process*, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning Company, Belmont, Ca., 2003, Sixth Edition, p. 330. “The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the National Security Council to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. That remains its purpose. The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States — domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the National Economic Council (NEC). The National Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.” See: The National Security Presidential Directive 1, White House, Washington, D. C., February 13, 2001, Internet 10/06/06 <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm>

¹² See: Peter M Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U. S. — Latin American Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K., 2000. p. 5ff. Quoted in: Niall Ferguson, *Colossus-The Price of America’s Empire*, The Penguin Press, New York, 2004, p. 128.

¹³ See for more: Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons—The Military Foundation of U. S. Hegemony”, *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 5 — 46; David Held,

Mathias Koenig — Archibugi, Eds., *American Power in the 21st Century*, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003; Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power — The Global Response to U. S. Primacy*, W. W. Norton, New York, 2005, pp. 11 — 61; Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited”, *The National Interest*, Winter 2002/03, pp. 5-17; Michael Mandelbaum, “David’s Friend Goliath”, *Foreign Policy*, January / February 2006, pp. 50-56; William C. Wohlforth, “U. S. Strategy in a Unipolar World”, in: G. John Ikenberry, Ed., *America Unrivaled — The Future of the Balance of Power*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002, pp. 98-18; Stephen G. Brooks, William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing” *International Security* — Volume 30, Number 1, Summer 2005, pp. 72-108.

¹⁴ See: Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy — Pattern and Process*, pp. 330-348.

¹⁵ “After attending the Council’s first meeting on September 26, 1947, Truman participated only sporadically in Council discussions. Of the almost sixty meetings held before the onset of the Korean War, he attended only eleven.” See: David Rothkopf, *Running the World-The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 57. It can be said that the President Truman feared that the body like that could become more than National Security Act prescribed. As Stanley L. Falk wrote “it is quite evident, however, that his absence was aimed at clearly establishing the Council’s position with respect to the President and at preventing any apparent dilution of his role as chief executive.” See: Stanley Folk, “The NSC under Truman and Eisenhower”, in: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 35.

¹⁶ See: David Rothkopf, *Running the World-The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 59.

¹⁷ See: Stanley Folk, “The NSC under Truman and Eisenhower”, in: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 41.

¹⁸ Eisenhower firmly believed in the benefits of a good organization. In his memoirs he wrote: “Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent nor could it make decisions which are required to trigger necessary actions. Disorganizations, however, could scarcely fail to result in inefficiency and can easily

lead to disaster." See: Fred Greenstein and Richard Immerman, "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering Eisenhower Legacy", in: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, quoted in: David Rothkopf, *Running the World-The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 66.

¹⁹ "With his military background, Eisenhower had a penchant for careful staff work, and believed that effective planning involved a creative process of discussion and debate among advisers compelled to work toward agreed recommendations." See: *History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997*, Internet, 10/04/06 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html#eisenhower>

²⁰ "He created the position of "special assistant for national security affairs" to run the Council's day — to day affairs." See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 29.

²¹ See: Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy — Pattern and Process*, p. 331.

²² See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 29.

²³ *Ibid*, p. 29.

²⁴ See: Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy — Pattern and Process*, p. 331.

²⁵ See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 29.

²⁶ During 1959, there were few hearings by the U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. Chairman of this Subcommittee was Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA), this is why he has such a name. Also, in a speech before the National war College, "he calling the NSC a "dangerously, misleading facade" and urged for his reorganization. See for more: Henry M. Jackson, "Forcing a Strategy for Survival", in: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, pp. 53-61.

²⁷ See: *History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997*, Internet, 10/04/06 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html#kennedy>

²⁸ He "realized that he was hostage to the information and analysis that was provided to him by cabinet agencies... at another level, the administration suffered because, unlike Eisenhower's team, which was heavily populated with military brass, Kennedy's

team was essentially civilian... Kennedy believed in the power of brilliant minds. But brilliant minds without experience were not enough. A balance was needed. The search for this balance has been reflected in the history of the national security advisor position... from this harsh lesson Kennedy recognized that he did in fact need more operational coordination and that he needed it to be led by people he could trust. He also wanted those people, such as Bundy and Rostow (NSA and his deputy — remark by D. Z.), close at hand..." David Rothkopf, *Running the World — The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 90.

²⁹ Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 66.

³⁰ See: Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy — Pattern and Process*, p. 332.

³¹ "Johnson liked informality, a trait he carried to extremes by continuing discussions with key aides while was in the bathroom — or, in one instance with Moyers (John Moyers was his chief of staff — remark by D. Z), while he was actually having an enema. The most important difference, between him and Kennedy managing his team, though, had to do with his introduction of habit he had developed in the Senate, which was to host Tuesday Lunches for his core team." See: David Rothkopf, *Running the World — The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 99.

³² Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 66.

³³ *Ibid*, p. 67.

³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 67.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 67.

³⁶ See: Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years*, Little, Brown, Boston, 1979 Quoted in: *Ibid*, p. 68.

³⁷ See: John P. Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparatus", *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1971-1972, pp. 3-27 quoted in: *Ibid*, p. 68.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 70.

³⁹ See: *History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997*, Internet, 10/04/06 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html#carter>

⁴⁰ See: Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy — Pattern and Process*, p. 335.

⁴¹ See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 74.

⁴² Ibid, p. 74.

⁴³ He succeeded on this position general Alexander Haig, who spent barely 18 months as President's Reagan Secretary of State.

⁴⁴ See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 77.

⁴⁵ David Rothkopf, *Running the World — The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, pp. 210-259.

⁴⁶ Ibid, pp. 78-79.

⁴⁷ See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 97. They were: James Addison Baker III as the Secretary of State, Dick Cheney as the Secretary of Defense, Collin Powell as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Robert Gates, first as the Deputy National Security Advisor and then as the Director of CIA, and finally, Brent Scowcroft as his National Security Adviser.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 98.

⁴⁹ This is paraphrase of a title of George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft's book about those years. See: George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, *A World transformed*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1998.

⁵⁰ During first two and half years at this position was Robert Rubin.

⁵¹ See: Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*, p. 105.

⁵² See: Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy — Pattern and Process*, p. 340.

⁵³ Some "observers pointed out that the NSC staff had almost doubled in size since 1993 and that it had taken on to many assignments and responsibilities, from issues like international health to adding new offices for NSC speechwriting and communications." See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 102.

⁵⁴ David Rothkopf, *Running the World-The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 382.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 382.

⁵⁶ See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 106.

⁵⁷ With the Reorganization Bill of 1949, Vice-President was added to the statutory membership of Council, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was added as an advisor. Also, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President.

⁵⁸ "The report of the 9/11 Commission in July 2004 proposed sweeping change in the Intelligence Community including the creation of a National Intelligence Director (NID). Very soon after the best-selling report was released, the federal government moved forward to undertake reform. President Bush signed four Executive Orders in August 2004, which strengthened and reformed the Intelligence Community as much as possible without legislation. In Congress, both the House and Senate passed bills with major amendments to the National Security Act of 1947. Intense negotiations to reconcile the two bills ultimately led to the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, which President Bush signed into law on December 8. In February 2005, the President announced that John D. Negroponte, ambassador to Iraq, was his nominee to be the first Director of National Intelligence and Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, USAF, as the first Principal Deputy DNI, which earned him his fourth star. On April 21, 2005, in the Oval Office, Amb. Negroponte and Gen. Hayden were sworn in, and the ODNI began operations at 7:00 AM on April 22." See for more: "History of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence", Internet 04/25/07 <http://www.dni.gov/aboutODNI/history.htm>

⁵⁹ "The Tower Commission" was set up in 1987 to investigate the Iran-Contra affair as well as the activities and structure of the National Security Council. It consisted of Senator John Tower (thus the name), Senator (and former Secretary of State in Carter's administration) Edmund S. Muskie and Lt. General Brent Scowcroft. See: *Report of the President's Special Review Board*, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1987.

⁶⁰ "This was the first time in the NSC's history that an incoming administration adopted the main organizational features of its predecessor." See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 100.

⁶¹ See: "George W. Bush, National Security Directive 1", February 13, 2001, in: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, pp. 124-129.

⁶² Too big influence of the Vice-President and his National Security Advisor is very much present nowadays, in the George W. Bush's administration. Comparing it with the influence and power of the preceding Vice-presidents of the US, some call it the "Imperial Vice-presidency", paraphrasing the title of the Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency*, Houghton Mifflin Co, Boston, 1973; For imperial vice presidency thesis see: Jonathan Alter, *The Imperial (Vice) Presidency*, Internet, 03/26/06 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11434566/site/newsweek/>; The influence is very evident in issues of national security. As we have seen from the structure, George W. Bush's NSC Principal Committee, Vice President and his national security team are very active in his sessions. As Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsey written "while Powell was on the defensive at the start of the Bush administration, Cheney aggressively staked out a major role in national security policy. He created his own mini-NSC staff, hiring a dozen national security specialists of unusually high caliber. Al Gore's staff was half the size and made up almost entirely of mid-career officers. This larger staff of professionals enabled OVP, as the Office of the Vice President is known inside the bureaucracy, to operate essentially as an independent agency." See: Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound — The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D. C., 2003, p. 59.

⁶³ See: *The National Security Presidential Directive 1*, White House, Washington, D. C., February 13, 2001, Internet 10/06/06 <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm>

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Regional NSC / pcc are: Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa; functional nsc / pcc are: (Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations; International Development and Humanitarian Assistance; Global Environment; International Finance; Transnational Economic Issues; Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness; Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning; Arms Control; Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Records Access and Information Security; The Trade Policy Review Group) Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ "The cumbersome formal title of "special assistant to the president for national security affairs" was shortened under President Nixon to "the assistant for national security affairs" or, in everyday parlance, "the national security advisor" — today's common usage." See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, pp. 132-133.

⁶⁸ Generally speaking "The National Security Council System consists of three key groups of people: the statutory principals (the president, the vice president, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense), the statutory advisers (the director of Central Intelligence and the chair of the Joint Chief of Staff), and the Council staff... The bridge that joins all three groups is the "special assistant to the president for national security affairs" See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 131.

⁶⁹ President "Kennedy moved his national security advisor, his deputy and the executive secretary of the NSC into small suite of offices on the ground floor of the West Wing of the White House adjacent to the Situation Room. Later Henry Kissinger would comment to me that in Washington, the most important thing was "proximity, proximity and proximity" — that the fact that his office (at the time moved upstairs into the fine, large corner office that has been occupied by national security advisors ever since) was just down the hall from the president, a few steps from the Oval Office, made all the difference in the world in terms of his relative influence compared with other cabinet secretaries. When Kissinger became secretary of state, one reason he kept the national security advisor's office and title was that he knew the power that comes from being easily and constantly accessible to the president." See: David Rothkopf, *Running the World-The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 91.

⁷⁰ The professional background of national security advisors is different. Among them, seven are "attorneys and businessmen (Lay, Cutler, Anderson, Jackson, Gray, Clark, Berger, and partially Hedley — remark by D. Z.); five military men (Rear Adm. Souers, Lieut. Gen. Scowcroft, Lieut. Col. Mcfarlane, Vice Adm. Poindexter, four — star General Colin L. Powell); six academics (Dean Bundy, professors Kissinger, Lake, Rostow and Brzezinski and Provost Rice); two men with longstanding government backgrounds (Gray

and Carlucci, and partially Hedley — remark by D. Z.); and a foreign policy consultant — entrepreneur (Allen).”, Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 173.

⁷¹ “By far the two group with the greatest representation in the ranks of national security advisors are academics (Bundy, Rostow, Kissinger, Brzezinski, Allen, Lake, and Rice) and military men (Souers, Cutler, Goodpaster, Scowcroft, McFarlane, Poindexter, and Powell). The system seems to work best when there is a balance among the NSC leadership (Scowcroft from the military, and Gates from the CIA, Berger from the political side and Donald Kerick from the military side, Kissinger from the foreign policy side and Scowcroft from the military side.) David Rothkopf, *Running the World — The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 90.

⁷² “The President determines how the NSC is used — or even whether it should be used. Each President from Truman to the present has shaped the NSC and used it according to his own perceptions of office and leadership style.” Same thing we may say for National Security Advisor. See: Sam C. Sarkesian, *U. S. National Security — policymakers, processes and politics*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Co., London, 1995, Second Edition, p. 103.

⁷³ See: *History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997*, Internet, 10/04/06 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html> see especially Appendix; For President Truman Executive Secretaries of the NSC see: *Papers of Harry S. Truman Staff member and Office files: National Security Council File*, Internet, 10/04/06 <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpape/nsc.htm>; Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, pp. 173-215.

⁷⁴ The Clinton NSC had this organization: National Security Advisor, Deputy of the National Security Advisor, Executive secretary, Legal Advisor, Legislative Affairs, Public Affairs, Speechwriting, Communications, Asia, Africa, Europe, South-eastern Europe, Russia/Ukraine, Inter-American, Near East and South Asia, Defense policy / arms control, Nonproliferation / exports controls, Multilateral and Humanitarian, International Economics, Intelligence, Environment, Transnational Threats, International Health. *Ibid*, p. 103. On the beginning of her tenure as a NSA, Condoleezza Rice, “had cut the NSC staff by a third

and reorganized it to emphasize the administration's priorities, including national missile defense and international economics. Offices handling international environmental and health issues were eliminated, as were those responsible for communications and legislative affairs (these functions were returned to the main White House staff) Ibid, p.104.

⁷⁵ For example "the White House... decided to establish two new NSC offices in response to 9/11, one focused on counter-terrorism and the other on cyberspace security." Ibid, p. 105.

⁷⁶ See: David Rothkopf, *Running the World — The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 7.

⁷⁷ "Champion" in writing national security memoranda was Henri Kissinger NSC staff. "Indeed, even today, senior policymakers look back on the Kissinger era as a halcyon time for planning ahead and participating change... In today's world in which virtually everything is reactive to the relentless demands of the twenty — four — hour news cycle, it looks particularly appealing. "In many situations which developed", said Kissinger, "we weren't surprised. We were prepared and had thought our options in advance." Ibid, p. 118.

⁷⁸ *Article II Executive branch, Section 2 Powers of the President* "The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; **he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices,** and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. (bolded by D. Z.).

He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments." See: *United States*

Constitution, Cornell Law School, Internet 06/07/06 <http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.articleii.html#section2>

⁷⁹ “There is a consensus among international relations experts that “national security is at the core of the national interest.” The national security can be defined in many ways. It includes the survival of a state, the preservation of its territorial integrity, its independence, and its population, but also, so to say, immaterial elements such as the quality of life, in the sense of providing a dignified life to its citizens. It also has to be pointed out that the content of the term — national security — is variable. Sometimes it could be reduced to the mere survival and protection of the bare existence and lives of the people in one country, or idea of state as such and some symbol of that state (it was the case after 9/11 terrorist attacks), but sometimes it may expand to other areas such as economic prosperity, the protection of environment, (during Clinton administration) and so on... Hence, the circumstances are playing an important role in defining the content of national security.

⁸⁰ By the words of President Kennedy, “domestic policy... can only defeat us... foreign policy can kill us.” See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 217. For very good description of indispensable relations between active world-wide foreign policy and domestic prosperity and security see: Walter Russel Mead, *Special Providence- American Foreign Policy and how it changed the World*, A Century Foundation Book, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2001.

⁸¹ During Cuban Missile crisis, President Kennedy “established a special group to deal with it: an Executive Committee, or “ExComm” of the National Security Council” See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 64.

⁸² Almost every Tuesday, President Johnson gathered people whom he wanted to hear about questions related to national security issues. “The lunches — private, small, attended only by those Johnson really wanted to work with — in effect largely supplanted the NSC process although, of course, it continued to operate and support the president and play its formal role”. See: David Rothkopf, *Running the World — The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 100.

⁸³ "Carter's team met informally more often than formally. Friday morning breakfast meetings were attended by Carter, Mondale (the Vice-president — remark by D. Z.), Vance (Secretary of State — remark by D. Z.), Brown (Secretary of Defense), and later Jordan (Carter's Chief of Staff — remark by D. Z) and occasionally others. As in past administrations it was in meetings like these that much of the real work — once imagined for formal NSC meetings, which were infrequent and usually done for history's sake, for major decisions — was done". Ibid, pp. 171-172.

⁸⁴ See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 217.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 105.

⁸⁶ "The last thing George Bush did before making the final decision on march 19, 2003, to try to assassinate Saddam Hussein by bombing Dora Farm was to meet privately with Cheney. At approximately 7:00 p.m. that evening, Bush asked everyone in the Oval Office at the time — including Powell, Card, advisor Karen Hughes, and a CIA official — to leave so he could speak with the vice president. He then issued the order at 7:12 p.m." See: Bob Woodward, *Plan of attack*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2004, quoted in: David Rothkopf, *Running the World — The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 425.

⁸⁷ Having in mind this bolded part of the US Constitution that we gave above, former advisor and speechwriter to President Kennedy, Theodore Sorensen gave us an answer why we may have such a situation in White House decision making. He wrote that this part of Constitution "does not prevent him from requiring their opinion orally, as the present incumbent frequently prefers in the early stages of decision. It does not prevent him from obtaining a cabinet member's opinion on subjects not relating to his respective office — if a Secretary of Defense has a business background, for example, that would be helpful in a dispute with the steel industry — or if Secretary of the Treasury has experience in foreign affairs. Nor is the President prevented from seeking the opinions of those who are *not* principal officers of the Executive department." See: Theodore C. Sorensen, *Decision-making in the White House — the olive branch or the arrows*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2005, pp. 57-58. Or as Henry Kissinger said it, in his "White House years", "for reasons that must be left to students of psychology, every President since Kennedy seems to

have trusted his White House aides more than his cabinet." See: Henri, A. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1979, quoted in: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds., *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. 283.

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 283.

⁸⁹ We also can say the same for relations between President Carter, his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance.

⁹⁰ The best example is definitely the one of President George H. W. Bush, his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft and his first secretary of state, James Addison Baker III.

⁹¹ See: Zbigniew Brzezinski, interview with the author, 21 may 2004, in: David Rothkopf, *Running the World-The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 172.

⁹² David Rothkopf calls this factor "personality and the 'sociology' of an administration". By this he means all what "begins with and emanates with president' and all what "is strongly influenced by the community of decision makers with which he surrounds himself, notably the "inner circle", those closest to him". Ibid, p. 15.

⁹³ Iran Contra scandal "included an attempted strategic opening to Iran, the sale of arms to Iran via Israel and by the United States itself in an effort to secure the release the of hostages held in Lebanon, and, ultimately, the diversion of profits from the arms sales to the contras fighting the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. All of that happened despite "that secretary of State Schultz and secretary of Defense Weinberger vigorously opposed to transfer of arms to Iran" and "that the arms-for hostages swap were approved by the president without their knowledge." Also, national Security advisor, Rear admiral John Poindexter, "authorized the transfer of arm profits to the contras without president's knowledge." This lead to rear Adm. Poindexter retirement and to the biggest crisis of NSC system in NSC history. See: Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy — Pattern and Process*, p. 337.

⁹⁴ See: Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, Eds. *Fateful Decisions — Inside the National Security Council*, p. XV.

⁹⁵ Ibid. p. XV.

⁹⁶ Ibid. p. XV.

⁹⁷ National Security decision Directive.

⁹⁸ After rear Adm. John Poindexter was forced to retire, Frank Carlucci become President Reagan fifth National Security Advisor.

⁹⁹ George P. Schultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as secretary of State*, Scribner, New York, 1993, p. 903. Quoted in: David Rothkopf, *Running the World-The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, p. 254.

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NOTES

MY USA

Views on American National Security and Foreign Policy


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This volume proudly offers a widely diverse range of views - from Western and Eastern Europe, North and South America, and South Asia - on contemporary US foreign policy and its impact on individual nations and regions and on world affairs. (...) For some contributors, the United States is a constructive, essential force for world peace and prosperity, for others the United States is destabilizing and US policy is badly in need of revision.

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